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Abstract 
The primary aim of this thesis is to assess vertical integration in the UK aerospace 
industry with a transaction cost approach. There is an extensive theoretical and 
conceptual literature on transaction costs, but a relative lack of empirical work. This 
thesis applies transaction cost economics to the UK aerospace industry focusing on the 
paradigm problem of the make-or-buy decision and related contract design. It assesses 
whether the transaction cost approach is supported (or rejected) by evidence from an 
original survey of the UK aerospace industry. 
The central hypothesis is that UK aerospace firms are likely to make components in- 
house due to higher levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, frequency and 
small numbers, which is reflected in contract design. The thesis makes these concepts 
operational. The empirical methodology of the thesis is based on questionnaire survey 
data and econometric tests using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logit regressions 
to analyse the make-or-buy decision and the choice of contract type. 
The results from this thesis find limited evidence in support of the transaction cost 
approach applied to the UK aerospace industry, in spite of a bespoke dataset. The 
empirical tests of vertical integration for both make-or-buy and contract type as the 
dependent variable yield insufficient evidence to conclude that the transaction cost 
approach is an appropriate framework for analysing the UK aerospace industry as 
applied in this thesis. 
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Preface 
The UK aerospace industry has a long and varied history dating back to the 
antecedents of powered flight. Over a hundred year period there have been many 
technical successes, as well as much controversy about excessive costs and delays in 
delivery (e. g. TSR-2; Typhoon; Concorde). The aerospace industry is permeated with 
uncertainty, which is reflected in the nature of aerospace firms. This thesis assesses the 
economics of the UK aerospace industry from a transaction cost approach using 
vertical integration as a basis for analysis. 
The complex nature of aircraft development and production creates uncertainty due in 
part to technological change. The core proposition in this thesis is that the issue of 
complexity and uncertainty can be assessed through the transaction cost approach. 
Namely, it is predicted that asset specificity, frequency, uncertainty, complexity and 
small numbers exchange combine to cause the inherent problems in the UK aerospace 
industry. On this basis, the key characteristics of aerospace production appear most 
appropriate for a transaction cost analysis, in terms of the make-or-buy decision and 
the choice of contract type. Alternative hypotheses are presented including monopoly 
power arguments, a principal-agent approach and game theory. The transaction cost 
approach certainly can be viewed as complementary with the concept of principal- 
agent, but monopoly power arguments do not fully capture the complexity of 
aerospace industry relationships and game theory is too general to assess the research 
problem. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the UK aerospace industry as a basis for 
testing empirically the relevance of transaction cost economics. This is achieved using 
an original database from a questionnaire survey of the UK aerospace industry. Ile 
thesis comprises three parts. Part I presents an overview of the UK aerospace industry 
and a survey of the transaction cost literature, with particular attention to the empirical 
studies since 1975. Part 11 describes the methodology of the research and empirically 
tests the transaction cost models, with specific analysis on the paradigm issue of make- 
or-buy and contract type. Part III brings together the theoretical and empirical work 
to present a set of conclusions and final recommendations for further research. 
The thesis has generated two pieces of published work by the author. Firstly, the 
analysis of the UK aerospace industry in Chapter Two has been published as a Chapter 
viii 
in the book Arms Trade, Security and Conflict (2003) edited by Paul Levine and Ron 
Smith. The Chapter is titled "The supply-side implications of the arms trade: UK 
aerospace industry, economic, ad ustment and the end of the Cold War" and it assesses 
the uncertainty in the UK aerospace industry over the decade of the 1990s. Secondly, 
the analysis of the aerospace firm in Chapter Eight has been published as a paper in 
Defence and Peace Economics, Volume 15, Number 6 (2004) edited by Guest Editor 
Dr. Derek Braddon. The paper is titled "The future of the defence firm: the case of the 
UK aerospace industry" and it draws upon analysis in this thesis to predict future 
developments in defence aerospace. Finally, the empirical work contained in this thesis 
is cited in a Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Research Monograph: "UK 
Aerospace Competitiveness: Literature and Research RevievP published in August 
2001 and edited by Paul Dowdall, Derek Braddon and Keith Hartley. 
Overall, the major thrust of this thesis is a questionnaire and econometric analysis of 
the UK aerospace industry as explained by the transaction cost approach. There are 
empirical tests of make-or-buy and contract type using data from an original survey 
and a unique attempt to make operational the transaction cost approach applied for the 
first time to the aerospace industry in the UIC 
At the start of the thesis the words of Alan Mulally, Chief Executive of Boeing 
Commercial Aircraft are relevant: 
"It's all about range. It's all about speed. It's all about economics. " 
Alan Mulafly (2002). Lecture on the future of flight, Derby, 14 May 2002. 
This quote confirms the importance of an economic analysis of the aerospace industry. 
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Part I 
Theory and Overview 
Chapter One: 
Introduction 
"Firms, markets, and relational contracting are important economic 
institutions. " 
Williamson (1985: 15). 
Introduction 
This introductory Chapter outlines the central hypothesis of the thesis and its 
methodology. It explains why UK aerospace is an appropriate industry for this 
research and presents a plan of the thesis. The analysis is empirical and derives from 
a problem-based approach. The focus on the UK aerospace industry is from a 
transaction cost perspective. 
The research problem centres on vertical integration in the UK aerospace industry. 
This is a study of the boundaries between the firm and the market and how companies 
with complex contracts are structured. The make-or-buy decision and contract design 
are considered essential aspects of the research that seeks to understand the economic 
and contractual relationships between firms in the manufacturing supply chain. The 
transaction cost approach is relevant because it focuses on the organisation of firms 
and relational contracting at the level of the transaction rather than the market. 
The central hypothesis tested is that UK aerospace firms are likely to make rather than 
buy due to higher levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, frequency and 
small numbers. A questionnaire approach is used to gather all the relevant 
information, because very little published data exists in this area. The original 
contribution of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, it applies the theoretical models of 
transaction costs to bespoke UK aerospace data for the first time. Secondly, it uses 
the original database to assess make-or-buy decisions within the aerospace industry. 
Thirdly, it utilises the original database to understand the design of contracts within 
aerospace companies. Overall, the thesis contributes to the knowledge of transaction 
cost economics by assessing the structure of firms in a single industry. It collects 
unique evidence from an original questionnaire survey using appropriate econometric 
techniques and critically analyses the operational aspects of transaction cost theory. 
The next section presents the research problem and the research questions. 
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The research problem and the research questions 
The research problem to be explored in this thesis is the determinants of vertical 
integration in UK aerospace firms (Jackson, 2003: 79)1. Vertical integration can be 
defined as the extent to which a firm will produce in-house (or make) and procure 
from the market (or buy). The make-or-buy decision and business-to-business 
contracts are central to this thesis within the context of company structures 
(Williamson, 1985: 32). A major feature of the research is the economic, contractual 
and organisational aspects of manufacturing and how production and purchasing is 
managed within aerospace firms. This approach relates the boundaries of the firm to 
the make-or-buy' strategy of procurement and the related hold-up problem of 
contracts. In the New Economics of Industrial Organisation literature the 
methodology is part of the transaction cost approach, which is developed in Chapter 
Three. Also, the thesis makes a critical assessment of the current transaction cost 
literature when applying the theory to the UK aerospace industry in Chapter Four. 
There are two research questions considered by this thesis. Firstly, what determines 
the make-or-buy decision within an aerospace firm? Secondly, what potential hold-up 
problem exists between aerospace firms in the supply chain from the perspective of 
contract design? In order to answer these research questions there are empirical tests 
of vertical integration using make-or-buy and contract type as the dependent variable 
with the data collected by an original questionnaire survey. Prima facie the UK 
aerospace industry is appropriately modelled by the transaction costs approach, 
because asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity are evident in aerospace 
production and long term procurement. However, the aerospace industry is not 
unique, but it does correspond strongly to the approximate characteristics of 
transaction costs, especially in terms of the make-or-buy decision. On this basis, the 
UK aerospace industry is expected to provide an appropriate industry for the 
application and testing of transaction cost economics. 
The thesis develops the concept of vertical integration in the UK aerospace industry, 
because the industry is characterised by complex contractual relationships between 
original equipment manufactures, the supply chain and the customer base. Aerospace 
1 Many of the issues in modem aerospace firms are generic industrial problems, which are also relevant 
to other major areas of manufacturing, such as shipbuilding, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and 
motor car manufacturing as well as service provision. 
2 The nature of makc-or-buy decisions will be defined in Chapter Three. 
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is worthy of attention because issues of vertical integration are crucial for the future 
delivery of high cost and high risk aerospace projects and the continued profitability 
of aerospace companies in the long run (Jackson, 2004: 520). Furthermore, make-or- 
buy decisions and contract design aspects of the transaction cost approach are 
relevant, because the industry is typified by asset specific investment, technological 
intensity of design and development plus market uncertainty, where governments act 
as customer, sponsor and regulator (DTI-ITG, 2004: 27). In particular, outsourcing 
and long term contracts between firms within supply chain relationships are relevant 
to the performance of the current UK aerospace industry with the make-or-buy 
decision reflecting efforts to economise on transaction costs. 
The transaction cost approach is potentially suited to assess the economic organisation 
and contractual features of vertical integration, because it focuses on the firm acting to 
minimise transaction costs as an efficient means of safeguarding specific investments 
compared with the monopoly power approach, which focuses on the firm generating 
monopoly rent by the control of inputs from factor markets and distribution (Klein, 
2004: 1). However, the results of this research find little, if any, support for the 
transaction cost approach as applied in this thesis. The negative conclusion arises in 
spite of a positive predisposition towards the theoretical framework of transactions 
costs as an explanation for vertical integration. The next section presents the plan of 
the thesis. 
Plan of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into three areas. Part One assesses the UK aerospace industry 
and the transaction costs approach. Part Two analyses the research questions based 
on make-or-buy and contract design, plus the empirical analysis of aerospace firms 
and the related supply chain. Part Three presents the conclusions and directions for 
further research. 
Part One applies the transaction cost approach to the modern aerospace industry in the 
UK. In particular, Chapter Two assesses the main features of the UK aerospace 
industry and suppliers from 1992 to 1997, which is the period covered by the survey. 
Chapter Three provides a literature survey of the current state of the transaction cost 
theory. It shows how the research problem can be modelled. Chapter Four focuses 
on the theory of transaction costs developed by Williamson (1975,1985). It shows 
how the transaction cost economics study of UK aerospace can be made operational. 
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Part Two addresses the methodological issues which reflect the lack of published 
data. Chapter Five introduces the questionnaire survey of UK aerospace suppliers and 
the methodology of the approach. Chapter Six uses the original data from the 
questionnaire to construct company profiles. Chapter Seven assesses the transaction 
cost model in terms of make-or-buy and contract type as the dependent variable. 
Chapter Eight considers the transaction cost predictions using quantitative data on 
make-or-buy in the supply chain. Chapter Nine assesses the transaction cost approach 
in terms of contract design based on the hostage model (Williamson, 1983: 520). In 
summary, the research questions central to the thesis are addressed in Chapters Six 
and Seven on vertical integration; Chapter Eight on the make-or-buy decision and 
finally Chapter Nine on contract design (Williamson, 1985: 18-21). 
Part Three presents the thesis conclusions and the implications for aerospace 
companies. In particular, Chapter Ten provides answers to the research questions and 
evaluates the operational aspects of the transaction cost model. Also, the need for 
further research is highlighted. The next Chapter presents a detailed analysis of the 
UK aerospace Industry (UKAI). 
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Chapter Two: 
The UK Aerospace Industry 
"UK aerospace is an increasingly sophisticated and technologically advanced 
sector. The aerospace industry is global, fast changing with market 
opportunities opening across the developing world. Suppliers face intense 
global competition with pressures to reduce costs, improve quality and meet 
demanding delivery milestones. " 
SBAC (2005: 5). 
Introduction 
This Chapter has three sections. Firstly, there is an introduction to the competing 
definitions of aerospace. Secondly, there is a presentation of the structure-conduct- 
performance (S-C-P) analysis of the UK aerospace industry (UKAI) and its supply 
chain. Finally, there is an assessment of the key features of vertical integration, where 
the S-C-P approach is used as a starting point for the analysis of markets and 
hierarchies (Williamson, 1975: 8). The theme of this thesis is that the make-or-buy 
decision and contract design within transaction cost economics provide a more detailed 
understanding of the firm than the S-C-P approach. The next section provides 
definitions of the UK aerospace industry. 
Defining the UK aerospace industry 
A working definition of actual aerospace production as a whole rcfers to thosefirms 
involved in design, development, production, repair and support services of aircraft 
and helicopters for military and civil markets, together with missiles and space 
systems and related equipment, parts and components. There are other ways by which 
to define and categorise the business activity of aerospace and related production. 
These alternatives are covered in this section. However, the guiding definition of the 
aerospace industry for this thesis is the one given above. 
The UK aerospace industry is a composite of over 3,000 firms, which manufacture 
aircraft and missiles; plus sub-assemblies, components and provides services to the 
various UK aerospace programmes (DTI-IGT, 2003: 10). The output of the UK 
aerospace industry encompasses the production of the Eurofighter Typhoon combat 
aircraft, the BAE Systems Hawk trainer and Augusta-Westland EHIOI helicopter as 
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well as the Storin Shadow cruise ýnissiles first used in the Iraq War in 2003; plus the 
wings for all the Airbus airliner programmes, including the A380 launched in 2005 and 
Rolls-Royce Trent aero-engines. In addition, LJK firms are world leaders in ejector 
seats, head-up displays for pilots and in-flight refuelling systems (DTI-IGT, 2003: 5). 
In 2003, the aerospace industry in the UK employed 121,979 people' with an annual 
turnover of; E17.08 billion. These figures include foreign-owned companies operating 
in the UK, but exclude UK-owned companies which operate overseas (SBAC, 2004: 
6). The global distribution of employment and turnover for the UK aerospace industry 
in the UK, the US and the rest of the world (RoW) is shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Global turnover and employment in the UKAI, 2003 
Geographical 
Local 
Turnover 
(i millions) 
Turnover 
(%) 
Employment 
(Number) 
Employment 
(%) 
UKAI in UK 17,080 76.3 121,979 75.5 
UKAI in USA 4,090 18.3 30,249 18.7 
UKAI in RoW 1,270 5.4 9,278 5.8 
ýG-Iobal 
UKAI 22,390 I 100.0 I 161,506 I 100.0 
- bource: btmu kzuu, 4: o). 
Table 2.1 shows that approximately three quarters of turnover and employment is 
generated by companies based in the UK (both UK and foreign-owned) and one 
quarter of global UKAI turnover and employment is generated by UK-owned 
subsidiaries in other countries, of which 75% is located in the strategic aerospace 
market of the USA (SBAC, 2004: 7). Some 95% of all UKAI activity is either in the 
UK or the US. The definition of what constitutes the UK aerospace industry is 
complicated by the global nature of the industry. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the UK aerospace industry will refer to production in UK territories whether 
UK-owned or not; and the production from UK-owned overseas subsidiaries is 
deemed to be outside the definition of UKAI. This definition is the one used by the 
Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC) when compiling its membership list 
used in the primary research in this thesis and is assessed in the next part of the section. 
1 2003 is the latest available data. SBAC is currently collecting questionnaire returns from its 
membership for data relating to the 2004 calendar year. 
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(a) The SBAC definition of aerospace 
The SBAC definition differentiates between three product-related segments namely, 
aircraft, missiles and space with 95% of business activity in the first category. SBAC 
also identifies three industry-related sectors namely, aircraft and systems, engines and 
equipment. In theory, this generates a three-by-three matrix of aerospace activity as 
shown is Table 2.2, where the V7.08 billion UKAI turnover in 2003, comprises 
approximately 48% airframes, 22% engines and 30% equipment (SBAC, 2005). 
Table 2.2: UK aerospace industry sector-segment mix 
Product Aircraft and Aircraft Aircraft Total 
Sector Systems Engines Equipment 
Aircraft a b C (a +b+ c) = 
95% 
Missiles d e f (d +e+ f) = 
2.5% 
Space 9 h i (g +h+ i) = 
2.5% 
(a +d+ g) (b +e+ h) (C +f+ i) Grand Total 
48% 22% 30% (100%) 
Source: SBAC (2005: 30) with additions ftom the author. 
The SBAC approach defines airframe production as the manufacture of the main 
exterior of the aircraft, including the fuselage, wings, nacelles and the tail. Aircraft 
engine production is the manufacture of the power-source of the aircraft to provide 
thrust on take-off, sustained flight and landing. Aircraft equipment production is the 
manufacture of all the other aspect of powered flight, including the avionics, 
electronics, electrical systems and mechanical controls for the cockpit interior, ancillary 
equipment for aircrew and aircraft maintenance apparatus. 
The overall output of privately-owned aerospace firms is complex and is generally co- 
ordinated within the aerospace supply chain to achieve an efficient outcome. Indeed, 
the importance of aerospace supply chain logistics and efficiency is emphasised by 
Hartley and Braddon in a study of aerospace competitiveness (Hartley and Braddon, 
2002: 2). The benefit of the SBAC definition is that is includes the multi-faceted 
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nature of UKAI, because SBAC collects data on the basis of a survey of its 
membership. In addition, there is consideration of the development of highly 
specialised equipment and machine tools used in the actual manufacture of the 
aerospace components, for example, jigs, tools and dyes, which are a vital and 
necessary part of the UK aerospace industry. These are covered by the SBAC 
definition of the UKAI. 
(b) The SIC (92) definition of aerospace 
A definition for aerospace production can also be generated using the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 1992, where the aerospace industry is mainly 
located in SIC (92) 3530, the manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft. Table 2.3 shows 
the position of aerospace production in the SIC (92) codes in comparison to other 
transport production such as shipbuilding and railway manufacturing. 
Table 2.3: SIC (92) codes of grouping 350 
SIC (92) code Description of activity 
351 Building and repair of ships and boats 
352 Manufacture of railway, tramway locomotives and rolling stock 
353 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 
354 Manufacture of motorcycles 
355 Manufacture of other transport not elsewhere specified 
Source: Standard Industrial Classification, LJK National Statistics (NS) 2005. 
However, a significant proportion of aerospace activity is not located in the 35 two 
digit code. As a consequence, representation of the aerospace industry by the SIC 
codes tends to be incomplete, because some of the major suppliers are located outside 
the SIC definition of 3530. For example, Rolls-Royce have a primary SIC (92) code of 
2911, (manufacturer of engines and turbines except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines), 
whilst other military aerospace suppliers have the SIC (92) code of 2960, (manufacture 
of weapons and ammunition) and civilian aerospace suppliers have the SIC (92) code 
of 3162, (manufacture of other electrical equipment). Furthermore, many aspects of 
aerospace production are located in four digit code 3320 (electronic air navigational 
instruments and systems, guided weapon launching and automatic pilots) and 3330 
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(manufacture of industrial process control equipment) and not 3530. Hence, there is a 
problem of consistency with the SIC (92) approach when defining the UKAL 
In the MM19 Aerospace and Electronics Cost Indices published by the LJK National 
Statistical Office the two SIC (92) codes used for aerospace are: 
1.3530: The manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft. 
2.2960: The manufacture of weapons and ammunition. 
The Annual Business Inquiry (ABI), which is also part of the data of UK National 
Statistics Office generates UK data using the SIC (92) coding by sampling businesses 
by employment size and industry sector. Table 2.4 shows the total turnover, the total 
employment and the number of enterprises specified by both the 3530 and 2960 from 
the ABI database. Table 2.4 presents ABI data showing that the weapons and 
ammunition sector is about 10% of the size of the aircraft and spacecraft sector of 
UKAI in terms of total turnover ýmd employment. 
The main difference between the SBAC data and the ABI data is the method of 
information collection. SBAC, as a trade association, collects data through a survey of 
its membership on an annual basis using the definitions from the matrix in Table 2.2. 
ABI, as a government agency, collect data through a sampling process of industrial 
activity based on the definitions of the SIC (92) coding. In particular, electronic and 
mechanical equipment used in UKAI is coded as 3310 and 3320, but not as 3530 under 
the SIC (92) codes. However, these areas are covered in the SBAC definitions. 
Whilst it has been proposed that air navigation instruments and systems plus automatic 
pilots and guided weapons gear be relocated from 3330 to 3530 in order to standardise 
the definitions of the UKIA it is not proposed to move any parts of 3310 or 3320 
(www. statistics. gov. uk). Moreover, a similar suggestion is to relocate satellite 
production from 3530 to 3220 (manufacture of radio and television transmitters and 
apparatus for line telegraphy) and if implemented would mean an estimated 4% or 10.6 
billion of UK aerospace turnover would be removed from the UKAT. Indeed, 30% of 
the UKAI (as defined by SBAC) could be relocated to other non-aerospace areas, if 
proposed convergence code changes are implemented by the LJK National Statistical 
Office in 2007. Overall, the ABI-proposed redefining of aerospace categories in the 
UK is incomplete and does not fully identify the boundaries of aerospace production in 
the UY, in spite of SBAC sponsoring some of the data collection for ABI. 
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Table 2.4: Annual Business Inquiry analysis of UKAI by SIC (92) codes 
SIC (92) 
Code 
Calendar 
Year 
Total 
Turnover 
(L million) 
Number of 
Enterprises 
(Number) 
Average Total 
Employment 
(Number) 
2960 1995 1,711 181 n/a 
Weapons & 1996 1,671 145 n/a 
Ammunition 1997 1,974 164 n/a 
1998 1,886 159 17,000 
1999 1,850 163 17,000 
2000 1,693 160 15,000 
2001 1,627 159 15,000 
2002 1,638 147 14,000 
2003 1,928 149 14,000 
3530 1995 9,639 1,212 n/a 
Aircraft & 1996 11,697 766 n/a 
Spacecraft 1997 17,721 971 n/a 
1998 17,601 875 114,000 
1999 17,623 800 116,000 
2000 17,050 811 119,000 
2001 17,387 769 115,000 
2002 15,091 716 106,000 
2003 15,354 664 101,000 
Source: Annual Business Inquiry (ABI: 2005): www. statistics. gov. uk 
Overall, the difference between the SBAC and the ABI approach to methodology is 
apparent in the data collected, which is presented in Table 2.5. In particular, the ABI 
turnover data tends to be greater than SBAC although the two sets of data are close to 
converging in 2003. The SBAC employment data tend to be greater than ABI except 
in 2002. This is an unsatisfactory situation as it indicates inconsistency in the 
collection of the data. ABI and SBAC are working together in the future, in spite of 
the different methods of data collection between the two organisations, which may 
result in a structural break in the data as the two methods are harmonised. 
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Table 2.5: Comparisons between ABI and SBAC 
Year 
Combined 
ABI 
Turnover 
(L million) 
Combined 
ABI 
Employees 
(Number) 
SBAC 
Turnover 
(L million) 
SBAC 
Employees 
(Number) 
ABI / 
SBAC 
Turnover 
(%) 
ABI / 
SBAC 
Employees 
(%) 
1998 19,487 131,000 17,000 155,000 114.6 84.5 
1999 19,473 133,000 17,600 154,000 110.6 86.4 
2000 18,743 134,000 18,200 150,000 103.0 89.3 
2001 19,014 130,000 18,420 147,000 103.2 88.4 
2002 16,729 120,000 16,120 117,000 103.8 102.6 
2003 17,282 115,000 17,100 122,000 101.1 94.4 
Source: ABI (www. statistics. gov. uk) and SBAC (www. sbac. co. uk) 
Table 2.5 confirms that the definitions of aerospace are complicated and using cross- 
referenced data can compound the issue. The problem of defining the UKAI is 
because many different engineering disciplines are applied to a specific mode of output. 
It is worth identifying the engineering aspects of aircraft, spacecraft and n-ýissile 
production in order to fully review the definitions of aerospace. 
(c) Engineering output definitions of aerospace 
There are alternative definitions of aerospace that involve assessing the engineering 
aspects of aircraft and spacecraft, which cover the physical characteristics of the 
output. The physical characteristics include: 
1. Fixed-wing aircraft, such as combat jets. 
2. Rotary-wing aircraft, such as helicopters. 
3. Specialist aircraft types, such as micro-lights. 
4. Other products, such as missiles and satellites. 
The majority of aircraft produced are fixed wing, but there are a significant number of 
rotary-wing aircraft for military uses and a variety of leisure and commercial purposes. 
In terms of technology definitions, the Civil Aircraft Research and Technology 
Demonstration (CARAD) divide aerospace equipment into four key areas. This also 
gives a concise insight into a technological definition of the industry. The four main 
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areas show the complexity of aircraft production and the level of advanced integration 
between airframe, engine and equipment. These categories are: 
1. Aerodynamics. 
2. Propulsion systems. 
3. Materials and structures. 
4. Advanced systems. 
Aerodynamics is defined as the physical processes which underpin aircraft design and 
govern the performance of flight. Essentially, this is the design of the central fuselage 
and wings of the aircraft. Companies in this part of the aerospace industry are 
involved with the aircraft flight specifications and the aerodynamics of thrust and drag. 
Propulsion systems are defined as the engine of the aircraft, but would include work on 
the power-plant evolution and control, noise, compressors, turbines, and combustion. 
Companies in this part of the aerospace industry are involved with the engine 
performance, efficiency and reliability. Material and structures cover all generic 
aspects of the airframe structure and engine components. This would include the stress 
requirements, heat properties and durability of metals, fabrication and composite 
materials. Companies in this part of the aerospace industry are involved with physical 
properties of landing gear, wings, nacelles, propellers, aero-engines and others 
manufacturing. Advanced systems are defined as the electronic and electrical systems, 
power plant and flight deck systems of the aircraft. Companies in this part of the 
aerospace industry are engaged with advances in computer hardware and software of 
aircraft production and hence there are strong links with the electronics industry. 
There are aspects of overlap between these four areas that need co-ordination between 
suppliers, quite apart from the complexity of aircraft integration and assembly. 
The relevance of this definition is that it permits the full range of aerospace activity to 
be shown, since only a limited number of aerospace suppliers actually manufacture 
complete aircraft For example, BAE Systems produces combat aircraft such as the 
Eurofighter Typhoon in military markets; and produces the wings for Airbus airliners in 
civil markets, where BAE Systems owns Airbus (UK). The wider narrative of UKAI 
production is covered in the engineering output definitions even though they are not 
dissimilar to the SBAC or ABI definitions above. Given that manufacturing in 
aerospace is carried out by many firms, then it is worth assessing the definitions of 
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aerospace from the viewpoint of the supply chain, which is the collective term for all 
firms engaged in production. 
(d) Supply chain definitions of aerospace 
In terms of the supply chain, the definitions are shown in Table 2.6, which highlights 
the distribution of firms in the UK aerospace industry. Tier I contains the major prime 
contractors such as BAE Systems, which are also known as super-primes, because 
these firms integrate and assemble aircraft, satellites and missiles. Tier 2 contains an 
array of large and medium-sized suppliers such as Dowty Aerospace (flight control 
systems) and Martin Baker (ejection seats), which supply major equipment and main 
components. Tier 3 contains a wide range of firms including small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SNE), which supply minor components, parts and services to the other 
firms in the supply chain, in addition to larger firms who supply only a small proportion 
of their output to the aerospace industry such as British Steel. This situation further 
explains why the SIC (92) definitions of UKAI are inadequate, because the aerospace 
industry uses suppliers that are an integral part of the aerospace supply chain for 
bespoke components, as well as more generalist suppliers for generic components. 
These firms form part of the wider manufacturing base of UK industry as a whole, 
which are included in the SBAC definitions of the UKAT. 
Table 2.6: Key characteristics of the UK aerospace supply chain 
Tier Type of firm Product type Examples 
1 Large-sized and major Aircraft, engines and BAE Systems 
primes prime contractors missiles Rolls-Royce 
2 (i) Large-sized equipment Systems/sub-systems Dowty Aerospace 
large manufacturers and major equipment Smiths Industries 
2 (ii) Medium-sized equipment Structure elements Pilkington Aerospace 
medium manufacturers and main components Martin Baker 
3 Variously sized Materials, processes, Aerospace Metals 
various component manufacturers software and services Hi-Shear 
Source: Based on DTI-IGT (2003: 27). 
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The industry as a whole can be divided into two further categories of final end-use, 
namely, civilian aerospace and defence or military aerospace. The first category is the 
production of passenger, freight and general aircraft (fixed-wing and rotary-wing or 
helicopter) and satellite systems used for commercial activity and accounted for 51% 
of UK aerospace turnover in 2003 or 18.78 billion (SBAC, 2004). The second 
category is the production of aircraft, missiles and spacecraft for military purposes and 
accounted for 49% of UK aerospace turnover in 2003 or 18.30 billion. Across the 
European aerospace industry as a whole, civilian aerospace accounted for 
approximately 70% of turnover in 2003 and military aerospace (including missiles and 
space) only 30% (AECMA, 2003). This evidence shows the relatively heavy reliance 
in the UK on military markets due in part to the historical legacy of post-war European 
defence activity in which Britain has been si0ficantly involved as a former world 
power as well as the European focus on civil aircraft post-1945. 
At the next level military aircraft markets can be divided into fighter, attack, transport, 
support, and reconnaissance aircraft, reflecting the operational capability of aircraft. In 
addition there are multi-role aircraft such as Tornado now supplied by one firm. 
Likewise, civilian aircraft markets can be divided into passenger, freight, sport, 
regional and business aircraft, reflecting the function or role of the various aircraft and 
more general aviation, including light aircraft. The relatively straightforward 
bifurcation of the aerospace industry belies the fact that there can be much overlap 
between the sectors in terms of cross-over in research, design and production that has 
led to many spin-offs, for example, the application of the jet engine from defence to 
civilian aircraft. Nevertheless, the split between defence and civilian aerospace remains 
a useful way to distinguish the output of companies in the supply chain, in spite of the 
production of both categories by many firms2. 
In summary, the definitions for core activity in the aerospace industry are not always 
able to fully capture the complexity of the industry, even though it is possible to 
categorise output by key factors, such as aircraft part or type of market. The issue of 
defining the UKAI means that care should be taken when using cross-sourced data 
2 In the literature, defence and military are used interchangeably as terms of description and so is 
civilian and commercial. The terms defence and military closely match one another, civilian and 
commercial do not since defence aircraft can be bought and sold via commercial means, for example. 
Hence in this thesis, only civilian will be used to describe non-military or non-defcnce aircraft. 
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comparisons. The working definition of aerospace which was stated at the start of this 
section is used throughout the remainder of thesis whilst acknowledging the diversity 
of the output from the industry, including the global nature of the markets as captured 
by the SBAC definition. The next section will analyse the aerospace industry by 
assessing the leading firms in aerospace markets through the Structure-Conduct- 
Performance (S-C-P) approach (Mason, 1939: 61). 
Structure-Conduct-Performance in the UK Aerospace Industry 
The S-C-P paradigm provides a fundamental framework for analysing an industry 
(Williamson, 1975: 90). The approach allows an appraisal of an industry in terms of 
the structural characteristics, for example, vertical integration, the number of sellers 
and entry barriers. Then the mode of conduct is assessed, for example, pricing policy 
and R&D input, followed by an analysis of the allocative performance, such as profit 
and price-marginal cost relationships. The simple relationship between structure, 
conduct and performance is shown in Table 2.7 and the line of causation runs from 
structure to conduct and then to performance as indicated by the arrows. However, 
reverse linkages are also possible where conduct can affect market structure and where 
performance can affect market conduct (Clarke, 1985: 3). 
The S-C-P approach is considered appropriate for any industry, because it generates a 
detailed description of the framework for analysing markets. It allows an analysis of 
the leading companies, which provides an assessment of market concentration and 
indicators of conduct and performance such as prices and profit, respectively. The S- 
C-P framework provides a starting point for analysing the UK aerospace industry 
before applying transaction costs (Williamson, 1975: 6-7). 
The S-C-P approach has provided a systematic approach since the original contribution 
to industrial economics by Bain (1956). In an investigation of vertical integration it is 
important to assess the underlying characteristics of the markets including the supply 
and demand conditions before addressing the make-or-buy decision. According to 
Clarke (1985: 3) the S-C-P paradigm begins with an understanding of the basic 
conditions of demand, including costs, scale economies and technology. In aerospace, 
such an assessment would focus on the key role of government procurement on the 
demand side (military and civil), the rising unit cost of aircraft (in real terms), learning 
16 
curve effects and the significant technical change over time that is R&D progress 
(Jackson, 2003: 78-79). 
Table 2.7: The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
in V STRUCTURE 
" Number of competing firms 
" Market concentration 
" Barriers to entry 
" Organisational form 
I 
CONDUCT 
" Pricing policy 
" Product differential 
" Research and development 
I 
PERFORMANCE 
" Industrial profitability 
" Productive efficiency 
" Employment 
-a Technical advance 
Sources: Clarke (1985: 3) and Douma and Schreuder (1998: 153). 
In general, the UK aerospace industry is currently experiencing a period of profound 
economic change, due to a combination of market and technological uncertainties in 
both defence and civilian markets (Hartley and Braddon, 2002: 1). The S-C-P 
approach can be used to assess the market conditions and the structural factors that 
determine conduct and in turn performance in advance of the more detailed analysis of 
vertical integration within a transaction cost framework. The next sections will assess 
the market structure, market conduct and market performance for the UKAI within the 
S-C-P paradigm. 
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Market Structure 
Table 2.7 shows there are four main aspects to market structure, which are the number 
of competing firms, market concentration, barriers to entry and organisational form 
(Le. horizontal and vertical integration). Each aspect will be covered separately. 
(i) Number of competing firms 
In terms of the number of firms in the aerospace industry, the key companies in the 
UKAI include BAE Systems plc (fixed wing aircraft); Augusta-Westland Limited (now 
owned by Finmeccanica, Italy: rotary wing aircraft); MBDA (internationally-owned: 
missile systems) and Rolls-Royce plc (aero-engines). The number of firms in an 
industry can be assessed with reference to the supply chainý which is simply defined as 
the business-to-business links between firms that often exists between various stages of 
the production process. It is usually specified in levels, with level one defined as final 
assembly, level two as major sub-components and level three as other parts and raw 
materials as identified in Table 2.6. 
Aerospace companies in the first tier of the supply chain can assemble or manufacture 
aircraft as a prime contractor (e. g. BAE Systems: Hawk) or as part of a consortium 
with leading companies from Europe (e. g. Eurofighter Typhoon) and North America 
(e. g. BAE Systems (formerly British Aerospace) and Boeing Harrier/AV-8)4. 
However, not since the Second World War has a single aircraft manufacturer been able 
to manufacture all the primary parts of an aircraft programme, which explains why the 
issue of vertical integration in the aerospace industry is importants. This is because the 
other aerospace firms in the supply chain offer economies from specialist knowledge, 
so that the make-or-buy decisions affect profitability. However, make-or-buy choices 
vary over time and can be different for every firm hence the issue of supplier-switching 
is relevant. Prime contractors have to decide whether to undertake work in-house or 
buy-in from suppliers. 
The companies in both segments of the second tier research, develop and manufacture 
the major sub-assemblies, substantial parts and sizeable apparatus of the aircraft, for 
3 The supply chain is an imperfect metaphor, but the convention is adopted here. 
4 The USA version of the Harrier is known as the AV-8 (where AV = Attack Vertical). 
'5 Similarly, neither a single designer nor one test pilot been solely associated with an aircraft project 
over this period either, which tended to happen in the pre-war period. 
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example, avionics equipment (GEC-Marconi Avionics Limited, now part of BAE 
Systems). The third tier of the supply chain manufactures smaller parts and 
components or supply raw material for the aerospace industry. This would include 
steel and titanium (Aerospace Metals Limited), aerospace paint and coatings (AD 
Aerospace Finishes Limited and Courtaulds Aerospace Europe), aerospace wiring 
harnesses (Kembrey Wiring Systems), cockpit windows (Pilkington Aerospace Ltd) 
and aerospace filters (Fairey Mircofiltex Limited). In general, the make-or-buy 
decision informs the extent of the supply chain through the propensity to out-source 
components and parts: this where transaction cost analysis is relevant. In sum, the 
number of firms in UKAI indicates a domestic oligopoly where there a few key 
suppliers. Some firms have a domestic monopoly such as BAE Systems and all firms 
face the potential threat of foreign competition. 
(ii) Market concentration 
In terms of market concentration, the top five firms by rank order in 1997 (the year of 
the thesis survey) were British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce and Dowty Aerospace, the 
aerospace division of Smiths Industries and Matra-Marconi Space (now MBDA). This 
information is shown in Table 2.8. BAE Systems (formerly British Aerospace p1c) is 
the largest single aerospace and defence-related company in the UK and has major 
defence programmes (e. g. Eurofighter Typhoon) and civilian contracts (e. g. Airbus 
wings) in its overall engineering portfolio. The next company is Rolls-Royce plc with 
a similar portfolio of projects for aero-engines. As a result the aerospace supply chain 
tends to be specified around the needs of the large prime contractors such as Airbus 
Industries (European civil aerospace), Boeing (North American civil aerospace) and 
Eurofighter (European military aerospace). By 2003, BAE Systems had a turnover of 
L8,387 million employing 68,700 people following a merger with GEC-Marconi and in 
the same year Rolls-Royce had a turnover of 15,645 million employing over 36,000 
people. Table 2.8 details the top fourteen leading UK aerospace companies in 
alphabetical order, where all these companies are represented in the thesis survey in 
1997. In the interim the top 14 companies have changed, in particular the creation of 
BAE Systems, but for the purposes of this thesis it is considered appropriate to use the 
original database from 1997 to generate the concentration ratios. 
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Table 2.8: The leading UK aerospace suppliers in 1997 
The name of UK 
Aerospace Company 
Turnover 
(i million) 
(a) 
Employees 
(number) 
(b) 
Aerospace 
Turnover % 
(c) 
Turnover 
(L million) 
(a x c) 
British Aerospace plc 7,267 43,400 95 6,904 
Cobham. plc 323 4,260 80 258 
Dowty Aerospace Ltd 661 614 100 661 
GEC-Marconi Avionics Ltd 283 3,656 95 269 
GKN Westland Limited 9 277 100 94 
Hunting plc 1,316 12,592 17 224 
European Gas Turbines Ltd 280 2,761 80 224 
Matra-Marconi Space Ltd 400 2,694 100 400 
Meggitt plc 265 3,767 90 239 
Penny & Giles plc 35 446 80 32 
Rolls-Royce plc 4,334 42,600 70 3,034 
Siemens Plessey Ltd 216 2,405 45 97 
Short Brothers Ltd 353 8,158 100 353 
Smiths Industries pic 1,076 13,582 40 431 
Total of top 14 sample 16,8 
. 
18 1 141,212 1 N/A 13,220 
Source: FAME (1998) database. 
From the data in Table 2.8, it is possible to calculate the concentration ratio for the UK 
aerospace industry in 1997, which is the year of the thesis survey. Column (a) is the 
turnover per company of the top aerospace companies and includes non-aerosPace 
business. Column (c) is the proportion of aerospace turnover expressed as percentage 
of the total turnover. Multiplying column (a) by column (c) provides the proportion of 
company turnover accounted for by aerospace business. SBAC have calculated that in 
1997, the LJK aerospace industry sales were 115,100 million. The top five firms 
account for 75.4 % of total industry sales and the top three firms account for 70.2%, 
which is typical of manufacturing industry in the UK (Hay and Morris, 1991: 533-534). 
In other words, apart ftom the top three firms the remaining companies in the supply 
chain account for only 29.8% of the value of the industry. Similarly, the share of the 
industry for BAE Systems alone is 45.7% and 20.1% for Rolls-Royce p1c. The 
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concentration ratio for the top 14 UK aerospace companies in Table 2.8 is 87.5%. 
This indicates that the UK aerospace industry is very highly concentrated indeed with a 
scale monopoly where one firms had a market share in excess of 25%, namely BAE 
Systems. These concentration measures are also in line with motor manufacturing, 
pharmaceuticals and shipbuilding. It also indicates that monopoly power is relevant to 
the industry and is appropriate for applying the S-C-P approach. 
(iii) Barriers to entry 
To generate meaningful data on barriers to entry is a problematic exercise in industrial 
economics (Hay and Morris, 1991: 86). However, it is a worthwhile exercise assessing 
some of the scale of the incumbent companies, which could act as a financial or 
logistical barrier for new entrants in the markets. Firstly, BAE Systems and Rolls- 
Royce had R&D costs of 11,099 million and 1281 million, respectively in 2003, (DTI- 
IGT, 2003). R&D costs are regarded as a proxy for investment and as such can be 
viewed as a barrier to entry for any potential new entrant, because with huge sunk cost 
the short run profits are unlikely to induce new entrants in to the market. Indeed, 
spending on R&D in the UK aerospace industry is currently at 5% of turnover (DTI- 
IGT, 2003: 31). Other potential barriers to entry include the role of the UK 
government as a domestic monopsonist in defence procurement who tend to source 
from UK suppliers, the high costs and high-risk nature of aircraft programmes, long 
development lead-times and the low volume output of high value products (DTI-IGT, 
2003: 27). Cumulatively, a combination of these factors in aerospace shows that the 
industry is significantly difficult to penetrate by new entrants as the costs are high, the 
risks are significant and the rewards relatively modest. As a result, 'hit-and-run' entry 
is an unlikely option for manufacturers in related industries such as ship-buiIding. The 
resulting conclusion is that UK aerospace is not a contestable market as developed by 
Baumol (1982: 1-2) where sunk costs are zero and incumbent firms are not protected 
from the potential threat of new entrants. 
(iv) Organisational form 
In terms of organisational form, the relatively limited number of UK aerospace 
suppliers is suggestive of a complex monopoly in domestic markets. The UK 
aerospace sector has a low propensity to import, even though there is the potential for 
foreign competition. BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, both created through merger, 
nationalisation and later privatisation, are clearly the two main domestic UK aerospace 
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prime contractors, for aircraft and aero-engines, respectively. On the other hand, there 
are scores of companies with an annual turnover less than 110 million in the supply 
chain, which suggests firms are not vertically integrated and rely on out-sourcing. For 
example, from the survey Electtronica (UK) Limited have an annual turnover of less 
than L2 million, but conducts specialist research into electronic warfare and flight line 
testing equipment. Similarly, there is Hi-Shear Fasteners Europe Limited with an 
annual turnover of 116 million to supply airframe fasteners at a unit cost of less than 
11. This illustrates the point that the larger firms may prefer to outsource from 
specialist firms rather than make in-house. 
The analysis of organisation form within market structure identifies one of the main 
weaknesses of the mono-causal S-C-P approach. The simple S-C-P approach assumes 
structure is exogenously determined and there is no indication about how market 
structure is shaped in the first place. There needs to be an explanation of market 
structure, because previous conduct and performance will influence existing structure. 
This is where the makc-or-buy decision within the transaction cost approach is useful 
because it begins to explain the existence of firms in the first place and views the 
structure as being determined endogenously. The final section of this Chapter returns 
to this criticism of S-C-P paradigm, because this is a primary motive for using the 
transaction cost approach to analyse vertical integration within organisational form. 
Overall, there is strong and compelling evidence of a highly concentrated market 
structure in the UK aerospace industry. The UK aerospace industry in both the civilian 
and defence sectors can be viewed as a scale monopoly and by 2003 BAE Systems has 
a market share in aerospace and defence of 37.5%6 in excess of 25%, which is the 
official definition of a monopoly. The purchase of GEC-Marconi by BAE Systems is 
further evidence of a complex monopoly in the industry and vertical integration by the 
major UK aerospace suppliers. The market structure is also shown by the huge entry 
costs and government procurement policy, which act as barriers to entry. However, 
rivalry within the UKAI defence and civil markets could be and is achieved via foreign 
competition. Given the potential for domestic monopoly power, the S-C-P paradigm 
predicts there is scope for price setting and collusion in conduct and opportunities for 
6 The 2004 R&D Scoreboard presents BAE Systems sales equal to L8,387 million from a total of 
L22,347 million for aerospace and defence as a whole. 
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high growth and super-normal profit in performance. In summary, the market 
structure of the UK aerospace shows a highly concentrated industry, which means that 
the make-or-buy decision is an important aspect of vertical integration because it helps 
to determine the economic nature of the firm. The next section assesses the market 
conduct of the aerospace industry in the UK. 
Market Conduct 
Table 2.7 shows market conduct includes an appraisal of company pricing policy, non- 
price competition and research and development (R&D). 
(i) Pricing policy 
A major issue experienced by UK aerospace firms includes the supply-side issues of 
rising unit costs between aircraft programmes, plus the demand-side issues of 
decreasing order size and uncertain military budgets. Figure 2.1 shows the supply-side 
problem of rising unit cost in the global military aerospace industry, where the 
horizontal axis represents time and the vertical axis is an index-linked comparison of 
aircraft at constant prices. In the UK, BAE Systems claims that the comparative unit 
costs of front-line combat aircraft have declined relative to those in the US. However, 
Eurofighter and Tornado remain more expensive than the previous generation of UK 
military aircraft, namely the Lightning and the Phantom, indicating the supply-side 
pressure of rising unit costs. At this stage it is too early to predict where the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter programme QSF) will fit into the picture, but the expected 
development contract is $19,000 million in 2005 prices (www. jsf mil). 
In general, there have been at least two main consequences of rising unit costs for 
military aircraft. The first consequence is an income effect as there has been a 
reduction on the demand-side. The second consequence is a substitution effect as 
rising unit costs have affected the armed forces7. Figure 2.1 highlights the effects of 
unit costs increasing over time. At the same time, the order size is decreasing but this 
is not shown on Figure 2.1. 
7 For example, the total number of Tornado aircraft in the UK is 398; whereas for the next generation 
of the aircraft to replace this aircraft, the Typhoon, the total number is only 232. 
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Figure 2.1: Rising unit cost of military aircraft 
Price at entry into service of front-line combat 
aircraft F22 / 
4D 
15E 
F18 
Eurofighter 
'n . 2! 
Phantom, Tornado 
cL Lightning 
8 
-,. --0- 
195o 196o 1970 1980 19M 2000 2010 
Date of first production delivery 
Source: British Aerospace Annual Report and Accounts (1997). 
(ii) Product differentiation 
In terms of product differentiation, many suppliers exist due to specialist knowledge or 
being more competitive on price than internal departments at either BAE Systems plc 
or Rolls-Royce p1c. The larger firms tend not to compete solely on price or even 
quality and buy from the market rather than make. Non-price competition has 
important consequences for the overall make-or-buy decisions in aerospace supply 
chain. If national defence agencies or civilian airlines require lower unit costs, then 
these contracts may only be achievable with substantial outsourcing to suppliers with 
lower overheads and hence the concept of the flexible firm with specialist know-how. 
In turn, this means improved supply chain management between the larger multi- 
national, publicly quoted corporations and the myriad of smaller suppliers, which are 
often independent. There is a dilemma for the industry as a whole, namely to 
outsource means a firm can be more competitive, but this also requires greater project 
management ability and supervision skills of commercial contracts, which ensures that 
agents (e. g. suppliers) depend on the principal (e. g. buyerf Indeed, a fallacy of 
composition argument may be applied against outsourcing, that is, what is good for a 
firm, may not be good for the industry, especially in terms of long-term 
competitiveness (Hartley and Braddon, 2002: 1). In other words, whilst outsourcing 
8 Of course, outsourcing may yield positive externalities for the firm. BAE Systems currently have 
military aircraft project management skills, which can be transferred to other defence projects. 
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has the potential to reduce costs within an aerospace firin, it changes the source of 
production in the future capacity for the aerospace industry. 
(iii) Research and development 
A major feature of UK aerospace is the level of expenditure on R&D, which in turn 
affects market conduct, because of the need to invest in R&D in the products and for 
the future profitability of firms and the industry as a whole. Table 2.9 shows the basic 
parameters of R&D spend for the UK aerospace and defence industry in 2003-04, 
including relative measures of R&D for the main firms in comparison with an all 
industry composite. The UK aerospace and defence industry is R&D-intensive and 
spends four times the all industry average on R&D as a percentage of sales and two 
and half times the all industry composite on R&D per employee. 
Table 2.9: UK aerospace and defence company R&D for 2003-04 
Company Name R&D 
(L million) 
R&D 
% of sales 
R&D per 
employee (L) 
DAE Systems 1,099 13.1 16,000 
Airbus (UK)** 349 21.3 39,000 
Rolls-Royce 281 5.0 7,800 
Smiths 130 4.2 4,100 
Cobham 40 4.9 4,500 
Meggit 20 5.0 5,700 
Dunlop Standard Aerospace* 17 3.8 4,400 
Ultra Electronics 13 4.5 5,100 
AMS** 9 1.9 2,200 
Alvis 6 1.7 2,200 
Chemring 5 3.9 2,900 
VT 1 0.2 100 
Thales Optronics** 1 1.6 2,000 
Aerospace & Defence Total 1,972 8.8 10,700 
All industry composite 16,599 2.1 4,300 
bource: MU4 JK&JJ Uornpany Scoreboard: Company data (DTI, 2004). 
*Company not listed on the London Stock Exchange as it is owned by BAE Systems. 
* *Company is a subsidiary of a foreign-owned parent company. 
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The data also shows that BAE Systems, Airbus in the UK and Rolls-Royce are the 
major contributors to UK aerospace and defence R&D expenditure in absolute terms 
(R&D expenditure) and in relative terms (R&D per employee). In particular, BAE 
Systems accounts for 56% of all the UK aerospace and defence R&D expenditure and 
collectively the top three firms account for 88% of the UK aerospace and defence 
R&D expenditure. These figures confirm that R&D is heavily concentrated in the top 
three firms. As a result, the relative measures of R&D as a percentage of sales and 
R&D per employee may be skewed by the performance of the top three firms. Further 
evidence of this situation is that only Airbus in the UK and BAE Systems perform 
better than the all industry composite on the relative measures of R&D per employee 
and R&D as a percentage of sales. 
A comparison of the UK aerospace and defence industry with other UK industries is 
presented in Table 2.10 and shows that the UK aerospace and defence accounts for 
approximately 12% of all UK R&D compared to almost 40% by the UK 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. The results confirm that aerospace has 
performed well in comparison to automobiles and electronics, but less well in 
comparison with another R&D-intensive industry, namely pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology. Whilst the aerospace and defence industry spends over twice the 
industry level on R&D per employee than the electronics and electrical, the 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology industry spends three times as much as aerospace 
on the same measure implying aerospace and defence may be relatively less innovative 
when compared to the most R&D-intensive parts of UK industry (Jackson, 2003: 83). 
Table 2.10: Comparison of UK aerospace R&D for 2003-04 
Industry R&D 
(L million) 
R&D 
% of sales 
R&D per 
employee (L) 
Aerospace & defence 1,972 8.8 10,700 
Automobiles & parts 1,140 4.6 8,800 
Electronics & electrical 581 2.6 3,700 
IT Hardware 951 7.2 16,600 
Pharmaceuticals & biotech 6,516 15.5 31,100 
All industry Composite 16,599 2.1 4,300 
Source: 2004 R&D Company Scoreboard: Company data (DTI, 2004). 
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The international comparison of R&D expenditure by other aerospace and defence 
firms is presented in Table 2.11. In 2003-04 UK and European companies account for 
59% of the total international aerospace and defence R&D expenditure. The 
aerospace and defence firms in France and Italy generally spend more on R&D per 
employee and as a percentage of sales than the aerospace and defence sector as a 
whole. In particular, the US defence and aerospace firms consistently spend under 5% 
of sales on R&D or under 15,000 on R&D per employee. There is an implicit 
corporate policy by American firms using these relative measures, which is not 
followed by UK and European firms. That is, the US aerospace and defence finns 
possibly aim to achieve a target of R&D spend approximately 5% of sales in order to 
maximise shareholder value; or altematively there may be relatively more govemment 
funded R&D in Europe than the US. However, further analYsis of corporate 
governance is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Table 2.11: International aerospace & defence R&D for 2003-04 
Company Name R&D 
(L million) 
R&D 
% of sales 
R&D per 
employee (f) 
EADS (Holland) 1,545 7.3 12,409 
BAE Systems (TJK) 1,099 13.1 16,000 
Boeing (USA) 922 3.3 5,900 
Finmeccanica (Italy) 865 16.4 19,200 
Lockheed Martin (USA) 504 2.8 3,900 
Snecma (France) 440 9.7 11,100 
Honeywell (USA) 420 3.3 3,900 
Rolls-Royce (TJK) 281 5.0 7,800 
Raytheon (USA) 272 2.7 3,500 
Thales (France) 268 3.6 4,700 
Northtrop Grumman (USA) 223 1.5 1,800 
General Dynamics (USA) 158 1.7 2,300 
Aerospace & defence 7,653 4.6 6,500 
Source: 2004 R&D Uompany Scoreboard: Company data (DTI, 2004). 
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Overall, the section on conduct has shown there are significant cost issues in UK 
aerospace including the rising unit costs rather than price per se. The role of R&D is 
also shown to be significant in the conduct of UK aerospace firms, even though the 
level of R&D invested is below the UK pharmaceutical and bio-technology industry, 
but nevertheless compares favourably with international comparisons in the same 
industry. The next section assesses market performance of the UKAL 
Market Performance 
Table 2.7 shows market performance can be measured in terms of industrial 
profitability, productive efficiency, employment and technical change. 
(i) Industrial profitability 
The performance of the UK aerospace industry is generally highly profitable with year- 
on-year growth reported by firms (Hartley and Braddon (2002: 4). In terms of market 
performance it is possible to assess the profit and value added nature of the LJK 
aerospace industry. Table 2.12 shows the relative value added measures of the 
industry at the firm level for the main EU aerospace companies. The UK aerospace 
and defence firms compare well against other European firms in the sector for value 
added per employee (Pl) and value added as a percentage of costs (P2), but below 'all 
companies' on the Value Added Scoreboard for P2. BAE Systems generates profit as 
a percentage of sales above the aerospace and defence average, but below 'all 
companies' whereas Rolls-Royce is below the mean for both measures. 
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Table 2.12: EU and UK aerospace comparative value added for 2003-04 
Company Name Value added 
(L million) 
Pl: VA per 
employee (1) 
P2: VA % 
of costs (%) 
Profit % of 
Sales (%) 
EADS (Holland) 7,330 67,200 113.2 1.9 
BAE Systems (UK) 4,133 60,000 129.6 5.1 
Thales (France) 3,110 54,100 n/a 2.3 
Finmeccanica (Italy) 2,213 49,200 122.9 5.6 
Rolls-Royce (LJK) 2,097 58,100 117.6 4.4 
Snecma (France) 1,931 48,600 122.6 6.0 
Smiths (LJK) 1,285 48,100 134.8 10.7 
Dassault (France) 937 77,700 144.3 12.1 
SAAB (Sweden) 7680 58,500 117.0 7.1 
Zodiac (France) 531 47,600 n/a 11.4 
Cobham (UK) 448 49,900 147.5 15.4 
Aerospace & defence 25,229 57,700 121.4 4.5 
All companies 1,434,612 51,500 144.1 8.2 
Source: 2005 Value added Company Scoreboard: Company data (DTI, 2005). 
(ii) Productive efficiency 
In general terms, operating profit (or loss) are defined as pre-tax profit plus gross 
interest cost whereas value added is equal to sales minus the costs of bought-in 
materials, components and services. Value added (VA) is equal to make, and sales 
minus value added is equal to buy. For financial accounting data to make the concepts 
operational, value added becomes operating profit plus employee costs plus 
depreciation plus amortisation (that is, equal to depreciation for goodwill and 
intangible assets). Table 2.12 includes the measure of value added and operating profit 
plus two separate measures. PI shows the aerospace labour productivity performance 
across the EU is 157,700 per employee. This figure includes the top four UK 
aerospace firms, which is higher than the 'all companies' average. P2 shows the 
measure of efficiency is consistent across aerospace firms except Finmeccanica, which 
is significantly more cfficient at adding value than other firms, including BAE Systems 
and Rolls-Royce both of which are below the 'all-companies' average. Table 2.13 
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does the same calculations for the UK aerospace and defence industries as a whole in 
comparison to other UK industries (Jackson 2004: 3). 
Table 2.13: UK industry comparisons of value added for 2003-04 
Industry Value added 
(f million) 
Pi: VA per 
employee (1) 
P2: VA % 
of costs (%) 
Profit % of 
sales (%) 
Aerospace & defence 10,433 53,100 125.5 5.9 
Automobiles & parts 9,796 42,200 112.9 1.2 
Electronics & electrical 6,493 30,900 115.0 n/a 
IT Hardware 4,426 56,400 97.7 n/a 
Pharmaceuticals & biotech 22,859 98,500 194.5 8.6 
All industry composite 494,223 
1 
48,100 152.7 8.41 
Source: 2005 Value added Company Scoreboard: Company data (DTI, 2005). 
UK aerospace and defence perform comparatively better than automotives and 
electronics, but lag behind pharmaceuticals and bio-technology. Indeed, the 
performance of UK pharmaceuticals and biotechnology industry is 85% better than 
that of the UK aerospace and defence industry in terms of labour productivity (P I) and 
over 50% better in terms of adding value efficiency (P2). 
(W) Employment 
The performance of the UKAI can be measured in terms of the number of people 
employed and the skills mix of the workforce. As shown in the opening section, 
definitions of UKAI employment are problematic, but the figures supplied by SBAC 
show that aerospace employment in the UK has fallen from 218,000 in 1985 to 
122,000 in 2003 and SBAC also claim that a further 150,000 people are indirectly 
employed in UKAI (SBAC, 2004). However, in spite of the significant reduction in 
the number of people employed in the industry, there are some other factors to 
consider. In 2003,30% of all employees held a university degree or equivalent and 
15% of the UKAI workforce were employed in R&D. These figures indicate the UK 
aerospace industry has a highly-educated and innovative workforce. The emphasis is 
placed on capital investment in employees and future products rather than a labour- 
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intensive industry, which accounts for the reduction in the total number of employees 
in the industry. 
(iv) Technical advance 
Performance can also be assessed through technical advance of the UK aerospace 
industry. Given the growth of technology (Gurnmett and Reppy, 1988: 8), there is a 
recent trend for UK aerospace companies to form consortia with other European 
companies. With the exceptions of the Harrier Jump-jet and the Hawk trainer, UK 
aerospace companies have only built military aircraft with other partner European 
companies, since the cancellation of the TSR-29 in 1966. This is due in part to the 
rising unit costs of aircraft and declining order size from the Royal Air Force (RAF). 
There is a similar trend in civilian aerospace, which led to the creation of Airbus 
Industries, a pan-European consortium, which has been able to compete with Boeing in 
the US by gaining scale economies. 
In summary, the S-C-P paradigm has provided a framework for describing vertical 
integration in the UK aerospace industry at the level of the market. The appraisal of 
market structure finds there is evidence of a highly concentrated market structure in 
the UK aerospace market with a scale monopoly in both the civilian and defence 
sectors. The result is that there is a reduced level of competition between firms in 
similar domestic market segments. The assessment of market conduct shows there are 
significant production cost issues in the industry principally relating to R&D 
expenditure that influence the conduct of aerospace firms. The result is that R&D is 
used as a form of competition between firms, where R&D is also a possible barrier to 
entry. The evaluation of market performance shows profitability in the UKAI to be 
satisfactory in comparison with other engineering industries such as motor car 
production and unsatisfactory in comparison with R&D-intensive industries such as 
pharmaceuticals and bio-technology. 
However, whilst the S-C-P approach can identify the underlying factors of competition 
between firms in any given industry, it falsely assumes that market structure is 
exogenously determined. As a result, the mono-causal assessment of market structure 
9 The multi-purpose TSR-2 (tactical, strike, reconnaissance) was cancelled during the development 
phase, as a result of spiralling costs and project delays. 
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within the S-C-P paradigm does not fully contribute to a detailed understanding of 
vertical integration, which is central to this thesis. The S-C-P assessment is overly 
descriptive and too general for the purpose of analysing organisational structure in UK 
aerospace firms. The next section identifies transaction costs a potential way of 
analysing the research problem, because the make-or-buy decision is the paradigm 
problem in transaction cost approach, which attempts to analyse vertical integration. 
Vertical integration and transaction cost economics: the research problem 
The S-C-P describes an industry using aggregate data and market level comparisons 
(Hay and Morris, 1991: 587). Whilst this is necessary for assessing an industry, it is 
not sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, which aims to assess vertical integration 
through the make-or-buy decision. The link between market structure and vertical 
integration is actually presented by Williamson as the organisation of economic activity 
within and between both markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975: xi). Williamson 
argues because S-C-P has characterised the research into industrial organisation in the 
post-war period that: 
"[a] goal of profit maximisation is ordinarily imputed to the firm, internal 
organisation is largely neglected, and the outer environment is described in 
terms of market structure measures such as concentration, barriers to entry, 
excess demand, and so forth. The distribution of transactions between the firm 
and market is mainly taken as a datum. " 
Williamson (1975: 8). 
However, there are two main criticisms of the S-C-P paradigm relevant to this thesis. 
Firstly, the simplified S-C-P approach assumes structure is exogenously determined, 
but fails to explain the nature of the market structure. The transaction cost approach 
explains the existence of firms and views structure as being determined endogenously 
through the minimising transaction costs via the make-or-buy decision. Secondly, the 
S-C-P approach is most useful for analysing single product firms, because a single 
product is specific to a given market (Worthington et al. 2005: 212). This Chapter has 
shown the complex nature of UKAI across many products and markets. Taken 
together, these are both compelling reasons to use the transaction cost approach to 
analyse vertical integration within an analysis of organisational form or structural 
govemance. As WHIiamson states: 
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"Just as market structure matters in assessing the efficacy of trades in the 
marketplace, so likewise does internal structure matter in assessing the internal 
organisation. " 
Williamson (1975: 9). 
The implication of S-C-P for this thesis is as a starting point for industry analysis, but it 
does not address the reasons why firms exist in the first place. The transaction cost 
approach with its focus on the make-or-buy decision shows how organisational 
structure can be endogenously determined. That is, the S-C-P approach considers the 
issue of how firms should compete with each other at the market level; whereas the 
transaction cost approach considers the issue of which activity should be performed in- 
house (make) or by the market (buy). In the S-C-P framework, governance structure 
is assumed to be exogenous and beyond the scope of the approach. The transaction 
cost approach is potentially suited to assess the economic organisation and contractual 
features of vertical integration, because it focuses on the firm acting to minimise 
transaction costs as an efficient means of safeguarding specific investments compared 
with the monopoly power approach, which focuses on the firm generating monopoly 
rent by the control of inputs from factor markets and distribution (Klein, 2004: 1). 
In summary, this thesis has identified the limitations of the S-C-P paradigm in respect 
to explaining vertical integration. Transaction cost economics extends the analysis of 
market structure through the make-or-buy decision and demonstrates that the firm is a 
substitute for the market. As a result, vertical integration is explained by transaction 
cost economics whereas it is not by the S-C-P paradigm. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, this Chapter has defined the UK aerospace industry in a number of 
meaningful ways and provided a working definition informed by SBAC. The Chapter 
has also used the S-C-P approach to assess the LJK aerospace industry, which has 
shown that there is evidence of a scale monopoly within a domestic oligopoly market 
structure. However, there are theoretical concerns about the S-C-P approach, which 
has ultimately led to the conclusion that the transaction cost approach is potentially 
more suitable for explaining vertical integration and the existence of firms. Overall, 
this Chapter has outlined the UK aerospace industry and sets the context for the main 
themes of the thesis with its focus on the make-or-buy decision and contract design. 
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The next Chapter deals with the literature on transaction costs. Specific reference is 
directed towards make-or-buy decisions and the role of contracts within a transaction 
cost framework, which is potentially more insightful for understanding vertical 
integration than the S-C-P approach. 
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Chapter Three: 
Literature Survey of Transaction Costs 
"... economic institutions of capitalism have the main purpose and effect of 
cconomising on transaction costs. " 
Williamson (1985: 17). 
Introduction 
This Chapter surveys the transaction cost economics literature by analysing the 
theoretical foundations and the empirical applications of the make-or-buy decision. 
The make-or-buy decision is the paradigm problem of transaction costs economics, 
since choice among alternative modes of production is resolved by minimising the 
costs of the transaction (Shelanski and Klein, 1995: 341). That is, a firm can either 
make the required inputs or buy the inputs from the market and maintain contractual 
relationships with supplies (Klein, 2004: 1). The transaction cost approach explains 
why firms exist (Domberger, 1998: 60). 
This Chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly, the definitions of transaction costs 
are presented showing how transaction costs differ from production costs. Secondly, 
there is an assessment of the theoretical foundations of transaction costs and the 
development of the theory. Finally, there is an analysis of over 70 empirical studies 
of transaction costs, including how the transaction cost approach works in practice. 
Definitions of transaction costs 
This section defines transaction costs in detail, because there is strong criticism of the 
transaction cost literature concerning the lack of clear-cut definitions (Dietrich, 1994: 
23). Indeed, in the absence of an appropriate definition, the transaction costs 
approach would be unable to provide an understanding of the difference between 
firms and markets and remain a concept with a list of factors that relate to only the 
"mode of analysis" (Hodgson, 1988: 200). That is, the definition of transaction costs 
has to identify where transaction costs differ from the accepted economic definition of 
production costs. 
To define transaction costs Williamson (1985: 19) uses the earlier definition presented 
by Arrow (1969: 48) that provides a general portrayal of transaction costs as follows: 
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Transaction costs are the "... costs of running the economic system... " 
Arrow (1969: 48). 
The benefit of this definition is that it implies that transaction costs are different to 
production costs, because the costs of providing goods and services are captured by 
the production function and the transaction costs are the additional costs of managing 
economic activity. Hodgson (1988: 200) refers to this definition as a "vague 
characterisation" because it is imprecise and difficult to make operational. Moreover, 
all types of costs could be defined in theory as contributing to administering the 
economic system, including production costs and hence the definition of transaction 
costs remains unclear in spite of Arrow's definition. 
Williamson (1985: 19) also uses an analogy to define transaction costs as follows. 
"Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in the physical 
systems. "' 
Williamson (1985: 19). 
To describe transaction costs as "frictioif' has the advantage of differentiating 
between an economic system without transaction costs (presumably the equivalent to 
a vacuum in a physical system) and an economic system with transaction costs. That 
is, friction is a comparative concept. Hence: 
"Frictionless ideals are useful mainly for reference purposes. " 
Williamson (1979: 261). 
However, Hodgson insists that an analogy is not a substitute for a meaningful 
definition and therefore comments: 
"The failure to provide a definition of such a crucial term [as transaction costs] 
is systematic of the lack of precision in much of Williamson's work. " 
Hodgson (1988: 200). 
In order to advance the discussion of defining transaction costs, Hodgson refers to the 
original work by Dahlman (1979: 148), which identifies three sequential episodes of 
the transaction. The first phase is the search and information costs; the second phase 
is the bargaining and decision costs and the third phase is the policing and 
enforcement costs. Hence, transaction costs are defined as the costs of finding the 
information, negotiating with information and monitoring through information, which 
altogether reduces to the cost of a "lack of informatioW" (Hodgson, 1988: 201). 
This definition of transaction costs as an aspect of information economics allows the 
crucial distinction to be made between transaction costs and production costs, which 
is an important contribution to the wider economics literature. Economic costs fall 
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into one of two broad areas, namely production costs and transaction costs (Jones, 
2004: 287). Their definitions are as follows. 
1. Production costs are defined as the costs of making and distributing 
goods and providing services, which include the costs of the factors of 
production such as labour, capital, land and raw material. 
2. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of using the market, which 
include discovering prices, negotiating contracts and monitoring 
subsequent outcomes all of which involve a lack of information. 
Accordingly, Hendrikse (2003: 211) asserts: 
"Transaction cost economics simplifies this analysis [of economic costs] by 
assuming that transaction costs and production costs (e. g. the presence or 
absence of economies of scale) are determined separately and can be added 
together in order to determine the total costs of a certain way of organising. " 
Hendrikse (2003: 211). 
The logic of this approach is that economic costs are the sum of the production costs 
and the transaction costs. This means that firms are an alternative method of co- 
ordination to markets given that economic systems do not operate with full and 
perfect information (Koutsoyiannis, 1979: 107). The transaction costs approach 
implies that production costs are not as important as transaction costs when 
determining the choice between the firm and the market, given a lack of information 
(Hendrikse, 2003: 211). 
Furthermore, the economic survey of transaction costs by Shelanski and Klein (1995: 
335) shows that: 
"Transaction cost economics studies how trading partners protect themselves 
from the hazards associated with exchange relationships. " 
Klein and Shelanski (1995: 336). 
In other words, transaction costs are: 
"... above and beyond contracted prices, including the acquisition of costly 
information, the costs of monitoring performance, the costs of committing 
specific assets and the costs of handling complexity and uncertainty in 
reaching agreements. " 
FitzRoy el al. (1998: 8). 
The definition of transaction costs is further developed by Hart (1995: 23) who 
identifies three sources of transaction costs within the standard principal-agent 
framework, where the principal is the task-setter and the agent performs the task 
(Besanko et al., 1996: 615). Firstly, decision-makers can not plan for all 
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contingencies; secondly decision-makers can not faultlessly negotiate about the plans 
and finally, decision-makers can not perfectly write the contracts for the negotiated 
plan in such a way that would avoid the need for a third party authority such as a 
court of law. All three areas result from incomplete contracts that give rise to 
transaction costs, because there is a lack of information. 
This result leads to two broad types of transaction costs according to Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992: 29). The first type is co-ordination costs, which are the costs of 
compiling and transmitting information. This communication is not perfect and 
decision-makers often have insufficient and inaccurate information with which to 
work. This type of transaction costs is associated with the make-or-buy decision, 
because co-ordination problems are resolved through buying from the market or 
making in-house depending on which minimises the costs of transacting. The second 
type is motivation costs, which are linked to either asymmetric information or 
imperfect commitment. This situation is known as the hold-up problem and occurs 
where parties to the transaction do not have all the relevant information or face 
asymmetric information and encounter opportunistic behaviour. The hold-up problem 
can result in adverse selection (hidden information) or moral hazard (hidden action) 
for contractual relationships. 
Given the general difficulties of defining transaction costs, it is worth introducing the 
other central criticism, namely that the definition is tautological, so it is true by 
definition. The implication of the tautology argument against transaction costs is that 
the concept unnecessarily repeats the concepts of market failure and opportunity cost. 
In addition, it is an over-simplification to define the market is a substitute for a firm 
when the market itself can be defined as a group of firms. Indeed, the whole notion of 
transaction costs is criticised as being too general, which leaves it open to the 
fundamental critique of being difficult to define, without a meaningful unit of 
measurement and altogether the status of "special case" concept (Dietrich, 1994: 8). 
Transaction cost econo 
, 
mics is viewed as tautological, because the concept does not 
necessarily advance the existing understanding of firms in a market environment and 
at best has a limited role under certain conditions. Whilst it is obvious to state that 
production can be either through the firm or the market and that this sheds little new 
light on the firm, nevertheless it remains an alternative view that firms can succeed to 
supply where markets fails (Hodgson, 1988: 299). Indeed, it is an original insight 
from the transaction cost approach to explain the boundaries of the firm in terms of 
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both productive technology and the costs of business transactions (Klein, 2004: 2). 
Hence, a transaction cost approach remains worthwhile and indeed, the language of 
transaction costs is becoming more widespread. For example, Foley (1999: 2) claims 
that the UK is moving towards a 'friction-free' economy, where information is more 
accessible electronically, which opens economic activity to greater levels of 
competition. That is, economic market structure has the potential to be described as 
an approximation of a perfectly competitive model. Nevertheless, transaction cost 
analysis is not a "special case", because: 
"[m]any businesses and jobs [which] still rely on the presence of market 
ffiction - entry barriers, switching costs, information costs etc. " 
Foley (1999: 2). 
A 'friction-free' economy may be possible in certain areas of economic activity, 
where gathering and processing simple and costless information is required to perform 
a straight-forward transaction, but with aerospace production where the information is 
more complex then the friction remains. Notwithstanding, transaction costs are 
apparently omnipresent, which does leave the concept open to the charge of being true 
by definition (Dugger, 1989: 607). This can be viewed as strength rather than a 
weakness, if the source of the transaction costs can be identified as attempted by Hart 
(1995: 23). However, the transaction cost model tends to lack conclusive support and 
the purpose of this thesis is a test of a specific transaction costs aspect, namely the 
make-or-buy decision in the UK aerospace industry. The next section will develop 
the definitions of the make-or-buy decision and the associated hold-up problem. 
(a) The make-or-buy decision 
The concept of make-or-buy is gaining wider acceptance in the mainstream 
economics literature, because of the markets and hierarchies schema' (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992: 20). The dichotomy is straightforward: economic production is co- 
ordinated either externally if the relevant labour or product market exists (the buy 
option); or internally, if a firm can be created to perform the task (the make option). 
If a firm buys from the market then there is the possible need for external contracts to 
be written, which can attract so-called "ink coste' or the repeated changes to a given 
Two textbook examples, which explicitly use transaction costs as a theoretical basis, include Dourna. 
and Schrcudcr (1998) and FitzRoy et al. (1998). Kreps (1990) was one of the first textbooks to use 
traiisaction costs in mainstream economics. 
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contract (Kreps, 1990: 767). Economic decision-makers within firms differentiate 
between the two alternatives of make and buy subject to a cost minimisation 
constraint. This approach defines boundaries of the firm in terms of vertical 
integration. Intra-firm co-operation becomes the preferred mode if the firm is the 
most efficient form of production. Similarly inter-firin competition becomes 
preferred, if the market as a whole is the most cfficient option. In the latter case a 
firm that buys ftom the market will use what are termed "market firme' that specialise 
in the production of a given component, part or service (Besanko et al, 1996: 77). 
Market firms can achieve greater economies of scale and therefore can produce at a 
lower unit cost than a firm further downstream. Whilst this approach is not a radical 
departure from the neo-classical economics paradigm, it is nevertheless a change in 
emphasis, which refers to institutional "grit and grime7 to prevent the smooth function 
of markets, (Leslie, 1993: 199-202). In particular, mainstream economic theory views 
vertical integration as an efficient form of rent-seeking. It is a way to earn monopoly 
rent by the control of inputs markets and distribution. Alternatively, transaction cost 
theory views vertical integration as an efficient means of safe-guarding specific 
investments under conditions of incomplete information (Klein, 2004: 1). 
In general terms, there are three levels of make-or-buy decisions, which need to be 
defined (Probert, 1997: 13). The level of the make-or-buy decision ranges from 
overall company strategy to specific procurement decision in the long run and the 
short run. 
1. Strategic make-or-buy. The strategic make-or-buy decision is at a higher 
level where a firm decides whether to invest in a manufacturing capability or 
use the capacity of another organisation. Such a level of decision tends to be 
longer term and determines whether a firm encompasses production in-house 
or not. 
2. Tactical Mke-or-buy. The tactical make-or-buy decision is usually in 
response to changes in the supply-side, where it is not possible to make in- 
house in the short run. This level of decision tends to be temporary and is 
often a response to an imbalance in the factor markets resulting from either 
excess supply or deficient supply. 
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3. Component make-or-buy. This make-or-buy decision is often at an early 
stage of design and takes the form of deciding whether it is economical to 
manufacture a part or component in-house or not. If the firm buys from the 
market then it purchases from a market firm, which specialises in the 
production and distribution of that specific part or component at a lower unit 
cost of production. 
As a result, the make-or-buy decision has implications for the governance structure of 
firms, because transaction cost economics is the analysis of alternative institutions of 
governance (Klein, 2004: 3). Williamson claims that economic organisation should: 
"... align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance 
structures in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way. " 
Williamson (1991: 79). 
The governance structures defined by Williamson in terms of vertical integration take 
one of the following three forms. 
1. Markets are defined as where buyers and seller interact and the place for 
firms to buy from specialist companies (or market firms). This relates to the 
buy option within the make-or-buy decision of the firm. 
2. Hierarchies are defined as where the organisation of the firm is internalised to 
generate the production in-house. This relates to the make option within the 
make-or-buy decision of the firm. 
3. Hybrids are defined as a combination of the partial alignment between 
markets and hierarchies. Hybrids take the form of long term contacts, 
franchises, networks, alliances and other forms of firms such as ownership 
agreements and property rights including licensing. 
Overall, the make-or-buy approach recognises vertically integrated firms as a feature 
of the modem industrial enterprise (Besanko, el aL, 1996: 72). It is an approach that 
simultaneously defines the boundaries between the firm and the market, as well as 
highlighting the capabilities of a firm (Kreps, 1990: 743). By virtue of being a 
selection process between comparative institutions, make-or-buy decisions can be 
regarded as a choice variable and assumes a significant strategic importance. 
However, there is a major problem with this approach, namely, the market does not 
occur naturally by itself as implied by Coase (1937: 388). Markets and firms (or 
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hierarchies) have in common the fact that each is a construct of economic expediency. 
According to Dugger (1989): 
"[t]he market is not a natural phenomenon. It bears no resemblance to the 
Grand Canyon or the Rocky Mountains. Instead, it is a manmade 
phenomenon. It resembles the Panama Canal or the Empire State Building. " 
Dugger (1989: 607). 
In sum, firms are hierarchies and the market comprises market firms. As a result, the 
make-or-buy decision is the choice of whether to produce in-house or procure from a 
supplier. The next part of this section defines the hold-up problem. 
(b) The hold-up problem 
The hold-up problem is defined as investments that become inefficient because of ex 
post opportunism (Hendrikse, 2003: 458). The cause of the expost opportunism is 
relationship-specific investment known as asset specificity. A hold-up problem is 
linked to credible threatsý between rivals or in situations of conflict, where there are 
irreversible or specialised investments (Williamson 1985: 167). The concept of the 
hold-up problem is closely related to the hostage-taking model (Williamson, 1983: 
519). In assessing unilateral and bilateral exchange, there must be a consideration of 
how economic agents may hold the specialised assets hostage if the contract is not 
precisely defined. This is known as opportunism since one or more of the parties 
involved have to negotiate contracts in order to get the terms of the deal correctly 
specified and avoid the hold-up problem. In this sense, the ink cost (of re-negotiation 
and haggling with suppliers) must be less than the cost of losing a hostage in a 
conflict situation, because of the specificity of asset (and investments). 
The hold-up problem can also be seen as quasi-rent, which is defined as earning from 
a factor of production (that is, economic rent) in the short run and transfer earnings in 
the long run (Griffith and Wall, 2000: 708). Both the hold-up problem and quasi-rent 
are central to make-or-buy issues. In terms of the decision-making process, 
transaction costs are a choice between make-or-buy and involve contracts and hostage 
taking by trading partners. The hostage-taking is measured by the quasi-rent, which is 
2 'Me opposite of credible threats is credible commitmcnM which are used in support of alliance to 
Promote exchange. Credible commitments are also the result of irreversible and specialiscd assets and 
investments but form part of the safeguard in favour of co-operation. In terms of game theory, credible 
threats are non-co-operativc games with conflict (or prisoners' dilemma) and credible commitments are 
co-operative games without conflict (or the folk theorem). 
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further clarified as the alternative between the make strategy and the buy strategy. A 
make strategy is adopted where there is quasi-rent, because to make a component or 
part is a way to safeguard against ex post opportunism in situations of relationship- 
specific investments. A buy strategy is adopted where there is no quasi-rent, because 
no safeguards are required with generic components or parts, which can be readily 
purchased from the market. Hence: 
Make Strategy (quasi-rent > 0) 
Gi = Gj' 
Eq. 3.1 
il ri (wi) < Li (, Ti 9 wo 
Eq. 3.2 
Buy Strategy (quasi rent = 0) 
Gi = Gi 
Eq. 3.3 
11 ri (wi) 2!: Li (Ai, wi) 
Eq. 3.4 
Where: 
Gi ý chosen institution; Gi- = intemal;, G, = external; 
4= internal costs; L, = market costs; 
(A) = specificity; (, ) = complexity. 
This analysis fully emphasises the notion of transaction cost minimisation; or the 
make-or-buy decision. In essence, decision-makers either create output through the 
firm (vertical integration) or engage the market (long term contracts). However, the 
chosen institution, either the firm (internal) or the market (external) can be liable to ex 
post opportunism (Williamson, 1983: 522-526). 
Overall, the make-or-buy decisions and the hold-up problem can be viewed as 
relevant areas of analysis for assessing the UK aerospace industry, because there is a 
role for outsourcing and contractual arrangements, respectively. The first part of this 
Chapter has attempted to define transaction costs in terms of the make-or-buy 
decision and the hold-up problem. The hold-up problem has been presented in terms 
of contract design and the make--or-buy decision in terms of economising ahead of 
assessing the transaction costs approach and its relevance to the UK aerospace 
43 
industry. The next section reviews the transaction cost literature, including its 
theoretical foundations and developments. 
A review of the theoretical transaction cost literature 
The heritage of transaction cost theory dates back to the seminal work of Knight 
(1921), Commons (1934), Coase (1937) and more recently Arrow (1969). The 
theoretical concepts of transaction costs were first brought together by Williamson in 
Markets and Hierarchies (1975) and 7he Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985). 
The fundamental works of this approach outline the importance of economics, law 
and organisation in assessing the boundaries between the firm and the market. The 
task of generating empirical results on the central transaction cost hypotheses was 
started by Williamson (1976: 73), after which there has been a significant body of 
work attempting to make operational the basic paradigm problem of make-or-buy 
(Shelanski and Klein 1995: 341). 
It is the aim of this thesis to make transaction cost theory operational and to test the 
significance of both make-or-buy and contract type as dependent variables in a 
transaction cost model. To this end, the remainder of this Chapter assesses the theory 
of the transaction cost approach and the related empirical analysis, which has been 
developed by many researchers in line with the work by Williamson (1976: 100). 
To begin with, the convention in the transaction cost literature is to accept Coase 
(1937: 390) as the pioneering contribution, upon which Williamson (1975,1985) 
developed the critical core of the analysis. Using the transaction as the basic unit of 
exchange (Commons, 1934: 4-8) and identifying uncertainty as important (Knight, 
1921: 270), Coase delivered the insight that the firm and the market act as alternative 
modes of organisation. That is, the firm and the market are close substitutes, which 
generates the make-or-buy decision. 
Next there is individual assessment of the work by Knight, Commons, Coase, Arrow 
and then Williamson in respect of the theoretical development of transaction costs. 
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(a) The contribution of Knight 
The work by Knight (1921) remains a landmark in the development of theoretical 
economics and in particular institutional economics. Knight identifies that economic 
systems are either complex (i. e. partial) or dynamic. The analysis of economic 
behaviour is limited by imperfections in knowledge. This limitation is known as 
uncertainty, which in turn has two forms. Measurable uncertainty is known as risk or 
chance; otherwise non-quantifiable risk is true uncertainty. When statistical 
probabilities can be attached to outcomes this is risk (or measurable uncertainty). In 
this case insurance contracts may be derived in order to offset some of the costs of the 
risk and thereby reduce liability for the full cost of the eventual outcome. The choice 
faced by economic agents is between either zero insurance costs (and the liability of 
full costs if the adverse state of nature is revealed); or insurance premiums (and the 
right to compensation if the adverse state of nature is revealed). It can be assumed 
there are two states of nature S, and S2; where S, ýý' S2 with a probability X of S, 
occurring and probability of (I - 7C) Of S2. Therefore, either of the following outcomes 
will apply, viz: 
SI=W (n) Eq. 3.5 
S2=W-FC (I - R) Eq. 3.6 
is the outcome without insurance; or 
SI=W-P (7C) Eq. 3.7 
S2 ýW-P +13 (1 - 7C) Eq. 3.8 
is the outcome with insurance. 
Where: W 
FC 
p 
B 
7c 
(I- 7c) 
wealth endowment 
full costs 
insurance premium 
insurance benefits 
probability of S, occurring 
probability Of S2 occurring. 
It is also assumed that the probabilities associated with the outcomes are known and 
the premiums are actuarially correct. This is known as a premium or an actuarially 
fair gamble which is akin to the bet associated with rolling dice or spinning a coin that 
Knight labels as aptioH probability. Other types of probability identified by Knight 
are statistical probability (or empirical evaluation of frequency) and estimates (or 
judgements). Whilst the latter two types of probability allow additional realism, it 
creates further complication and inexact interpretation of the data. The lack of 
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confidence in estimates or judgement is true uncertainty, where the outcomes are 
extremely difficult to predict and hazardous to use. This situation is the antithesis of 
perfect knowledge because of asymmetric information, imperfect knowledge and the 
inability of economic agents to instantly compute all the relevant data. The insightful 
contribution of Knight is therefore to highlight the inexact nature of economic inquiry 
in the presence of complexity and ignorance. 
Knight charts three quite different scenarios. Firstly, with perfect knowledge, full 
information and no ignorance the world is characterised by certainty. As a 
consequence of complete awareness, economic agents operate in the absence of 
probability, because there is no need for predictions (and therefore no role for 
insurance, judgement and even gambling). Loasby (1976: 5) regards this as the 
paradox of choice, where genuine choice cannot be predetermined: 
"If choice is real, the future cannot be certain; if the future is certain there can 
be no choice. " 
Loasby (1976: 5). 
These ideas are later associated with the human factors in transaction costs. Knight 
has described in essence a situation of unbounded rationality with no scope for 
opportunism. Whilst it is Simon (1957: 198) who eventually develops these concepts 
fully, it is clear that Knight appreciates the problems related to search, choice and 
information. These are recurrent themes in transaction costs and culminate in the 
hold-up problem, where hostage taking is prevalent with specific assets (Williamson, 
1983: 522). The analysis develops into aspects of microeconomics and the law of 
contract, which is important for assessing the UK aerospace industry. 
Secondly, once ignorance is assumed in addition to a lack of information, then there is 
a role for probabilities to be assigned to outcomes. If probability reasoning can be 
applied this is known as risk (or measurable uncertainty). As such, various outcomes 
are given certain quantifiable probabilities. Knight acknowledges that an exhaustive 
search for probabilities is not always possible, due to search costs, which gives rise to 
insurance and limited judgement and estimates. The ultimate extremes of this 
approach can range from identifying the probabilities of rolling dice to long-term 
scenario planning. 
Finally, if outcomes are unknowable, by definition, this is true uncertainty. This 
situation requires full estimation, judgement and forecasting by economic agents. 
Therefore, it is regarded as actual uncertainty characterised by both bounded 
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rationality and opportunism. However, probability reasoning cannot meaningfully be 
applied in situations of true uncertainty, because of imperfect knowledge and 
incomplete or asymmetric information between decision-makers. Where probabilities 
are applied in situations of true uncertainty, then moral hazard and adverse selection 
occur to characterise the market (Biswas, 1997: 31; Hillier, 1997: 81). As a 
consequence, the insurance episode reduces incentives (moral hazard) and distorts 
signals (adverse selection), which is modelled as a principal-agent problem. In 
summary, the work by Knight is important to modem institutional economics in 
general and transaction costs in particular, because of the emphasis on risk and 
uncertainty first developed by Knight, which is central to the current understanding 
and analysis of information in microeconomics. 
(b) The contribution of Commons 
The contribution of Commons (1934: 4) to the overall understanding of economic 
institutions is also highly significant. The single most important insight to transaction 
cost economics offered by Commons is to re-base the unit of economic activity from 
market exchange to transactions. In essence, Commons wanted to discover a unit of 
activity, which is universal to economics, law and ethics. The fact Williamson (1975: 
385) later corrupted the trinity to economics, law and organisation is testimony to the 
importance of Commons in the development of the transaction cost literature. 
Prior to Commons there was considerable ambiguity concerning the basic economic 
unit of activity. Historically, economic analysis was based in part upon ownership of 
commodities and trade. Commons dates this approach back to Locke (1690) and 
upon the concept of property: 
"The state of nature has a law to govern it, which obliges every one .... that being all equal and independent no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty or possessions. " 
Locke (1690) paragraph 6. 
The traditional view regarding the ownership of commodities was carried forward by 
the subsequent work by Ricardo (1819), Menger (187 1) and Marshall (1890). This 
collection of writing ultimately led to the foundations of neo-classical economics and 
has developed into the foundations of the competitive free-market model. However, 
Commons argues that the mechanism proposed by Locke is insufficient to connect 
economics, law and ethics. Three principles are needed, which are conflict, 
dependence and order. The conflict element arises from contrasting interests in 
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relation to ownership; dependence highlights the mutual interdependence of interests 
and order is the security of expectations (given that the future is uncertain). Overall, 
conflict, dependence and order are necessary and sufficient conditions, within a 
transaction for creating the basic unit of activity. Thus: 
"Transactions.... are not the "exchange of commodities" in the physical sense 
of "delivery", they are the alienation and acquisition, between individuals of 
the rights of future ownership of physical things, as determined by the 
collective worldng rules of society. " 
Commons (1934: 58). 
Therefore, Commons injects a huge degree of dynamic analysis into the proceedings. 
Law, economics and ethics are thus connected as follows. The legal element is 
captured by the contract or the transfer of rights embodied in the exchange. This 
allows for interaction between economic agents other than casual and informal spot 
markets. Indeed, there may be complex and more formal aspects to the exchange, 
which is the basis of modem exchange markets and hedging (Commons, 1934: 5). 
The economics component is embodied by the buying and selling of the rights, which 
relate to future ownership. Essentially this is where production coincides with 
consumption under a specified time fi7ame. The ethics detail the actual rules, which 
coordinate society. As identified previously, Williamson (1985: 385) substitutes the 
latter element for organisation. The intention of this change is to emphasise the 
economic features of the exchange and governance structures. 
Given that a transaction is the transfer of ownership, Commons provides taxonomy to 
differentiate between three types of transactions. In bargaining transactions all parties 
to the exchange are equal and voluntary. This allows a free movement of prices 
between the buyers and the sellers. A managerial transaction anticipates the 
hierarchical structure between economic agents, where there is a legal superior (and 
by definition a legal inferior). This is clearly a rudimentary version of the principal- 
agent problem, and in particular has echoes of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Finally, a rational transaction is the negotiation between several parties and as such it 
creates a team production function or collective action (Sandler, 1992: 14). Output 
and prices within aerospace may be regarded as relational transactions. In essence, 
bargaining transactions can be viewed in terms of property rights, managerial 
transactions in respect to principal-agent problems and relational transactions as a 
club good, which generates burdens and benefits. 
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In further analysis, Commons also highlights the difference between strategic and 
routine transactions. Within the transaction cost approach there is always a certain 
degree of asset specificity. The strategic transactions are those with high asset 
specificity, whereas routine transactions are those with low asset specificity. Whilst 
these conclusions about complex markets and spot market transactions are not too 
explicit in the analysis by Commons, it is nevertheless important enough for 
Williamson to incorporate this within transaction cost economics. 
Moreover, Commons offers initial insights into the make-or-buy decision. The 
terminology is loose and the definitions are imperfect, but Commons touches upon the 
essence of transaction costs as follows: 
...... the 'internal' economy turns out to be the engineering economy of 
managerial transactions producing use-values; the external economy becomes 
the proprietary economy of bargaining transactions ...... Commons (1934: 297). 
In other words this is a clear expression of make (internal economy) and buy (external 
economy), which pre-dates Coase (1937: 390) .3 
Finally, Commons incorporates the notion of property rights from the viewpoint of 
economic transactions. In this analysis the legal implications of the transaction 
overlap with the economic considerations (Commons, 1934: 93). Therefore, a 
transaction involves a transfer of future rights, but Commons does not claim credit for 
the concept of property rights per se. 4 However, the analysis by Commons, places 
property rights as a central idea. However, property rights are: 
not something foreordained by divine or natural 'right' or materialistic 
equilibrium, or laws of nature'. 
Commons (1934: 93). 
Commons insists upon the notion of property rights being viewed as the due process 
of law in an uncertain world. Hence: 
property rights are the collective activities of government or other 
concerns apportioning to individuals an exclusive claim against others in the 
use of anything that is expected to be scarce enough to create conflict over 
exclusive use. " 
Commons (1934: 3 03). 
This is a tradition, which runs consistently through the subsequent transaction costs 
approach (Williamson, 1975: 3). Subsequently, Hart (1995: 29) uses the property 
3 Coasc (1937) claims the rudimentary ideas as early as 1925 in an unpublished letter. 4 Commons (1934) credits the development of property rights to Jcvons (1871), Walras (1874) and 
B6hm-Bawcrk (1884). 
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rights approach to analyse the hold-up problems in a merged firm, which is especially 
important during a period of merger activity and consolidation in an industry. 
In summary, the contribution by Commons within the transaction costs literature is 
usually confined to the credit for introducing the transaction as the basic economic 
unit of analysis (Williamson, 1985: 6). However, this misrepresents the importance of 
Commons, who also introduces many other concepts including principal-agent related 
issues, internal or external economies and asset specificity, as well as contributing to 
many other areas most notably contract theory (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005: 55 1). 
This sizeable contribution is partially captured as follows: 
...... transactions are interdependent and variable in a world of collective action 
and perpetual change which is the uncertain future world of institution 
economics. " 
Commons (1934: 93). 
Combined, the path-breaking work by Commons and Knight has led directly to many 
concepts in the transaction costs literature, such as the focus on the transaction plus 
uncertainty and ultimately the work by both Coase and Williamson. 
(c) The contribution of Coase 
The work of Coase (1937 and 1960) is seen as an important contribution to the entire 
transaction cost approach. According to Coase, production is synchronised through 
markets by the price mechanism. A firm can reduce the cost of the transaction, if the 
costs of transacting are greater in the market. Hence, 
"The main reason why it is possible to establish a firm would seem to be that 
there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of 
C organising' production through the price mechanism is that of discovering 
what the relevant prices are. This cost may be reduced but it will not be 
eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information. " 
Coase (1937: 390). 
This insight from Coase is crucial in establishing the make-or-buy decision as the 
paradigm issue of transaction costs. In other words: 
" 
... a pure Coasian definition sees firms as the means of co-ordinating 
production without using market exchange. " 
Cowling and Sugden (1994: 2). 
Indeed, Pitelis (1993: 7) states that mainstream microeconomic theory has been 
transformed by the transactions cost economics inspired originally by Coase (1937). 
The history of economic thought in this area of inquiry can be divided into three 
stages. Firstly, in the pre-Coase era, the market alone was regarded as being able to 
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allocate scare resources through the price mechanism. This mono-institutional view 
of microeconomic activity was concerned primarily with market equilibrium and 
market efficiency. This has lead Williamson (1975: 20) to remark: 
"In the beginning there were markets". 
Williamson (1975: 20). 
Firms are viewed as a near perfect substitute for markets and hence firms can succeed 
in supply, where the market has failed, due to transaction costs. Secondly, following 
the 1937 article by Coase, on the nature of the firm, duo-institutional theory 
developed wherein scarce resources could be allocated by either the firm or the 
market (i. e. market firms). With two different sets of institutions to choose from, 
firms or markets, decision-makers could either make or alternatively buy. The 
decision is actually determined by which of the two institutions minimises the various 
transaction costs. Finally, as a result of the 1960 article by Coase on the problems of 
social costs, multi-institutional theory was created along the same lines because the 
state could also be viewed as a mechanism for the allocation of resources, along with 
the firm and the market. 
The work by Coase is important to make-or-buy decisions, because information is 
central to economics of vertical integration (Coase, 1937: 388). In addition, 
"... the costs of carrying out exchange transactions through the price 
mechanism will vary considerably as will also the costs of organising these 
transactions within the firm. " 
Coase (193 7: 3 96). 
This observation from Coase delivers a way of assessing the make-or-buy decision 
with the firm as a close substitute for the market. However, this break-through from 
Coase was not improved until the initial work of Arrow (1969) and then the major 
work of Williamson (1975), which followed several decades later. 
Whilst the original approach from Coase has attracted much criticism for being too 
theoretical, most notably from Hodgson (1988: 207) and Loasby (1994: 15) the 
intention of transaction cost economics is to amplify the view that an economic 
analysis of the firm was largely lacking prior to the seminal work by Coase. 
However, this view does underestimate the insightful work by Knight (1921) on risk 
and uncertainty and Commons (1934) on institutional economics. Nevertheless, it is 
accurate to state that Coase (and later Williamson) have transformed microeconomic 
theory into specific analysis of transactions and information. 
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(d) The contribution of Arrow 
The source of the more recent developments in transaction costs since Coase (1937) 
can be traced to a defining article of Arrow (1969: 59)5. The contribution of Arrow6 
is important in both the theoretical and empirical understanding of transaction cost 
economics. Arrow highlights the three primary areas of transaction costs namely 
exclusion costs, costs of information and disequilibrium costs. This analysis views 
transaction costs in terms of market failure. Accordingly, 
"In a price system, transaction costs drive a wedge between buyer's and 
seller's prices and thereby give rise to welfare losses as in the usual analysis. " 
Arrow (1969: 60). 
As a consequence, Arrow is the first to recognise that a transaction cost approach is 
market-based (Deitrich, 1994: 29). Arrow predicts a role for transaction costs in 
respect of public goods (exclusion costs), price discovery (information costs) and 
resource allocation (disequilibrium costs). In addition, Arrow makes the wider point 
that all non-market allocation, by definition is a 'second best' solution. As a result, a 
firm cannot restore Pareto efficiency in the presence of this type of market failure, 
which is sub-Pareto efficiency. This is true because, 
"[m]arket failure is the particular case where transaction costs are so high that 
the existence of the market is no longer worthwhile. " 
Arrow (1969: 60). 
This is the reason for the existence of the firm as opposed to resource allocation 
exclusively by the market. The full spread of analysis ranges from markets to firms 
through a complex system of contracts. Williamson (1985: 32) continued this 
analysis as prescriptive and states firms should: 
"[o]rganise transactions so as to economise on bounded rationality while 
simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of opportunism. " 
Williamson (1985: 32). 
On an empirical note, Arrow provides the basis for much of the subsequent work on 
vertical integration, anti-trust legislation and bounded rationality. This contribution 
helped the development of transaction cost economics in respect of changing of 
contracts (ink costs) and the formation of collective action (hybrid organisations). 
Overall, this is considered as the hold-up problem, modelled by Williamson (1983: 
,5 Dietrich (1994: 20) asserts that Arrow (1969) was the first author to dircctly use the term 'transaction 
costs'. Previously Coasc refmcd to the phenomena as 'marketing costs' (Coase., 1937: 392). 
6 Indeed, the contribution of many economists in this sphere contains a number of Nobel Laureates in 
EcDnon-dcs, including Kenneth Arrow (1972), Ronald Coase (1991), Douglass North (1993) and Joseph 
Stigler (1982). 
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522) as the hostage model, where there is credible commitment as well as credible 
threats in the exchange. Next, the importance of the theoretical work of Williamson 
(1975,1985) to the transaction costs approach is assessed. 
(e) The contribution of Williamson 
The extensive work by Williamson has developed the work of both Coase (1937: 386) 
and Arrow (1969: 59) to create a wider theoretical literature basis for transaction 
costs. A sizeable part of the work is based upon the premise that the co-ordination of 
resources by decision-makers is a process of minimising transaction costs (Kreps 
1990: 744). To this end Williamson has acted as a conduit through which a great deal 
of empirical work has been generated in economics, law and organisation 
(Williamson, 1985: 2-7). Essentially three forms of co-ordination are apparent 
(Coase, 1960). Resource allocation can occur through the price mechanism or spot 
markets7, via long term contracts (Menard, 1995: 161) or through non-market forms 
(Arrow, 1969: 59-60). The latter category involves two more alternatives, namely the 
visible hand of the firm (Chandler, 1977: 35) or the hybrid form of the firm-market 
boundary (Alstron and Gillespie, 1989: 191). This latter category has a rather fluid 
definition and incorporates many different forms such as franchise and government 
procurement agencies. Finally, the important issue of contracts is dealt with 
extensively by Williamson (1975,1985). It is clear that if firms are to engage the 
market then there must be some safeguard against the hazards of procurement 
betweenfirms. The complexity of the contract depends on the type of transaction. In 
a spot market exchange, so-called because the transaction is 'on-the-spot' there is 
immediate exchange of standardised contracts because exchange is instantaneous 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 13 1). However, where there is more uncertainty in the 
exchange due to the long-term nature of exchange or asset specificity, then there is a 
need to negotiate contracts in order to facilitate the transaction. 
According to Williamson (1985: 68) there are a variety of contracts between 
economic agents, including informal agreements, hybrid contracts, long-term 
contracts and franchising. In general, a system of contracts has to facilitate exchange 
(MacNeil, 1978: 738). This purpose is especially relevant if transaction costs are 
7 The term spot market is credited to lbyeck (1945), in which exchange between economic agents was 
conducted 'on the spot. ' TUcrefore, spot markets by definition assume zero transaction costs. 
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present and when there are no spot markets. There are three types of contracting 
tradition according to Williamson (1985: 69-72). 
1. Classical contract law, where standard market transactions apply and the 
terms of the contract are completely specified ex ante. 
2. Neo-classical contract law, where third parties are included as attempts to 
incorporate contingent contracts. 
3. Relational contracting, where the relationship between the parties must be 
specified and the transactions must conform to the law of contract. 
In general, the role of contracts in transaction costs can be linked to the notion of 
governance structures and market responsibility between economic agents. The work 
by Williamson shows that transaction cost economics goes beyond the make-or-buy 
dichotomy (Williamson, 1985: 368). That is, transaction cost economics centres upon 
the behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 
1985: 45-49). Bounded rationality is based upon the premise that both informational 
complexity and informational uncertainty prevent decision-makers from computing 
and acting upon all the relevant data (Dietrich, 1994; 19). This stems from the work 
by Simon (1957: xxv) in which it is asserted that individuals are: 
"... intentionally rational, but only limitedly so". 
Simon (1957: xxiv). 
The reasoning behind this stems from recognition that economic agents do attempt to 
be rational within certain constraints. Accordingly, not every single event can be 
accounted for and not every single price can be discovered. Since ex ante search costs 
can be excessive, some individuals simply curtail these costs by acting in a rational 
way, but within the limited information at their disposal. In that sense bounded 
rationality is recognition that markets are not perfect, because cognitive human 
maturity is not perfect. Indeed, even if information was perfect, it is unlikely that 
human decision-making can process the data and always reach the correct outcome. 
Whilst humans act rationally this rationality is nevertheless constrained. 
In terms of human behaviour, the other factor is opportunism, which has been 
described by Williamson (1985: 47) as: 
"... self-interest seeking with guile". 
Williamson (1985: 47). 
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Opportunism is essentially the prospect of viewing individuals as highly competitive 
with an objective function in line with self-interest (Hodgson, 1988: 155). However, 
this does not imply that economic agents are deceitful or fraudulent; simply that 
opportunistic behaviour dominates the overall objective function. In essence, it is 
possible to equate bounded rationality with adverse selection as an ex ante issue and 
equate opportunism with moral hazard as an expost issue. 
Both bounded rationality and opportunism are the human factors within transaction 
cost economics and this implies that individuals have a different economic outlook 
from individuals within other models, which assume complete rationality and self- 
interest without guile. Kreps (1990: 217) cites temporary general equilibrium as an 
example of the latter. The analysis and predictions of transaction costs can not be 
easily compared with other economic models, but there are no assumptions of full and 
perfect information as with neo-classical economics (Klein, 2004: 24). 
The non-human factors, which are involved in transaction costs, include asset 
specificity, the level of uncertainty and the frequency of the transaction (Kreps, 1990: 
747). These dimensions to the transactions are defined as follows: 
1. Asset specificity is the degree to which a transaction has specific aspects or 
features such as physical or attributes. 
2. Uncertainty is the major complexity that derives from bounded rationality 
and is linked to the work of Knight (192 1). 
3. Frequency is the extent to which the transaction occurs either as a one-off or 
a recurrent event. 
In respect to the make-or-buy decision the link between asset specificity and 
frequency is highlighted in Table 3.1. The frequency variable can be split between 
occasional transactions (or generally one-off) and recurrent transactions, which occur 
repeatedly. Similarly, asset specificity can be non-specific at one extreme to highly 
specific at the other with mixed in between. Williamson (1985: 73) refers to complete 
specificity as idiosyncratic because the investment is peculiar to that individual or 
organisation. The distinctive nature of the specificity means that the quasi-rent is 
higher, which is the difference between the use of an asset and the next best 
alternative. Where transactions are non-specific it is preferable to buy even if the 
frequency is occasional or specific. Likewise, where transactions are specific it is 
preferable to make even if the frequency is occasional or specific. 
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Table 3.1: Commercial transactions: asset specificity and frequency 
The Investment Approach 
Frequency Non-speciric Mixed Idiosyncratic 
Occasional Purchase of Purchase of Construction of 
standard equipment customised equipment a plant 
BUY BUY/MAKE MAKE 
Recurrent Purchase of Purchase of Site-specific 
standard material customised material transfer 
BUY BUY/MAIKE NUKE 
Source: Williamson (1985: 73). 
Where: Buy = procurement from external spot markets (market); 
Make = production by internal sources (hierarchies); 
Buy/Make = variable strategy, including long term contracts, 
competitive tendering, franchises and licensing. 
Table 3.1 shows that Williamson regards asset specificity as the most important 
dimension to the transaction, even though with the mixed asset specificity the 
outcome can be make or it can be buy. Table 3.1 also identifies theoretical extremes 
in the decision-making process, where in reality the mixed strategies of make and buy 
may apply to different areas within a firm. The implications of the make-or-buy 
decision are profound for purchasing and production strategies, because both the 
market as well as the firm is an artificial entity, which are created by economic agents 
to facilitate various forms of exchange. This analysis will be examined by a close 
analysis of the transaction cost model in Chapter Four. 
From the preceding analysis it is clear that there is considerable scope to apply a 
transaction cost approach to aerospace and defence. Indeed, Dugger (1993) has 
coffectly pointed out that: 
"The defence contract is heavily laden with transaction cost problems". 
Dugger (1993: 203). 
It is a major gap in the literature that there has been no systematic application of 
transaction cost economics to either aerospace or defence procurement or the 
manufacturing of aerospace goods and services. Primafacie, there is no reason why 
the transaction cost approach should have been previously applied to aerospace. 
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However, the industry has the sufficient and necessary conditions to warrant being 
assessed by the transaction cost methodology, which is the focus of this thesis through 
the make-or-buy decision. 
Summary of literature search 
The main findings of the theoretical literature review are that the Knight developed 
the theme of uncertainty; Commons allowed the unit of analysis to be at the level of 
the transaction; Coase viewed firms and markets as substitutes; Arrow developed the 
initial concept of market failure and Williamson brought all the concepts together as 
markets and hierarchies or the make-or-buy decision. 
In summary, there are at least four methodological elements to theoretical transaction 
costs economics, which are relevant to this thesis (Kreps, 1990: 744). These are: 
L The basic unit of economic analysis is the transaction. 
ii. The human factors involved are opportunism and bounded rationality. 
iii. Transaction dimensions are asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty. 
iv. The make-or-buy choice is based on economising on transaction costs 
Firstly, the make-or-buy framework allows the choice of the comparative institution 
to focus on the transaction as the unit of exchange and not only aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand at the level of the market. As a result of analysing the transaction, 
ex ante search and bargaining costs, plus ex post monitoring and enforcement costs 
become central to the approach. Secondly, information issues are central allowing a 
moral hazard assessment of opportunism and an adverse selection assessment of 
bounded rationality. Hence, the hold-up problem can lead to hostage taking situations 
and the need for the law of contract and the law of tort, given the two behavioural 
assumptions. Thirdly, a measure of transaction costs is possible if the dimensions of 
the transaction can be accurately calculated. Of course, this is the challenge for 
empirical research given there is little or no relevant published data in the area 
(Williamson, 1985: 390). Finally, the make-or-buy decision is the paradigm problem 
in transaction cost economics as a way to economise on the alternative modes of 
production. This can be meaningfully applied to both the boundaries of the firm as 
well as the logistics of the supply chain and highlight the claim that economics, law 
and Organisation are at the focal point of transaction costs (Williamson, 1985: 385). 
A review of the empirical studies will be presented in the next section. 
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A review of the empirical transaction cost literature 
Appendix I presents a comprehensive list of empirical studies in transaction cost 
economics. It is based on classifications devised by Williamson (1989: 173) and 
adopted by Shelanski and Klein (1995: 338), which in general differentiates between 
case studies and statistical analysis. Whilst the list is not exhaustive it is designed to 
be indicative of the empirical studies available since the publication of Markets and 
Hierarchies (Williamson, 1975). The empirical studies are an attempt to make 
operational the theoretical approach offered by Williamson in a meaningful and 
cogent way, beyond the purely descriptive. There are three broad types of empirical 
work into transaction cost issues (Shelanski and Klein, 1995: 338). 
1. Qualitative case studies for example a business history. 
2. Quantitative case studies for example costs study. 
3. Cross-sectional econometric analysis for example industry investigation. 
The first category is qualitative case studies, in which research is conducted into a 
specific transaction or event. The original example of this type of work is Williamson 
(1976), where the author investigates the legal and economic issues of a cable TV 
franchise in some depth. This type of analysis is common in transaction cost 
economics for two reasons. Firstly, there are data collection issues with the key 
transactional variables that make industry to industry comparisons very difficult. 
Secondly, the law dimension of the paradigm lends itself well to case specific 
analysis. In fact, there can only be a proper consideration of the law of contract (that 
is, the hold-up problem) and the closely related law of tort (that is, the externality 
problem) through detailed analysis of individual cases. Indeed, Coase has an impact 
on both the law of contract and the law of tort, via the problem of transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937) and the problem of social cost (Coase, 1960), respectively. Other 
examples of this approach which reflect the legal dimension to transaction cost 
economics include Palay (1984) a consideration of rail freight; Goldberg and Erickson 
(1987) an investigation of petroleum coke; and Nichols (1995) a commentary on 
leisure services. The main finding of the empirical work is that transaction costs can 
be applied to an industry and therefore there is academic credibility to the approach, 
especially following the work by Chandler (1977). 
The second category is quantitative case studies, where research is conducted on a 
detailed and thorough aspect of governance structure or contract. The original 
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example of this approach is Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), in which automobile 
suppliers are assessed in respect to make-or-buy. The seminal papers by Monteverde 
and Teece (1982 a, b) develop this approach in the same industry and establish a clear 
framework for assessing specific transaction costs issues. The methodology used 
proxies to measure the transaction cost variables with vertical integration as the 
dependent variable. The detailed nature of this work is significantly beyond an 
analysis of output and prices and used probit and logit regression analysis. The main 
findings for this category of studies are that the transaction cost approach can stand up 
to a critical economic analysis. In general, the results are consistent with the 
transaction cost approach to vertical integration and are robust in spite of the 
imperfect proxy variables. Hence, Williamson (1985: 104) has commented that the 
transaction cost approach is microanalytic, because it focuses on the transaction as the 
basic economic unit of analysis. 
The third category is cross-sectional econometric analysis, where the research is 
quantitative and attempts to measure and analyse the key transaction cost variables in 
a direct way. This is a very difficult process, because transaction cost variables are 
difficult to accurately measure across industries and between firms, hence data 
problems are evident. An early undertaking to use empirical analysis is seen in the 
study of large firms carried out by Steer and Cable (1978) and across industries by 
Levy (1985). The study by Steer and Cable used OLS estimates of organisational 
form with profit as the dependent variable and firm size, firm growth and 
organisational form as the explanatory variables. Whilst the econometric studies have 
become increasingly more sophisticated, severe measurement problems still trouble 
the transaction cost approach since the transaction cost variables are not from 
officially published sources. This has had the possible effect of limiting the number 
and scope of empirical studies conducted under a transaction cost framework, because 
the data are rarely if ever found in published sources. Nevertheless, the main findings 
are a positive proof that the transaction cost approach is capable of being subject to a 
rigorous and econometric treatment of its logic. 
Williamson (1989: 173) attempts to categorise the empirical studies of transaction 
costs into ten areas and Appendix I outlines the author, year in chronological order, 
country and industry of each study using this Williamson system of classification of 
empirical transaction cost analysis: 
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1. Statistical models, for example, Monteverde and Teece (1982 a). 
2. Bivariate tests, for example, Masten (1984). 
3. Contractual vignettes, for example, Chandler (1977). 
4. Focused case studies, for example, Williamson (1976). 
5. Contractual studies, for example, Masten and Crocker (1985). 
6. Vertical integration, for example, Helfat and Teece (1987). 
7. Multinational studies, for example, Gatignon and Anderson (1986). 
8. Business history, for example, Chandler (1977). 
9. Corporate governance, for example, Hallwood (1991). 
10. Organisation of unions, for example, Anderson and Schmittein (1984). 
This list allows the potential range of transaction costs methodologies to be assessed. 
There are three different types of studies where the methodologies range from 
discursive and descriptive case studies to complex econometric analysis. The first 
type of study includes the statistical models, bivariate tests and vertical integration 
studies, which tend to use econometric techniques to test data. The second type of 
study includes tests of vertical integration, multinational studies and governance 
structures, which tend to use quasi-quantitative data analysis. The final type of study 
tends to be discursive and qualitative in nature and include the contractual vignettes 
and studies, focused case studies and business histories. For the purposes of this 
thesis there will be both statistical models and bivariate tests of the data from the UK 
aerospace survey, because this is the most significant and robust way to assess the 
transaction cost approach. Whilst there will also be discursive commentary on the 
dataset in this thesis, the more successful studies have employed econometric 
techniques in order to accomplish better predictions from the model and that will be 
followed here as well. 
So far this section has attempted to categorise the empirical studies. For this thesis, 
there will be an assessment of vertical integration in the UK aerospace industry using 
a transaction cost approach and consideration of the results through statistical 
analysis. The study by Masten (1984) used a similar approach for aerospace in the 
US at the firm level. At the industry level the study by Lyons (1995) is similar to this 
thesis, especially since data was collected through a postal questionnaire of UK 
manufacturing firms. 
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To summarise, Appendix I presents over seventy of the significant empirical works 
undertaken on transaction cost since the publication of the seminal book Markets and 
Hierarchies by Williamson (1975). The list covers a large number of industries 
including timber harvesting, automobile components and popular music, as well as the 
main sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and services. There is also a wide array of 
transaction cost methodologies from the business history pioneered by Chandler 
(1977) to the probit and logit regression analysis within the econometric tradition 
(Lyons, 1995). However, a major criticism of the body of empirical work is that the 
overwhelming majority of work is undertaken in the US and only a few elsewhere, 
mostly the UK. Hence, the studies are not representative of transactions costs 
globally. Also, very few studies compare the transaction cost results with any other 
explanations. The work by Mahoney (1992) is a rare example of reviewing across the 
literature. Finally, it is worth noting for later in this Chapter that the papers by 
Masten (1984), Masten et al. (199 1), Crocker and Reynolds (1993) and Finch (1998) 
deal specifically with the aerospace industry or defence and as such form the focus of 
this section. 
The next section attempts to categorise and critique the growing body of empirical 
work. There are two key features to this section. The analysis will assess the list 
generally for the evidence of transaction costs. In addition, it will analyse the list for 
the work on aerospace in particular and also defence generally, for clues to improve 
the model to be used in Part Two of this thesis. 
The most recent work by Klein (2004: 9) argues that the empirical evidence of make- 
or-buy decisions can be divided into five categories. These categories are as follows: 
1. Component procurement: the make-or-buy decision. 
2. Contracts and contractual design: the hold-up problem. 
3. Forward integration: marketing and distribution: vertical integration. 
4. Informal agreements: negotiation and settlement. 
5. Other examples: business cases. 
Each category is assessed in terms of the contribution to this thesis. 
(a) Component procurement 
The contribution of Masten (1984) and Masten el al. (1991) on make-or-buy in 
defence and aerospace has been very significant, especially for the purposes of this 
thesis. Masten (1984) attempts to analyse the relative costs of internal and external 
61 
procurement in the defence-related aerospace industry and presents the most direct 
application of the make-or-buy decision to defence. In essence, Masten uses bivariate 
methods to test for association between attributes of the transaction and contract type. 
The main focus is the administration of subcontracts in the aerospace industry by 
prime contractors. A secondary focus is a discussion of how the government chooses 
the prime contractor in the first place. Overall, the analysis is concerned with a trade- 
off between the opportunity costs of an inflexible contract and the ink costs of 
renegotiations under a bilateral monopoly. The hypothesis is written in terms of asset 
specificity. 
"The more specialised.... [are] the assets, the larger will be the quasi-rents 
at stake over that period ....... Masten (1984: 405). 
In other words, there is a possible positive correlation between the complexity (and 
uncertainty) of a transaction and the costs of the transaction. " The model that is tested 
is specifically written in terms of the make-or-buy decision. In particular, the choice 
variable is given as Gi, which is the institution chosen by the firm to acquire the 
product or process. Ui is the external source of procurement, Gi is the internal 
source. In summary: 
(make): Gi Gi if Li (wi) <L (X i, wi) 
or 
(buy): Gi UiifL i (wi) i, wi) 
Where: Li costs to source internally 
Ei costs to source externally 
% asset specificity 
w complexity of transaction. 
Eq. 3.9 
Eq. 3.10 
The empirical test involved identifying 1,887 aerospace component specifications and 
using a team of key personnel to decide which items were purchased from external 
sources. For example, at one extreme all 180 component specifications under the 
category connectors were sourced from the market (buy); whereas all 80 hamess/coax 
component specifications were produced in-house (make). Questionnaires were then 
Robcrtson and Langlois (1995: 548) corrclate bctween ownership and coordination intcgration. 
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devised to generate variables on complexity and asset specificity, the latter including 
whether bespoke or generic parts were required. Using a probit model to test the 
choice between make and buy, Masten supports the hypothesis that as complexity and 
asset specificity increase, so does the probability of the component being produced in- 
house. However, Masten also identifies that there is a high propensity to source item 
from the market, especially in the absence of significant asset specificity and 
complexity. This is because there are greater costs involved in the make option, 
especially for the government. Thus: 
"[e]vidence from both stages of the defence procurement process 
indicates a general reluctance on the part of administrators to internalise 
transactions ...... Masten (1984: 416). 
The specific case nature of this study by Masten means it is difficult to generalise 
from the results. However, this study is significant overall because of the use of 
probit methodology and in particular to this thesis due to the application to the 
aerospace industry in the USA- Rogerson (1995) offers some support for Masten for 
US defence procurement: 
"Many observers believe that government either lacks the ability to take 
production in-house .... or simply does not want to design and produce its 
own weapons because of an ideological preference for private 
enterprise. " 
Rogerson (1995: 317). 
In sum, Masten (1984) assumes under the reduced form analysis that the true costs of 
organisation, both make-or-buy were known. This has an important outcome that 
may be generalised, for subsequent research, making the approach developed by 
Masten very significant. However, the costs of the institution not chosen may actually 
be unknown. Assume the true costs of the organisation are as follows: 
X+e, 
an Z+t4 
Where: GQ 
Gtn 
x 
z 
e+g 
if G9 < G", (make) Eq. 3.11 
if G9 > G' (buy) Eq. 3.12 
costs of internal organisation 
costs of market 
vector of attributes (make) 
vector of attributes (buy) 
normallY distributed random variables. 
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If the make option G9 is chosen then the cost of G" will not be available. However, if 
it assumed that G9 is chosen because it is the least cost option then it is possible to 
estimate U, given that the probability of observing Go can be written as follows: 
Prob(GQ < an) Prob(e -p<Z- X) Eq. 3.13 
Masten (1984) assesses the hypothesis that the costs of G9 will be less than G' 
because aerospace has a high proportion of labour-intensive and low technology tasks. 
The evidence to test this hypothesis is taken from a survey questionnaire of key 
respondents involved in a sample of make-or-buy decisions inherent in the aircraft 
construction programme. The standard transaction cost variables are present, 
including complexity (uncertainty), physical asset and human asset specificity. Probit 
estimations are made of the make-or-buy decisions and a simple regression is also 
employed. In the latter case G9 was the dependent variable and internal organisation 
specifications were the independent variables. This allows an estimation of the dollar 
cost of organisation. 
The contribution of the work by Masten (1984) in terms of this thesis is threefold. 
Firstly, the findings show that aerospace production is an appropriate industry to study 
in the context of transaction costs. It is no coincidence given asset specificity and 
uncertainty in the nature of aerospace business that Masten used the industry as the 
basis for the pioneering study in the field. Secondly, the results show that it is 
possible to directly measure the various transaction cost variables in particular make- 
or-buy. This outcome is crucial in the attempt to test the paradigm problem of make- 
or-buy as it demonstrates there is a precedent in the research area to follow. Finally, 
the use of probit analysis adds credibility to the research and shows how the 
transaction costs approach can be made operational with econometric analysis. In the 
case of this thesis logit analysis is used where there is a limited dependent variable 
such as make-or-buy, which is very similar to probit. In sum, the paper by Masten is 
central to the methodology of this thesis, which seeks to expand and develop 
transaction costs analysis of the aerospace industry in the UK. 
Masten el al. (1991) continues the transaction cost theme of comparative institutional 
efficiency with an empirical study of naval shipbuilding in the US. Other transaction 
cost studies have focused on mainly manufacturing industries (except Anderson and 
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Schmittlein in a following category) and estimations of reduced form relationship 
between the type of organisation (make or buy) and contract type. In this study 
censored regression techniques are employed to a large vessel construction 
programme and the procurement of naval ship components. This is detailed in Table 
3.2 below: 
Table 3.2: Naval construction: estimated make-or-buy costs 
All Figures in US S Make Items 
(n = 43) 
Buy Items 
(n = 31) 
Total 
(n = 74) 
Estimated Costs 1,863,620 1,717,710 3,581,330 
Costs if all components made internally 1,863,620 2,945,930 4,809,260 
Costs if all components sub-contracted 5,435,200 1,717,710 7,155,060 
Source: Masten et aL, (1991: 2 1). 
The results are very insightful for the make-or-buy approach as a whole. If an 
organisation can make the items it can produce cheapest in-house (and buy all other 
items) then this is the most efficient outcome. Hence, the evidence ranks the costs of 
organisations with the hybrid firms (make and buy) as the least cost; the internal firm 
(make only) the next expensive; with the external firm (buy only) as the most 
expensive. This result is supported in the economic literature by Ouchi (1980) with 
work on clans and networks? (that is, make and buy); and in the procurement 
literature by various means. In other words, if the firm had to make all the items it 
could buy for less from the market, then the cost of these items would increase by 
71%. Similarly, if the firm had to buy all the items it currently makes then the cost 
would increase by almost three times. Evaluation of these results show there are 
greater cost savings for a firm producing all components in-house than the cost 
savings made from buying all components from the market. 
Overall, the results support some of the transaction cost arguments and as such 
Masten el al. refers to the outcome as quasi-integration. Nevertheless, the research 
generates some interesting results about the internal costs of organisation. For 
examPle, the naval construction firm is unlikely to integrate engineering-intensive 
activities and more likely to integrate labour-intensive activities, on the basis of make- 
9 This enThasises neither a co-operative approach nor an adversarial approach to the market. 
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or-buy due to human asset specificity. If the internal costs of organisation minimise 
the transaction cost then a make strategy is followed by the firm. 
(b) Contracts and contractual design 
The contribution of Crocker & Reynolds on aerospace is also highly significant from 
a transaction costs perspective. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) attempt to develop 
transaction cost issues of US Air Force engine procurement through the notion of 
incomplete contracts. This research recognises the need for incentives in contracts 
and identifies of opportunism by defence firms. In essence, Crocker and Reynolds 
recognise contract design difficulties faced by defence procurement agencies. There 
is a cost trade-off between more complete contracts, which reduce ex post 
opportunism, and incomplete contracts, which do not incur ex ante design costs. The 
conclusion has clear implications for transaction costs: 
...... the degree of contractual completeness chosen in practice reflects a 
desire by parties to minimise the economic costs associated with 
contractual exchange. " 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993: 126). 
This is viewed in terms of so-called ink costs that are the cost of renegotiating 
contracts (Lewicki et al., 2001: 99). If there were zero transaction costs then defence 
contracting would simply involve specifying all the relevant issues and contingencies 
in the design of the contract. However, once it is recognised that contracting is not 
costless then contract design can either reduce ex post opportunism or ex ante ink 
costs (from constantly re-drafting the contract) of long term contracts which are 
commonplace in defence procurement. Therefore, defence and aerospace firms view 
long-term contracts as an alternative to spot markets in the face of uncertainty and 
complexity (Williamson, 1975: 245). Chandler (1977: 10) has famously coined the 
phrase of the visible hand (long term contracts) as an alternative to the invisible hand 
(spot markets). Hence: 
"[t]he degree of environmental complexity and the likelihood of 
opportunism come directly to bear in the design of military procurement 
contracts. By its nature, defence acquisition involves substantial 
recurring investment in relationship-specific assets by a relatively small 
group of highly specialised defence contractors. " 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993: 129). 
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In order to test these issues, a list of contract types was drawn up (including firm- 
fixed price and not to exceed price) and applied to a panel dataset of contracts for both 
the F-15 and F-16 engines procured from General Electric and Pratt and Whitney 
between 1970 and 1991. 
The hypothesis states that the efficient degree of complete contracts is evident in 
contract type, which reflects uncertainty, opportunism, and complexity. The model of 
reduced form relationship is: 
P* it pi(a 
Where: p 
P* 
0) 
it, Lft) + eit Eq. 3.14 
degree of incomplete contracts 
degree of contractual completeness 
environmental uncertainty 
opportunistic behaviour 
error term 
Using OLS the following empirical relationship was tested: 
Yit = cd + ffiv, wit + yit + eit Eq. 3.15 
Where Yit is the degree of contractual completeness. 
The results showed that long-term contracts provided guarantees to defence 
contractors whom had entered into asset specific contracts with the DoD. Initial 
uncertainty also diminished over time as contracts became more complete and trust 
developed on all sides. Also this emphasises the endogeneity of contract type, which 
previous studies assumed to be exogenous. As a result, Crocker and Reynolds 
conclude that incomplete contracts are used in contract design as a choice variable, 
whilst still minimising the costs of the contract. 
In addition, there are two other studies on aerospace, a location study of former 
British Aerospace sites in the UK (Finch, 1998) and a case review of Rolls Royce UK 
aero-engines (Prencipe, 1996). The work by Finch (1998) does not approach the 
study from a transaction cost perspective, but it is possible to interpret the analysis as 
assessing the location asset specificity of Lancashire-based aerospace companies. 
Also, Finch uses a logit model to assess diversification in the aerospace sector in 
terms of size of the firm and engineering function. The findings show that the size of 
firm influences diversification, which can be taken to mean that larger firms do not 
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have the same location asset specificity as smaller firms. The main fault in the study 
is that it simplistically assumes that British Aerospace is the only core company in the 
area and therefore does not fully assess the supply chain or the contractual 
relationship between firms. The work by Prencipe is an assessment of the role of 
contract design in the aero-engine sub-section of the industry. The study tends to be 
an overly descriptive account of the domestic monopoly position of Rolls-Royce, but 
there is some useful assessment of contracts and asset specificity of the company. 
These latter two studies confirm that there is a scope for a transaction cost approach to 
the UK aerospace, because each provides support for the model and the methodology. 
Even though neither study is written from a transaction cost perspective per se, the 
studies do contain references to transaction costs involving location and contract in 
the UK aerospace industry. 
(c) Forward integration into marketing and distribution. 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) apply transaction cost to the US electronic 
component industry. The point of the analysis is the empirical study relates to a sub- 
contractor (rather than a prime contractor) and the focus is on a marketing functionlo, 
namely personal selling (rather than production). This is a test of vertical integration, 
which recognises the behavioural features of bounded rationality and opportunism. 
The comparison is between two types of personal selling, namely, a manufacturer 
representative (buy) or a directly employed sales-person (make). Therefore, this is a 
test of human asset specificity, since differences in physical assets of companies are 
insignificant in this context. 
Four key variables are highlighted through a questionnaire of sales managers from 
sixteen companies. Namely, company size, which is not a transaction cost specific 
variable, asset specificity, uncertainty" and frequency (transaction cost variables). 
Such survey data from one industry, electronic components, does allow the study to 
be microanalytic, but it is not possible to generalise from the results. As with Masten 
(1984), this is an estimation of reduced form relationship involving make-or-buy. The 
hypothesis is then the greater the level of uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency 
the greater the likelihood of employing a direct sales force (make). The inclusion of 
10 This widens the debate considerably, because previously Masten (1984) was a study of 
manufacturing projects. " in this case it is internal uncertainty. 
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the transaction cost variables was statistically significant and important in determining 
vertical integration. 
In particular, internal uncertainty, (that is the difficulty in monitoring individual 
performance) and transaction-specific assets was strongly associated with employing 
a direct sales force. This study did not find transaction frequency to have any impact 
as predicted by Williamson (1985: 60-61). In addition, Anderson and Schmittlein 
find that the inclusion of the specific transaction cost variables (uncertainty, frequency 
and asset specificity) improve the results relative to a model of integration simply 
based on company size. However, there is no indication of how other variables would 
be included such as lagged profit. Furthermore, the transaction cost variables are 
good predictors of integration for those electronics firms not included in the survey. 
Whilst this is initial empirical work which is limited in terms of general implications, 
it does present evidence that transaction costs are potentially important in determining 
vertical integration. 
(d) Informal agreements 
A significant set of work on relational contracts is the seminal study by Monteverde 
and Teece (1982 a, b). The first article is an attempt to test the transaction costs 
approach to vertical integration with US automobile industry data and has echoes of 
the earlier work by Klein el aL (1978), in terms of car production and the scope for 
opportunism. The main point of analysis is asset specificity, because this will help to 
determine the cost of switching supplier. A firm will tend to buy from the market, if 
the costs of supplier switching approaches zero. Hence, the prediction that the firm 
will buy the components when there is a clearly defined and operational spot market. 
However, a firm will tend to make, if the costs of supplier switching are significant. 
This is because if the firm continues to buy a component, in the face of high supplier 
switching costs, then the firm will be exposed to the hold-up problem and hostage- 
taking. This is also viewed as an issue of quasi-rent, where quasi-rent is defined as 
the difference between highest value of an asset and the next-highest value of the 
asset. If the quasi-rent approaches zero, then there is low asset specificity. In this 
case, the transaction cost economics prediction is that the firm will buy from the 
market. However, if the quasi-rent is high, then there is also high asset specificity. In 
this case, the transaction cost economics prediction is that the firm will vertically 
integrate or make. Hence, Monteverde and Teece (1982 a) hypothesise that 
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assemblers will vertically integrate production when the firm is dealing with 
specialised and non-patentable know-how, in order to avoid opportunistic contractors 
and hence the hold-up problem. The main hypothesis reads: 
"The greater is the applications engineering effort associated with the 
development of any given automobile component, the higher are the expected 
appropriable quasi-rents and therefore the greater is the likelihood of vertical 
integration of production for that component. " 
Monteverde and Teece (1982 a: 207). 
A list of 133 car components were assessed in terms of whether the item was 
purchased fi7orn an external source or made in-house by either GM or Ford. If 80% or 
more (the overwhelming majority) of the required quantity of a component or product 
is made in-house then the item is coded as make; whereas if 80% or more of the 
required quantity is procured from outside sources then the item is coded as buy. 
Once again, because of human asset specificity, both GM and Ford are more likely to 
bring production in-house if purchasing from suppliers gives that supplier an 
opportunity for an advantage. The study found that Ford outsources more than GM or 
alternatively, GM is more vertically integrated than Ford. This suggests that GM has 
apparently greater transaction costs, which is why the firm has maintained more work 
in-house. A car assembler or prime contractor will supply itself with a component, if 
the engineering design contains transaction specific skills, which could be exploited 
by the opportunism of an external supplier. As a result, asset specificity can lead in 
part to the hold-up problem. However, the analysis does not raise the issue of why the 
make-or-buy profile for GM and Ford are not identical given that each operates under 
largely similar conditions. In answer, an in-depth business case history or analysis 
along the lines of Chandler (1977) may reveal significant development differences of 
each firm that account for the alternative approaches. For example, Ford has 
witnessed largely organic growth, whereas GM has been the product of merger and 
acquisition, which in part may reflect the different propensities to make and buy 
between the different parts of the company. 
(e) Other examples 
For the area of other examples three works are assessed in this thesis, which include 
Williamson, Chandler in the US and Cable and Steer in the UK. These empirical 
works are considered in this section. 
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(i) The example from Williamson 
The first significant empirical work on transaction cost economics appeared in 1976, 
after the publication of Markets and Hierarchies by Williamson in 1975. The initial 
studies were mainly case studies or reviews of business history. The study of 
franchise bidding for CATV by Williamson (1976: 73) is indicative of this work. The 
main argument is that cable TV is a natural monopoly and there is a possible hold-up 
problem caused by bi-lateral monopoly. Williamson considers that regulation is 
necessary due to both market and technological uncertainty, where uncertainty is a 
key transactional variable. The real insight of this study is the attempt by Williamson 
to conduct a microanalytical study of economic behaviour, which examines a contract 
or transaction in greater detail than simply aggregate market supply and demand. 
According to the aim of the analysis by Williamson (1976): 
"... it was necessary to examine the contracting process in greater detail than 
had been done previously to discern the types of difficulties which market 
mediated encounters and, relatedly, to establish in what respects and way 
internal (collective and hierarchical) organisation offers an advantage. " 
Williamson (1976: 74). 
In other words, the greater detail at the level of a contract or transaction can be 
translated in the fundamental issue of make-or-buy. The example of CATV illustrates 
that there are no frictionless alternatives when supplying a natural monopoly. There 
needs to be a choice between the make-or-buy modes of exchange, in order to 
mininýiise the transaction costs. The specific transaction costs in the example of 
CATV, include the costs of bidding process, demand uncertainty, asset specificity of 
the incumbent firm and opportunism. These are all familiar themes of transaction cost 
and the case study approach allows the analysis to focus on the number of ex ante 
bidders plus the conditions of expost supply. There is inevitably an issue of adverse 
selection in the bidding process and moral hazard in the final supply, which 
Williamson highlights in the analysis. The problem with the case study approach is 
that it can only be used for the purpose of general deduction and also it understates the 
significant problems of measuring and quantifying the key transactional variables, 
such as uncertainty and complexity. These problems are left to other papers by 
subsequent research teams. For example, the approach taken by Goldberg (1976) 
favours a more legalistic framework for the analysis, whereas the first of several 
contributions by Teece (1976) is a focused industry studies in this case the 
transactions of petroleum refining. 
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(ii) The example from Chandler 
The contribution of Chandler (1977) is an important landmark in development of 
empirical transaction cost analysis. This is because for the first time a significant 
body of work was assessed under a transaction cost framework (Williamson, 1985). 
The work by Chandler is an impressive contribution to the history of corporate 
business and the developments of the modem firm. Essentially, Chandler developed 
the business history of huge corporations, for example Ford and complex industries, 
for example American railways. In addition, in his book Yhe Visible Hand (1977), 
Chandler basically shares the view of Williamson (1975: 133) that transaction costs 
will focus on the alternative means of contracting. Chandler (1977) was one of the 
earliest researchers to give academic credibility to transaction costs and indeed helped 
to establish transaction cost in terms of vertical integration, via scale and scope 
(Chandler, 1990). 
A potential offshoot of the work by Chandler is the much-cited paper by Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978), in which the authors assess suppliers in the US 
automobile industry. This is a showcase of how transaction costs can begin to explain 
the trading partnerships and how firms protect themselves from incomplete contracts 
and asymmetric informatiom In this industrial study, the conflict between General 
Motors and Fisher Bodies is examined in terms of the hold-up problem, caused 
directly by dedicated physical assets following a move from wooden-bodied to metal- 
bodied cars in the 1920s. The eventual decision by GM to buy-out Fisher illustrates 
the importance of asset specificity in non-spot market transactions. This analysis 
predates the hostage model developed later by Williamson (1983), but has all the 
hallmarks of asymmetric commitment, which ultimately may lead to vertical 
integration. Klein (1988) revisits this area as a case study, but gives greater emphasis 
to specific human capital, as the cause of the failure of the long term contract. In 
essence, GM switched the governance structure from buy to make as a result of the 
hold-up problem. Other case study approaches are later found in Lilien (1979) and 
Williamson (1979), which look separately at various aspects of transaction costs from 
a largely descriptive perspective. The main problem with the case study approach is 
that it tends not to measure directly the key variables of transaction costs. Also, the 
results whilst interesting are not always sufficiently robust to generalise. Therefore, a 
more systematic and statistical approach to the transaction cost approach is required in 
order to move the analysis forward. 
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(iii) The example from Steer and Cable 
One of the earliest statistical studies was conducted by Steer and Cable (1978) on 
large companies in the UK. This study was an attempt to predict the organisational 
form of companies. The basic premise is that the internal form of the firm will help to 
determine efficiency and hence the internal form is correlated to size, growth and 
control. The dependent variable is the profit-maximising level of profit for a given 
firm and the explanatory variables are a vector of organisational form and firm size 
and growth. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on data from 82 large 
UK in the period 1967 to 1971, Steer and Cable found the process of acquiring 
optimal organisation form to have non-trivial transaction cost (Steer and Cable, 1978: 
17). In other words, organisational form matters in explaining inter-firm and inter- 
industry profitability. In particular, 
"The choice among alternative internal organisation structures also has a 
pervasive and important implication for the locus of decision-making within 
the firm... " 
Steer and Cable (1978: 28). 
One of the next important pieces of statistical work was produced by Armour and 
Teece (1980) on vertical integration in the petroleum industry 1954 to 1975. The 
authors found a statistically significant relationship between vertical integration and 
R&D, suggesting the importance of human specific capital. Hence, technological 
know-how is rarely traded via arms-length market transaction, because of exposure to 
the hold-up problem and the potential opportunity for hostage taking. Instead, the 
conclusion from Armour and Teece is that firms involved with basic and applied 
R&D will prefer to vertically integrate and avoid outsourcing strategically important 
work such as innovation and design. As a result, the existence of positive transaction 
costs will help determine governance structures in modem capitalist firms. Teece 
(1981) is the first to revisit the notion of large firms, which was first introduced by 
Steer and Cable (1978). Teece was interested in internal organisation or M-form 
structure and profitability, where the leading or principal firm in an industry is paired 
against a control firm for twenty different industries and across two different time 
periods. M-form innovation is shown to have a statistically significant impact on firm 
performance, supporting the previous analysis by Steer and Cable (1978) and Amour 
and Teece (1980), plus the business history case studies of Chandler (1977). Of 
course, the transaction cost approach is not unique in offering an explanation of this 
outcome as a monopoly power argument could meaningfully be applied as well. 
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However, at this early stage of the empirical development of transaction costs the 
results were viewed as positive, especially the contribution of Alfred Chandler. 
Summary 
The studies in Appendix I have a common understanding that the transaction cost 
approach is an appropriate method for analysing the complexities of modem vertical 
integration through make-or-buy and contract design. The studies share a coherent 
theoretical foundation and a methodology that is operational albeit over a relatively 
short period of time since Williamson (1976). The studies do not share a uniform 
approach nor benefit from a consistent set of results. This variability of interpretation 
and results is part of a continuing process to establish transaction cost within the 
wider framework of theories of the firm, rather than a single theory of the firm 
(Backhouse, 2002: 318-319). It is apparent that there is considerable scope to apply a 
transaction cost approach to aerospace and defence (Dugger, 1993). 
There is no coincidence that three of the major empirical works in transaction cost 
economics have been related to complex engineering programmes in both aerospace 
and defence. Masten (1984), Masten el al. (199 1) and Crocker and Reynolds (1993) 
assess aerospace production, naval shipbuilding and aero-engine procurement, 
respectively and provide this thesis with precedence. These are fiirther compelling 
reasons why a transaction cost approach to the UK aerospace industry is wholly 
appropriate. However, transaction costs is not solely concerned with complex 
engineering and since the empirical work of Crocker and Reynolds there has been a 
array of other applications of the transaction cost model. These studies range from 
agriculture and transport (Foss, 1996, Pirrong, 1993, respectively) to leisure services 
and entertainment (Nichols, 1995, Cameron and Collins, 1997, respectively). Also, 
there is a cross-section of approaches from business case history along the lines of 
Chandler, for example Argyres (1995: 338) to an econometric analysis, for example 
Lyons (1995: 431-432). All the studies use transaction cost hypotheses and test 
vertical integration through asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty and all find 
support for the approach. 
In sum, there are definition issues in transaction cost that should not be ignored and 
there are also measurement issues to tax the empirical researcher. However, the 
definitions are not proven to be fundamentally flawed and the measurement problems 
are not insurmountable to prevent widening the empirical applications of the 
74 
transaction cost approach to a single industry such as UK aerospace. Even so the 
research in this thesis proceeds with caution (Klein, 2004: 2). Nevertheless, there are 
four key findings to emerge from the assessment of the empirical work outlined in 
Appendix 1. 
i. The make-or-buy approach can be applied to the aerospace industry through 
component procurement studies. 
ii. The statistical studies of make-or-buy tend to use probit or logit models of 
analysis for the limited dependent variable. 
iii. Asset specificity is considered to be the most important aspect of the empirical 
work determining make-or-buy. 
iv. The hold-up problem can be applied to the aerospace industry through 
contracts and contractual design. 
Overall, there are some important findings to develop in Chapter Four, which include 
the specific criticisms relating to the transaction costs paradigm. These findings are 
summarised as follows. Masten (1984) assesses the make-or-buy choice for 12 
categories of aerospace components in the US. This work finds a strong 
predisposition to buy, encouraged by government procurement policies. Also, there is 
further strong evidence for this in Masten et al. (1991) for a transaction cost approach 
to defence contracting on naval shipbuilding. Taken together these two studies are 
compelling support for applying the transaction cost approach to aerospace and 
defence industries in the United States. The purpose of this thesis is to apply the 
transaction cost approach to the UK aerospace industry. 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) examine US Air Force engine procurement and find 
evidence of ex post opportunism and hold-up problems in sole-source exchange. In 
addition, a defence firm will have a high propensity to produce in-house, leading to 
inefficient allocation of resources (for example labour hoarding and 'gold-plating') 
because the US DoD is only willing to act as vendor for defence equipment. As a 
result, the issue of the hold-up problem is relevant in aerospace procurement and 
therefore worthwhile of fiirther investigation from a transaction cost perspective. 
Furthermore, Finch (1998) finds evidence of location and facility asset specificity in 
the UK aerospace industry in the Lancashire area for British Aerospace and its 
suppliers. Finally, Prencipe (1997) observes an established pattern in the UK of 
developing and integrating aero-engines in-house and contracting-out components and 
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sub-systems. Overall, there is evidence from North America and Western Europe that 
issues such as the asset specificity, the make-or-buy decision and the hold-up problem 
are relevant and measurable in the aerospace sector. Therefore, the transaction cost 
approach is viable, but the model needs to incorporate the various critiques of 
transaction costs in order to establish a meaningful research schema. 
Conclusions 
So far, this thesis has explored the UK aerospace industry in terms of the relevant 
economic analysis and in particular transaction cost economics. The main conclusion 
to be drawn is that the UK aerospace industry may be meaningfully assessed in terms 
of the transaction costs approach due to the nature of the production and procurement 
decisions. This review has documented gaps in the literature, namely, the scope for 
applying transaction costs to the UK aerospace industry, especially the make-or-buy 
decision and contract design. 
To conclude, mainstream economic analysis does not fully capture the complexity of 
the modem aerospace industry. A transaction costs analysis is more subtle than a 
simple partial equilibrium or market approach and certainly goes beyond a structure- 
conduct-performance paradigm. Whilst aerospace firms and supply chain network are 
complicated, it is possible to assess and predict the behaviour of aerospace firms using 
the transaction cost economics. From the theoretical underpinning developed by 
Coase, Commons, Knight and Arrow plus the formations of the model by Williamson 
to the array of applied work in Appendix 1, the transaction cost approach is currently 
in a position to analyse and critically evaluate the UK aerospace industry with a 
robust and testable framework. The next stage of making the transaction cost 
economics model operational will form the basis of Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Four: 
Applying the Transaction Cost Model 
Introduction 
This Chapter presents the transaction cost model and demonstrates that the theory can 
be made operational through empirical research. The predictions of the transaction 
cost model are identified, but the imprecise nature of the approach means it is a 
difficult task to conduct transaction cost investigations. The transaction cost approach 
is superficially attractive in terms of the choice between markets and hierarchies. 
However, to make the theory tractable, the empirical research has to create practical 
data from imprecise concepts. For the research to proceed, problematical decisions 
have to be made concerning definitions and the choice of data. This Chapter reports 
on the strengths and weaknesses of previous studies that have attempted to formulate 
the transaction cost predictions and collected data for empirical testing. 
There are three parts to the Chapter. Firstly, the background to the model and the 
methodology of transaction costs is described. Secondly, there is a section on the 
transaction model and its hypotheses. Thirdly, the operational aspects of the 
transaction cost model and methods of testing are presented. The main finding of the 
Chapter is that the transaction cost approach is difficult to make operational. The 
relevance of the UK aerospace to transaction costs is emphasised throughout the 
Chapter. The next section presents a brief background to the transaction cost model. 
Background to the model 
The aim of this section is to identify the two levels of the make-or-buy decision and to 
identify the methodology. Transaction cost economics has evolved from a general set 
of premises articulated primarily by Williamson (1985: 386-387) into a potentially 
useful economic analysis, which can be applied in all sectors of the economy including 
defence, education and health (Dugger, 1993: 202)1. It has been empirically tested 
1 Ile full quote from Dugger (1993: 205) is relevant and reads: 
"The make or buy decision facing the nation state in the provision of public or private 
goods is overripe for the application of transaction cost analysis. Tle provision of 
defence, health and education could all bencfit from such an applicatiorr. 
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across many industries such as aerospace, electronics and shipbuilding (Williamson and 
Masten, 1995: xiii). Dugger identifies two types of organisation that attempt 
transaction cost minimisation (Dugger, 1989: 607): 
1. The national state or government, including procurement agencies. 
2. The corporate state or firms, including conglomerate organisations. 
Both the national state and the corporate state can either make-or-buy. At the 
government-level of decision-making, the national state can either make "in-house" 
through public monopolies or buy from private firms operating in national and 
international markets. There is a strong argument by Dietrich (1994: 169) that 
transaction costs only exist in the short run because in the long run the choices 
automatically become more efficient. Furthermore, Dietrich considers econornising on 
transaction costs as a relatively static exercise. As a consequence, he argues that 
transaction costs are zero in the long run as the dynamic effects of governance 
structures are created through monopoly power (Dietrich 1994: 179). From this 
perspective it can be argued that it is inappropriate to apply a transaction costs 
approach where long run contracts exist. The criticism is relevant to this thesis, where 
long term relational contracting is clearly central to aerospace and defence production. 
The response to Dietrich is recognition that the modem firm can be understood as 
assessing governance structures within organisations through a transaction cost 
approach. The basis of transaction cost economics is that governance structures at the 
level of national state depend largely on the make-or-buy decision rather than ways to 
earn monopoly rent by the control of inputs markets and distribution. 
At the firm-level of decision-making, the analysis of Coase (1937 and 1960) has 
allowed considerable work to be undertaken into the nature of the firm. The general 
type of model implies the decision-making process is guided by a holistic view of the 
firm rather than a linear production function. Figure 4.1 represents the firm as 
concentric relationships with production and distribution at the centre (or make) and 
procurement in the outer circles (or buy). If the core business of the firm is 
production and distribution, then the firm has the decision to make-or-buy, which is 
known as a hybrid form. The transaction cost approach is not the mechanistic black 
box methodology of the linear production function (Demsetz, 1997: 426). 
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In the concentric model of the firm, ex ante search information and ex post policing 
costs create positive transaction costs. This implies the firm is part of a wider supply 
chain where the boundaries between the firm and the market exist and determine 
governance structures. 
Figure 4.1: The concentric model of the firm 
Contracting 
-- Internal 
Organisation 7, 
Production/ 
Distributiotn 
Source: Dietrich (1994: 32). 
The concentric model of the firm can be developed into the compass model of the firm 
shown in Figure 4.2, where vertical and horizontal integration is shown, based on the 
strategic core at the centre. The strategic core consists of high asset specificity, 
otherwise it would be more appropriate to buy from the market. An expansion of the 
boundaries of the firm is achieved by either vertical integration (scale and scope 
monopolies) or by horizontal acquisition (complex monopolies). 
The close link between defence firms (i. e. vendor) and government agencies (i. e. 
buyer) may be explained by economies of scale generated 'upstream' in the factor 
markets (e. g. procurement); and economics of scale generated 'downstream' in the 
goods market (e. g. distribution). Both 'upstream' and 'downstream' economies of 
scale are an attempt to minimise transaction costs. As a result, it is the make-or-buy 
decision at the firm level which is the focus of the thesis as an analysis of transaction 
costs in aerospace (Masten, 1984: 404). 
79 
Figure 4.2: Vertical and horizontal integration of the finn 
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Source: adapted by the author. 
The implication of the concentric firm is two predictions within the transaction cost 
economics approach. Firstly, if transaction costs are approximately zero, then 
economic agents will buy from the market. Secondly, if transaction costs are positive 
or greater than zero, then economic agents will make in-house. These predictions 
incorporate transaction cost minimising (economics), the role of contracts (law) and 
governance structure of the firm (organisation). There are three corollaries, namely 
firms exist where markets fail (the make option); market firms exist to minimise 
transaction costs (the buy option) and firms that make and buy are hybrids. However, 
this is a source of the tautology criticism, because it is over-simplistic to state that 
firms either make-or-buy, which in turn is difficult to make operational. The next part 
of this section introduces the economic methodology of the transaction cost models. 
The methodology of transaction cost models 
The deductive logic of the transaction costs approach is focused on a common 
structure or universal law (Blaug, 1992). In essence: 
"[b]y a universal law, we mean some such proposition as 'in all cases 
where events A occur, events B also occur' 
Blaug (1992: 4). 
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Event A in the transaction cost approach is the coincidence of asset specificity, 
bounded rationality and opportunism; event B is the full catastrophe of transaction 
cost, where asset specificity, opportunism and bounded rationality are all present 
(Williamson, 1986: 178). These methodological features remain firmly embedded in 
the architecture of neo-classical economics (Dietrich, 1994: 179). Williamson (1986: 
175-176) terms the approach by definition as micro-analytic, which is another 
expression for partial equilibrium analysis, including constrained optimality (internal 
features) and the price mechanism (external features). However, transaction costs 
economics assume a market solution is possible. 2 Nevertheless, once the problem of 
positive transaction costs is introduced, then the make-or-buy strategy itself becomes 
the most preferred outcome. In other words: 
".... transaction costs would have to be considered external to the 
individual decision-malcing process .... The claimed sub-optimal state 
is 
thus seen as being optimal with regard to the barrier of transaction costs. " 
Boland (1986: 33). 
In theory, an economic environment with zero transaction costs is a relatively static 
3 
and populated by the one-person firm (Demsetz, 1997: 427). Positive transaction 
costs generate the need for a comparative institutional approach. The criticism of the 
methodological approach centres upon whether or not it is tautological. Thus 
according to Boland: 
"If the transactions cost is in any way influenced by prices, the explanation 
become circular or at best incomplete. " 
Boland, (1986: 146). 
Transaction costs are prone to this criticism of tautology, because the features of the 
approach are universal: the arguments underlying the theory may appear circular but 
are not necessarily true by definition. However, transaction costs are not absolute and 
can be viewed as part of a continuum allowing a more general approach to be adopted. 
Indeed, the tautology criticism is not conclusive simply because transaction costs can 
be applied to many areas. The main argument against the circular nature of transaction 
costs is that the approach itself is far more rigorous than the tautology argument 
2 The neo-classical paradigm assumes zero transaction costs. Langlois and Robertson (1995: 29) 
predict zero transaction costs in the long run under transaction cost economics. This is similar to the 
Marshallian theory of the firm and the idea of Dietrich (1994: 179). 
3 This inspired Williamson! s famous quote "In the beginning there were markets .. ý" Williamson (1975: 20) criticised by Loasby (1976: 65-66). 
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implies. In other words, transaction costs are viewed on many levels from the general 
concept of friction in the economy to the detailed nature of make-or-buy, where the 
latter is not tautological in nature. As a direct consequence of a deductive approach, 
transaction cost economics has evolved into a generalist theory of industrial 
economics, combining organisation, law and economics. 
Transaction costs have also been applied to specific categories of hybrid firms, namely, 
multinational corporations or the conglomerate enterprise (Kay, 1984: 78). This is 
because interrialisation leads directly to the hierarchical development within firms and 
ultimately to the M-forin architecture, (Williamson, 1985: 128). In contract, the S-C-P 
paradigm assumes firm structure is determined exogenously, which is why transaction 
cost econornics is used in this thesis. M-form structures are possible, if internal 
divisions create individual profit centres within the various departments of a firm (and 
as a result beyond the one-person firm). Conglomerates may be explained by failures 
in capital markets, which encourage apparently unconnected firms to merge. Also, 
there is evidence of the M-forni firm and economies of agglomeration (Fujita and 
Thisse, 2002: 3) and company towns (Williamson, 1985: 35). 
Overall, this thesis develops an empirical approach to the issues of the make-or-buy 
decision and contract design, because transaction costs assumes firm structure is 
determined endogenously and not exogenously as with the S-C-P paradigm. The next 
section presents the transaction cost model. 
The Transaction Cost Model 
An economic environment, which is characterised by positive transaction costs, is one 
where the firm tends to be a collection of contracts (Williamson, 1985: 43). The 
definition of the firm as a series of contracts is made operational by Williamson (1985: 
230) through formulating the boundaries between the firm and the market: 
Firm =f (internal contracts, external contracts) Eq. 4.1 
Where: 
internal contract =f (core skifls, organisational incentives). 
external contract =f (complementary skills, inter-organisational incentives). 
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According to Shelanski and Klein (1995: 336): 
"Transaction cost economics studies how trading partners protect themselves 
from the hazards associated with exchange relations. " 
Shclanski and Klein (1995: 336). 
As a consequence, the decision to make-or-buy develops the firm into a mixture of 
internal core activity (make) and strategic external alliances (buy) and also a hybrid. 
Besanko et al. (1996: 73) confirms this notion as follows: 
"To resolve the associated make-or-buy decisions, the firm must compare the 
benefits and costs of using the market as opposed to performing the activity in- 
house. " 
Besanko et al. (1996: 73) 
This is converted into a prediction through the existence of transaction costs. That is, 
a firm will make-or-buy depending on the presence of three factors, namely, asset 
specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism. Asset specificity is critical to 
protect against, because once there is relationship-specific investment then the hold- 
up problem tends to follow. However, Williamson also considers human factors 
(bounded rationality and opportunism) and environmental factors (uncertainty and 
small numbers) as important in respect to the eventual outcome. This can be shown in 
the organisational failures framework in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3: The organisational failures framework 
Human Factors Transformation Environmental Factors 
Bounded Rationality ++ Uncertainty & Complexity 
Opportunism 1 +4 1 Small Numbers 
Source: Williamson (1975: 40). 
In the organisational failures framework, bounded rationality is linked with uncertainty 
and complexity, whereas opportunism is linked with small numbers exchange. 
Bounded rationality will be created once uncertainty or complexity is present and 
there is no longer a classical contract. Similarly, small numbers in the transaction will 
generate opportunism, because the firm will move from a situation where there are 
many ex ante bidders to fewer expost suppliers, which is known as the fundamental 
transformation (Williamson, 1985: 55). The connection between the human factors 
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with the environmental factors shown in Figure 4.3 is crucial to the analysis. 
According to Williamson (1986: 178): 
"The full catastrophe appears when bounded rationality, opportunism 
and asset specificity are joined". 
Williamson (1986: 178). 
Whilst an expression noting the full catastrophe is rather overstating the case, it does 
convey the sense of how transaction costs are different from neo-classical economics. 
The basic equation in the transaction costs framework is usually specified using the 
dimensions from Figure 4.3 (Williamson, 1985: 52): 
TC =f (asset specificity, bounded rationality, opportunism) Eq. 4.2 
Where: TC is transaction costs 
A firm will buy (fi7om the market) if none of the factors are present or if the costs of 
make are greater than the costs of buy. The concepts of asset specificity, bounded 
rationality and opportunism, which were introduced in the previous Chapter are 
important to the model and require more detailed definitions. 
(a) Asset Specificity 
The straightforward definition of an asset is any property which is owned (or leased) 
by a firm or individual. This property can be physical assets, for example, plant and 
machinery, or human assets, for example, R&D staff and skilled employees. All assets 
such as physical, financial or human can be given a monetary value or an opportunity 
cost. If there is an alternative and competing use for the asset then the opportunity 
cost will be high, which is related to the transferability of the asset. If the opportunity 
cost of an asset equals zero, then the asset is totally specific with no alternative use. 
Asset specificity is greater in the short run, because there are fewer alternative uses 
with all factors of production being variable in the long run, which is linked to the 
concept of quasi-rent (Williamson, 1985: 30). 
Asset specificity contributes to market uncertainty due to relationship-specific 
investments. This is manifest within incomplete contracts and non-standard 
commercial contracting. In sum, asset specificity adds to the costs of transacting 
because of relationship-specific contracts. The four broad types of asset specificity 
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are site, physical, human and dedicated (Williamson, 1985: 95-96) with reputation as 
the fifth. The first four aspects of asset specificity are highly significant for aerospace 
firms that face relationship-investments and long term contracts. 
1. Site Asset Specificity 
Site asset specificity is the actual factory or industrial unit where production and 
distribution takes place. This resource is immobile, although it may have 
alternative uses. For example, a final assembly point for a military aircraft could 
be employed for civilian aircraft production with additional investment. However, 
the actual location of the site is non-transferable. There has been the closure of 
several military aircraft sites in the UK over recent years including Kingston in 
1991 and Preston in 1990. For example, the Preston site was regarded as 
incapable of being used as a modem production facility and in addition the area 
was too close to the central business district of Preston. Not only was it possible 
to re-locate production elsewhere, but it was also possible to transfer the site to 
alternative and more profitable use. In transaction cost terms there was a low 
quasi-rent on the Preston site. As a consequence the aircraft factory was 
demolished and the land was sold to commercial developers who built office 
accommodation and houses, whilst production was transferred to a modem 
production facility at Warton a few miles away. 
2. Physical Asset Specificity 
Physical asset specificity comprises the actual technological assets engaged in the 
manufacturing process. At the extreme, it relates to the highly specific jigs and 
tools, which can be used for a single specific purpose, for example, the 
manufacture of the Typhoon military aircraft. The same principle applies to 
numerical control (NC) machining or bespoke software used in avionics. There is 
also a notion that the physical assets can involve patents, licenses and other 
property rights. Physical asset specificity is relevant to all complex engineering 
projects such as aerospace, because of the huge capital investment in the industry. 
In this respect, a fife cycle approach is an important consideration for the analysis. 
Some physical assets will not only depreciate over time, but also become less 
relevant and important as technological change occurs. This was showcased 
within the former arms race between the respective military establishments in the 
United States and the Soviet Union especially in defence aerospace. 
85 
3. Human Asset Specificity 
Human asset specificity is related to the know-how, experience and ideas of 
employees. The creativity and innovation of firms originates from its employees. 
In certain research-intensive industries, such as aerospace and electronics, it is the 
employees which make possible day-to-day problem solving. Such engineering 
disciplines in aerospace include metallurgy, fabrication and mechanical engineering 
that help to assemble complex aircraft, missiles and spacecraft. The range of the 
human input spans from broad-brush entrepreneurial skills to more detailed 
practical on-the-job skills including education and training. Human inputs are 
essential if work is to come to fruition. However, there are incentives to hoard 
valuable labour and information within firms and even incentives for individuals 
within firms to move to rival firms, where the skills may be transferable within an 
industry even if the skills and training are highly specialised. 
4. Dedicated Asset Specificity 
The top-level definition of dedicated assets highlights those specialised 
investments required by a customer. These investments cover a wide area from 
research and development, training and education to auditing and lobby activity. 
This is not meant to be a category to cover a multitude of factors. It is necessary 
to highlight the broad spectrum of every specific investment, which firms must 
necessarily undertake to fulfil the needs of the customer. By definition a decision 
to invest on behalf of a client is a decision that involves relational contracting. 
This is certainly true in aerospace markets, where for military aircraft the UK 
government acts as customer, sponsor and regulator (DTI-ITG, 2004: 27). 
5. Reputation Asset Specificity 
The final asset specificity does not directly originate from Williamson (1985: 95). 
The reputation asset specificity is derived from empirical research into the 
transaction costs of marketing. Reputation asset specificity is investments in 
brand value, which can be costly to acquire for example, Boeing. It can be argued 
that this form of asset specificity is a sub-set of dedicated asset specificity, which 
identifies how asset can be devoted to a specific purpose such as the marketing 
mix. Reputation can be gained through first mover advantage, developing a status 
for excellence or from being the incumbent. Route to market and creating a brand 
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image or product reputation all require relationship-specific investment, which is 
why this is considered to be similar to dedicated assets. 
A detailed analysis of asset specificity reveals the implied prediction of transaction 
costs namely, that non-specific assets are required for efficient markets. This is 
because highly specific assets give rise to opportunism, which have transaction costs 
and tend to be inefficient (Dietrich, 1994: 22). As a result, there is a need for third 
parties to help in resolving disputes, for example, courts, arbitration or independent 
experts. The transaction costs approach highlights the fixity of assets, uncertainty in 
decision-making, the complexity of contracts, as well as provides an explanation of 
the make-or-buy decision. 
(b) Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality is a behavioural feature of transaction costs and is linked to both 
uncertainty and complexity in Figure 4.3. The definition of uncertainty offered by 
Knight is an outcome that is unknown or unknowable that is, outcomes that can not 
have probabilities assigned to the set of feasible results (as opposed to risk where 
probabilities can be designated). The basic notion here is that individuals only have a 
limited capacity to process all the market information that is available. Whilst decision- 
makers attempt to be rational, this is only possible in a partial way and hence bounded 
rationality. The human factor of bounded rationality is viewed as an environmental 
factor and becomes uncertainty, which will be measured in this thesis by identifying 
unexpected changes in supply and demand. 
Given the nature of business-to-business aerospace supply chains (and the need for 
firms to be constantly buying and selling goods and services) uncertainty will be 
directly measured in terms of supply and demand. That is, demand uncertainty will be 
measured in respect to the likelihood of unexpected changes in demand for the 
products of the firm. If there is little likelihood of unexpected demand then it can be 
deduced that demand uncertainty is low and vice-versa. Also, supply uncertainty will 
be measured in respect to the likelihood of unexpected changes in supply for the 
components purchased by the firm. If there is little likelihood of unexpected supply 
then it can be deduced that supply uncertainty is low and vice versa. 
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(c) Opportunism 
Opportunism is also a behavioural feature of transaction costs and referred to as self- 
interest with guile, by Williamson (1975: 26) and involves the hold-up problem, which 
can be replicated by the hostage model in Chapter Nine. Opportunism is linked to the 
problems of bi-lateral monopoly and the effect of small number exchange, shown in 
Figure 4.3. Individual economic agents may not set out to look for opportunistic 
events, but similarly wiH not ignore opportunities once they occur. Also, there is the 
vital notion of what the model predicts, because firms need to provide contracts to 
safeguards against opportunistic behaviour. The small number exchange will be 
measured directly in the thesis by asIdng the firms to describe the number of UK 
aerospace suppliers in the main markets of the firm. The number of UK suppliers is 
low, where there is a significant degree of monopoly power and the number of UK 
suppliers is little or no monopoly power, which is identical to the S-C-P paradigm. 
This question captures an element of monopoly power as well as expost small number 
exchange and can justify the view that monopoly power is a special case within the 
transaction cost paradigm and not the opposite way round as stated by Dietrich (1994: 
23). If bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism are joined then the 
outcome is transaction costs in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1: The full catastrophe of transaction costs 
Bounded Asset Opportunism Outcome 
Rationality Specificity 
Complete 
Zero Zero Zero Contracts 
Chinese 
Positive Positive Zero Contracts 
Contestable 
Positive Zero Positive Markets 
ExAnte 
Zero Positive Positive Planning 
Transaction 
Positive Positive Positive Costs 
Source: Williamson, (1985: 3 1) with additions by the author. 
88 
The full catastrophe of transaction costs is apparent in Table 4.1 where the make-or- 
buy decision depends on the dimensions of the transaction (Williamson, 1986: 178). 
Each economic environment (with and in some cases without the presence of each of 
the three dimensions) is considered next. 
(a) Complete Contract (Zero Transaction Costs) 
The antithesis of transaction costs is complete contracts, where indeed contracts are 
no longer strictly necessary because there is information symmetry. In this scenario 
there is unbounded rationality, an absence of opportunism and no asset specificity. 
The result is the likelihood that economic agents can maximise profit with certainty 
from the various market encounters. The two ends of the spectrum range from 
minimising transaction costs to safeguard investment specific investments 
(uncertainty) to maximising profits subject to cost minimisation (certainty). The 
frictionless economy is one where transaction costs are zero and as a result there are 
complete contracts. It is difficult to pinpoint specific market examples of ffictionless 
transactions, which is like a vacuum in the physical sciences. Complete contracts can 
be viewed as a benchmark against which in theory it is possible to compare other 
types of markets. However, there are examples of long term relational contracts, 
which are typical in the UKAI such as the JSF in military aircraft. 
(b) Chinese Contracts (No Opportunism) 
If there is no opportunism then by definition there is trust in the exchange process. 
Participation and truth telling is more likely to occur since each transaction will not 
require a revelation mechanism. Handy (1994: 80-81) describes this as a Chinese 
contract, which dates back to ancient Chinese transactions whereby there was no 
resort to litigation. It is social honour and saving face that is important to the ancient 
Chinese system of resolving disputes reflecting a greater emphasis on social and 
cultural norms and less on the law. Such contracts are designed to benefit both sides 
of the exchange and as a consequence are mutually self-enforcing. The exchange is 
open and transparent, which generates trust and co-operation. There is no 
opportunism and no huge or costly legal apparatus. In other words, there is a strong 
culture of self-motivating and social enforcing mechanism and no need for legal 
discourse, because disputes are rare and regarded as socially unacceptable. 
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(c) Contestable Markets (No Asset Specificity) 
Baumol et al. (1982) acknowledge transaction costs in the exchange process. Whilst 
Williamson (1986: 189) regards transaction costs as significant and having a positive 
value, Baumol et al. (1982: 351) see them as approaching zero in line with orthodox 
neo-classical economics: hence transaction costs are assumed to be zero. With 
insignificant or zero transaction costs, the 'hit and run' entry condition of a perfectly 
contestable market is made possible. The existence of asset specificity makes costless 
entry and costless exit unfeasible. It is noteworthy that other theories in economics 
assume away the problems of transaction costs in order to make stronger predictions 
such as auction theory (Nfilgrom and Roberts, 1991: 28-29). 
Transaction costs and contestable markets do have certain themes in common and 
form part of the New Economics of Industrial Organisation. However, each approach 
analyses a very different type of market situation. Neither approach is universal or 
straightforward to prove empirically. A contestable market is likely to be a special 
case within transaction cost economics, where there are sunk costs and no barriers to 
entry, but there are still transaction costs. 
(d) F-x-ante Planning (No Bounded Rationality) 
By definition all planning tends to be done ex ante, so the need for specific contracts 
in the face of unbounded rationality is difficult to conceptualise, in spite of the 
presence of opportunism. This is because unbounded rationality allows economic 
agents to generate and analyse the relevant information from the beginning of the 
transaction. All issues and difficulties can be considered ex ante, which allows for a 
complete bargain albeit that this situation creates difficulties for empirical testing. 
Asset specificity and opportunism are secondary considerations. This particular state 
of the world highlights the considerable importance given by Williamson to the work 
by Simon (1957). Economic agents can compute information, but find it 
problematical to comprehensively deal with complete information. Any disputes or 
contract drift, which may arise as a result of the ex ante bargain are either dealt with 
in the contract specification and/or through litigation in the court system. This is a 
situation of moral hazard where there is hidden action. Notwithstanding, Williamson 
is perfectly clear on the situation where bounded rationality is absent: 
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"Contract, in the context of unbounded rationality is therefore 
described as a world of planning. " 
Williamson (1986: 178). 
The significance of this statement is that Williamson expects planning to replace 
contractual arrangements when there is unbounded rationality, because there is 
information to avoid the need to safeguard against the hazards of the transaction. As a 
result, in the world of bounded rationality the role of the contract becomes very 
important not only as an exchange arrangement, but also for regulating behaviour and 
defining incentives between economic decision-makers. 
(e) Transaction Costs (Positive Transaction Costs) 
The situation where asset specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism coincide is 
where positive transaction costs emerge manifest. Bounded rationality, opportunism 
and asset specificity are all necessary and sufficient conditions for transaction costs to 
exist and assessing these variables will generate a transaction costs analysis. In this 
state of the world, there is little or no trust between economic agents, which results in 
opportunism. The planning process is incomplete because of bounded rationality, and 
asset specificity results from idiosyncratic investment and opportunism means long- 
term relational contracts. These situations are applicable to the UKAI as well as other 
industries. Risk and uncertainty, information deficiency and principal-agent problems 
blight the exchange between economic agents. The result is vertical integration by 
organisations, missing markets, as well non-standard and incomplete contracting. For 
example, the development of aircraft is a complex activity and requires considerable 
amount of R&D, which generates uncertainty. There is specific investment that needs 
to be protected and this leads to vertical integration as an effective way to organise 
production, where asset specificity is the most significant. If at least one of these 
factors is set to zero then other related markets will materialise as described above. 
The analysis assumes that all resource allocation is marked-based and a function of 
economising within the scope of firms. It is true that identifying positive transaction 
costs and predicting the resultant impact on markets and contracts as shown in Table 
4.1 is a challenging task. It is logical to suggest that Chinese contracts and ex ante 
planning are particular types of cultural and market situations, respectively. Also, 
contestable markets are a special case within transaction costs and complete contracts 
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are a comparative benchmark. The implication is that there is a propensity for 
transactions costs to occur most often in markets situations (Shelanski and Mein, 
1995: 339). In practical terms transaction costs seem ubiquitous, but this may be 
because the definitions are superficial and ill-defined (Dietrich, 1994: 174). The next 
part of this section assesses the hypotheses generated by the transaction costs model. 
Transaction cost hypotheses 
The transaction cost approach presented by Williamson states that the governance 
structures are based on how firms minimise transaction costs. That is: 
"The basic transactions cost economics strategy for deriving refutable 
implications is this: assign transactions (which differ in their attributes) to 
governance structures (the adaptive capacities and associated costs of which 
differ) in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost discriminating) way. 
Williamson (1989: 136). 
Furthermore, contractual arrangements are identified as significant: 
"Although marginal analysis is sometimes employed, implementing transaction 
cost economics mainly involves a comparative institutional assessment of 
discrete institutional alternatives - of which classical market contracting is 
located at one extreme; centralised, hierarchical organisation is located at the 
other and mixed modes of firm and market organisation are located in 
between. " 
Williamson (1985: 4142). 
There are three implications of the transaction cost approach. Firstly, it regards the 
firm as a governance structure rather than a production function. Secondly, it regards 
the role of contract as essential to the comparative analysis. Thirdly, the boundaries 
between mixed modes of firms and markets are determined by make-or-buy decisions. 
A working hypothesis would identify how firms use contracts to choose trading 
partners in order to minimise the hazards of asymmetric information at the lowest cost 
of organising (Mein, 2004: 3). In particular: 
"Consider the decision of a firm to make or buy a particular good or service. 
Suppose that it is a component that is to be joined to the mainframe and assume 
it is used in fixed proportions. Assume, furthermore, that the economies of 
scale and scope are negligible. Accordingly, the critical factors that are 
determinative in the decision to make or buy are production costs and the ease 
of effecting inter-temporal adaptations. " 
Williamson (1989: 15 1). 
For the purposes of this thesis, three hypotheses are relevant. Firstly, the Monteverde 
and Teece (1982 a: 206) hypothesis is relevant because it sets out the make-or-buy 
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decision for the firm and is subsequently the hallmark for transaction cost hypotheses. 
This hypothesis is the first to follow the Williamson approach and is repeated 
throughout Appendix I (for example John and Weitz, 1988: 106). Monteverde and 
Teece specify the dependent variable in binary form using a probit model, which is also 
an approach used in this thesis. Secondly, the Masten (1984: 405) hypothesis is 
relevant because it is applied to the aerospace industry in the US. Also, it recognises 
the pivotal role of asset specificity in the make-or-buy decision, which is similarly 
adopted in this thesis, given the nature of the UK aerospace industry. Asset specificity 
is shown to be fundamental by Mulberin (1986: 220-221) and Crocker and Masten 
(1988: 330) again an issue that is vital to the aerospace industry. Finally, the 
hypothesis presented by Lyons (1994: 260) is relevant to this thesis, because it 
develops the link between manufacturing in-house (make) and procurement from the 
market (buy) as a feature of contract design. The approach adopted by Lyons is useful 
to the UK aerospace industry due to the nature of manufacturing and the procurement 
process as a whole. Therefore, three key hypotheses for this thesis are Monteverde 
and Teece (1982 a), Masten (1984) and Lyons (1994,1996), because collectively these 
studies allow make-or-buy and contract design to made operational using a probit or 
logit regression methodology; and are applied to the aerospace industry specifically or 
manufacturing in general. Each study is assessed in turn. 
(i) Monteverde and Teece (1982 a, b): make-or-buy decision in a binary fonn 
The work by Monteverde and Teece (1982 a: 206) on USA car components analyses 
the incentives for backward vertical integration. The approach is stated as follows: 
"We hypothesize that assemblers will verticaHy integrate when the production 
process broadly defined, generates specialized, non-patentable know-how. 
When production processes are of this kind, both assembler and supplier are 
exposed to the possibility of opportunistic re-contracting. " 
Monteverde and Teece (1982 a: 206). 
The research attempts to study the costs of switching supplier when there is asset 
specificity, which results in the possibility of opportunism. There is a choice of make- 
or-buy where the dependent variable is specified in binary fonn. Hence: 
"The dependent variable we construct is dichotomous; each sample component 
is coded as being predominantly manufactured in-house or by an external 
supplier. " 
Monteverde and Teece (1982 a: 207). 
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The strength of the research is that a dichotomous dependent variable can be used to 
test the data via a probit model with cross-sectional data (Monteverde and Teece, 1982 
a: 211). This is because there is a limited dependent variable on the left-hand side of 
equation 4.2, which is not possible to test with an ordinary least squares regression. 
The testable hypothesis used in the research is: 
"The greater is the applications engineering effort associated with the 
development of any given automobile component, the higher are the expected 
appropriate quasi-rents and, therefore, the greater is the likelihood of vertical 
integration of production for that component. " 
Monteverde and Teece (1982 a: 207). 
The dependent variable was generated from a list of 133 car components and used as a 
proxy for transaction-specific skills. If 80% or more of the supply requirement of a 
component was in-house then it was labelled as make. Conversely, if more than 20% 
of the supply requirements were purchased fi7om the market then it was labelled as buy. 
Although a figure of 80% is arbitrary, this threshold remained highly significant even if 
the level for make was changed to 70% or 90%. The independent variable was 
engineering effort, which was a surrogate measure of asset specificity and developed 
using a Likert scale. Also, control variables were introduced into the model to avoid 
misspecification of the model. If a component was specific to a particular company 
then it was identified with a control variable; and if a component was integrated into a 
wider system then it was also identified with a control variable. 
The results form the probit analysis show that if the engineering design contains 
transaction-specific skills then car-assembling firms such as General Motors (GM) and 
Ford would make in-house; otherwise they will buy from existing spot markets. Also, 
car-assemblers will avoid exposure to the opportunism from suppliers through 
backward vertical integration when components are firm-specific and are highly 
integrated with other parts in a system. Monteverde and Teece conclude that the 
results confirm the hypothesis and give support to the transaction costs because: 
"GM and Ford are more likely to bring component design and manufacture in- 
house, if relying on suppliers for reproduction development service will provide 
suppliers with an exploitable first-mover advantage. " 
Monteverde and Teece (1982 a: 212). 
The work by Monteverde and Teece is important in three areas. Firstly, it uses a 
binary dependent variable for make-or-buy, secondly it generates a proxy for human 
asset specificity and finally it uses probit analysis. However, whilst it uses control 
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variables for engineering effort, it does not explore other measures of asset specificity 
such as location. Location asset specificity would appear important to USA car 
production given the significant cluster of car assemblers and component suppliers in 
the Detroit area of Nfichigan where the majority of USA car production is located. 
Also, there are no explanatory variables for uncertainty and complexity. This means 
whilst the Monteverde and Teece research is significant it is only partial in terms of the 
transaction cost approach. This weakness of the research was due to data collection 
problems because the car-assemblers were highly sensitive to revealing make-or-buy 
decisions. Finally, this approach to the make-or-buy decision was at the level of 
systems and not the market and does not take account of the institutional choice 
between firms and markets unlike this thesis, which develops make-or-buy at the 
market level. Another benefit of the approach adopted in this thesis is the respondents 
to an anonymous questionnaire survey are more likely to disclose data on make-or-buy 
than an interviewee where the sensitive data is compared against a close rival at the 
systems level and not at the wider market level. 
(ii) Masten (1984): make-or-buy decision and probit analysis 
The work by Masten (1984: 403) focuses on the make-or-buy decision by US 
aerospace firms. It attempts to link the various aspects of asset specificity, frequency 
and uncertainty with contract type. Hence: 
"Idiosyncratic assets, because of their specialised and durable nature, imply that 
parties to a transaction face only imperfect exchange alternatives for an 
extended period. The more specialised those assets, the larger the quasi-rents 
at stake over that period and hence the greater the incentive for agents to 
attempts to influence the terms of trade through bargaining or other rent- 
seeking activities once the investments are in place. " 
Masten (1984: 405). 
Masten identifies the make-or-buy plan at two levels as outlined at the start of this 
Chapter. Namely for defence aerospace: 
"The administration of procurement in this [aerospace] industry is two- 
tiered. On the first level, the government chooses a prime contractor 
who is assigned overall responsibility for a particular program; and on the 
second, the contractor manages the production of the system itself, including 
what is of particular interest here - the administration of subcontracts. "' 
Masten (1984: 404). 
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The transaction costs analysis shows that if firms vertically integrate through the make 
decision this wiH have implications for hierarchies, (Williamson, 1975: 49). Even if 
there is a buy decision, then this has implication for other firms in the supply chain 
known as market firms. Similarly, 
"The greater the complexity of the transaction and the level of uncertainty 
associated with it, the greater the likelihood of being bound to inappropriate 
action .... In surn, the more 
idiosyncratic are the investments associated with a 
particular transaction, the greater are the incentives to incur the costs of writing 
more detailed and long term contract. " 
Masten (1984: 405). 
Masten asked the procurement team in a large aerospace firm to assess which of 1,887 
components are make and then developed two measures of asset specificity. The first 
measure was design specificity and the second was site specificity. A measure of 
complexity was used as a binary variable because demand uncertainty could not be 
used at the systems level. With make-or-buy as a dichotomous dependent variable the 
probit regression generates a pseudo R 2of 0.61. This result shows acceptable 
explanatory power for the model. In a similar study by Masten el al. (1989) of 118 
motor vehicle components the pseudo R2 is 0.36, which in comparison to Masten 
(1984) is modest explanatory power. Complexity and design specificity are highly 
significant and with the correct positive sign; but co-location is not significant even 
though it has the correct positive sign. Masten conclude that government policy in the 
USA and contractor procurement policy indicate a "strong predispositioif' towards 
buy, but this situation is reversed when components are specialised and complex since 
there are hazards to market exchange (Masten, 1984: 416). 
The strength of the research is that the decision to make-or-buy can be modelled in 
terms of designing the contract to avoid opportunism and the results show relatively 
significant explanatory power. Masten also represents the make-or-buy choice as a 
dichotomous variable and uses a probit model of estimation (Masten 1984: 410). Like 
Monteverde and Teece, Masten also used cross-sectional data and focused on a single 
industry to restrict the need for absolute measures of asset specificity and complexity. 
Masten develops the use of questionnaires, but crucially also develops other 
transaction cost variables to test the hypothesis. The weakness of the research is an 
inability to generalise from the approach, because the analysis is at the systems level 
within a single firm rather than a specific market. Also, the role of contracts is not 
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developed either, which is a problem for assessing aerospace firms, which are 
characterised by long term and relational contracts. Unlike the research by Masten this 
thesis will take into account uncertainty and not focus only on complexity. The thesis 
also incorporates an analysis of contracts and assesses the role of contract design. 
Finally, it is possible to generalise the research in this thesis, because it samples a 
significant number of firms across the aerospace industry. 
(iii) Lyons (1994,1996): contract design and probit analysis 
Lyons (1994) views contract design an important issue in transaction cost 
minimisation, but only in the absence of spot markets. This is because spot markets 
deal at arms-length with suppliers, whereas other market types require relational 
contracting. Constant changes to contracts such as negotiation, haggling and writing 
will result in ink costs. As a result, contracts written in the absence of standard spot 
market contracts then face the hold-up problem. This is because: 
"... specific assets and opportunism are at the heart of maldng transaction costs 
into a falsifiable theory. " 
Lyons(1994: 259). 
The hypothesis tested by Lyons (1994) is in the form of a question: 
"What determines the probability of sub-contractor-customer relationship being 
governed by a formal contract? " 
Lyons (1994: 259). 
The work by Monteverde and Teece (1982 a) and Masten (1984) assess the make-or- 
buy decision within a single firm or between two firms and identify a number of 
specific components. The work by Lyons assesses the make-or-buy decision across 
many firms, which is the approach of this thesis. The questionnaire used by Lyons was 
sent to 1,000 general engineering firms and there were 103 responses (that is a 10% 
response rate). In the questionnaire, Lyons required the respondent to answer in terms 
of the most important customer or supplier. This technique is vital in establishing the 
context of the response, since unlike Monteverde and Teece (1982 a) and Masten 
(1984), this research was at the level of the market and not a closed system. The 
Lyons methodology also uses a dichotomous dependent variable and also tests using 
the probit model. The suggestion of the research is that the make-or-buy decision has 
implications for contract design as a way to avoid opportunism in the face of 
relationship-specific investments. The dependent variable was not make-or-buy, but 
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the probability to write a formal written contract, whilst the "proximate determinants 
of transaction costs" are vulnerability, complexity, size and trust (Lyons, 1994: 260- 
264). Vulnerability is a proxy for opportunism; complexity is a proxy for bounded 
rationality-, size is a proxy for ink costs and trust is a proxy for safeguards. Lyons uses 
a probit model and the results show "powerful support for the transaction cost theory 
of contract" (Lyons, 1994: 272). That is: 
"Bounded rationality has been shown to influence the writing of contracts 
through the complexity of specification for advanced technology inputs. Fear 
of opportunism particularly in relation to specific investments, has an even 
stronger influence: The more vulnerable a supplier is, the more likely she is to 
negotiate a formal contract. " 
Lyons (1994: 272). 
The strength of Lyons research for purpose of this thesis is that the transaction cost 
approach is important for contract design. This facet of transaction costs has been 
overlooked in previous studies. Also, the questionnaire approach can be used to 
gather data beyond the level of a closed system, which has been preferred by the other 
two selected studies. As a result the questionnaire can be written to capture 
information from different suppliers across an industry or sector. In previous studies, 
key decision-makers in specific firms were interviewed, which may result in a biased 
selection of interviewees. 
The weakness of Lyons research is that there is no direct measure of make-or-buy, 
which would have been relatively straightforward to achieve given the questionnaire 
approach. Indeed specifying the hypothesis as a question limits the test of vertical 
integration within the framework of make-or-buy. This thesis will build upon the 
general approach presented by Lyons and then directly test the make-or-buy decision 
and contract design within the transaction cost paradigm. The original contribution of 
this thesis is a questionnaire survey approach utilised by Lyons, but used directly on the 
make-or-buy decision and contract design. It builds upon the pioneering work of 
Monteverde and Teece who developed make-or-buy in a binary form and the probit or 
logit regression methodology of Masten. 
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Summary of the transaction cost model hypotheses 
In summary, the make-or-buy hypotheses derived from the transaction cost model can 
be specified in the following ways to generate a set of testable features: 
The make-or-buy decision as the paradigm problem of transaction costs can be 
modelled a binary or dichotomous dependent variable. This allows the research 
to use econometric studies of analysis and rigorously test the predictions of 
transaction costs. 
I Choice among alternative modes of production to be resolved by minimising 
the costs of the transaction and can use probit or logit models for the analysis 
with a limited dependent variable. This allows the research to go further than 
descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations and use econometrics and make 
operational the transaction cost model. 
iii. Contract type can be used in conjunction with the make-or-buy decision as an 
attempt to understand vertical integration. This approach is useful for 
analysing the behavioural features of transaction costs such as safeguards 
against the threat of opportunism. 
The hypotheses of the three key studies suggest that there is scope for the transaction 
costs approach to overcome the criticisms of tautology and measurement deficiencies 
that are contained in the previous Chapter. The final section in this Chapter will 
consider how to measure and test the variables expressed in the transaction cost 
hypotheses that are relevant to this thesis. 
Applications of the transaction cost model 
Applying the transaction cost methodology develops the model where the dependent 
variable is a proxy for transaction cost (Williamson, 1985: 52). The relationship is 
presented in equation 4.3. 
TC =f (AS, F, U/C, SN) Eq. 4.3 
Where: 
TC = transaction costs, AS = asset specificity, F= frequency, 
U/C = uncertainty / complexity, SN = small numbers. 
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Williamson (1985: 34) specifies asset specificity as variable k. If k>0, then asset 
specificity is both positive and significant. if k=0, then exchange takes place through 
a spot market. There is another related variable, namely s, which measures the 
safeguarding of the transaction through a contract. If s=0, then there is no safeguard, 
but if s>0a safeguard exists. These have implications; for the efficiency of the market 
price as indicated below, where p, is the lowest price in the spot market and pis the 
highest price in the presence of asset specificity and no safeguards. If a contract is 
employed to safeguard an asset specific transaction, then an intermediate price P 
prevails, which is higher than p, but lower than p. Both k and s are measured in this 
thesis (see Table 5.1). This analysis is show in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2: Safeguards and asset specificity 
Price (p) Asset Specificity (k) Safeguards (s) 
Pi K=O s=O 
K>O s=O 
K>O s>0 
Source: Wflliamson (1985: 33). 
Where: p, <b< Eq. 4.4 
The next part of this section attempts to measure asset specificity, frequency, 
uncertainty, complexity and small numbers in this thesis. 
(a) Asset specificity 
Asset specificity is fundamental to transaction costs, because specific investments 
require safeguarding through relational contracting. Williamson views asset specificity 
as the "degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternatives and by alternative 
users" when there is no reduction in productive value (Williamson, 1989: 142). 
However, measurement problems are an acute issue in the empirical transaction cost 
literature. The aim of the thesis is to show that these measurement problems can be 
overcome and form a substantially original element in Part Two. This thesis has to 
deal directly with measurement issues. Since asset specificity is an important variable 
there will be four direct measures of asset specificity used in this thesis. Firstly, to 
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measure the asset specificity of location, firms are assessed in terms of proximity to the 
most important customer. This generates a response based on a similar issue in the 
questionnaire by Lyons (1994) that measures whether location is important to 
aerospace firms by measuring in miles the distance from the most important customer. 
Secondly, to measure the asset specificity of facilities and equipment, firms are asked 
to rank how specific the production process is to the company. Given the high levels 
of investment in the UK aerospace industry this is expected to be a significant variable. 
In order to add some detail firms are asked to give examples of core activity that are 
highly specific to the firm. Thirdly, to measure human asset specificity firms are asked 
to rank how specific are the skills, knowledge and experience of employees to the 
company. Once more, given the high level of training and skilled qualified scientists 
and engineers in the UK aerospace industry this is expected to be a significant variable. 
In order to add some detail firms are asked to give examples of occupational groups 
that are highly specific to the firm and this is dealt with in Chapter Five. Fourthly, to 
measure the dedicated asset specificity and commissioned investments the firms are 
asked to rank how specific are the production process of the company to the most 
important customer. This variable is expected to yield significant results given the 
close working relationship between firms in the supply chain. For example, Rolls- 
Royce is highly unlikely to design and manufacture an aero-engine that does not fit into 
the range of airframes produced by BAE Systems even though the UK market on its 
own is too small for Rolls-Royce. Finally, reputation asset specificity is not covered in 
this thesis, because it is an explicit marketing issue of branding and product value and 
not necessarily relevant to an economics study of the UK aerospace industry. 
(b) Frequency 
If there are frequent or recurrent transactions then the fixed costs of the specialised 
governance structure are best recovered through the firm that is by making the 
component or part. Table 4.3 shows that asset specificity given as the investment 
approach is the dominant factor. If the asset is non-specific then frequency is irrelevant 
since transaction cost theory predicts the classical contracting mode of the market. If 
the asset specificity is mixed or idiosyncratic then the frequency determines whether 
neo-classical contracts prevail (occasional transactions) or relational contracts prevail 
(recurrent transactions). 
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Table 4.3: Efficient governance 
The Investment Approach 
Frequency Non-specific Mixed T Idiosyncratic Occasional Market Trilateral Governance 
Governance (Neo-classical 
Contracting) 
Recurrent (Classical Bilateral Unified 
Contracting) Governance Governance 
(Relational Contracting) 
Source: Williamson (1985: 78). 
The measurement of frequency can be specified along a continuum from one-off 
transactions to frequent repeat transactions. For example, in aerospace ball-bearings 
are ftequent transactions and ejector seats are rare transaction. In this thesis, the 
frequency variable is measured along a Likert scale with intervals or reduced to a 
binary code of either frequent or infrequent transactions. The dimension of frequency 
in the transaction cost model should be included, but in practice is dominated by 
dimension of asset specificity as shown in Table 4.3. 
(c) Uncertainty and Complexity 
The dimension of uncertainty is usually co-specified in terms of complexity 
(Williamson, 1985: 5 1). However, the concepts of uncertainty and complexity are not 
identical. Uncertainty is immeasurable risk and complexity is the difficulty or intricacy 
of a problem. There is some overlap between the two terms, because complexity can 
lead to uncertainty. In the Masten research it was not possible to test for the effects of 
demand uncertainty, because the make-or-buy decision only focused on internal 
systems. The variable for uncertainty was then substituted for complexity, which was 
defined as a proxy for the degree of uncertainty (Masten, 1984: 409). 
In terms of measuring uncertainty, the transaction cost theory predicts that asset 
specificity is the dominant factor over uncertainty. Table 4.4 shows that the market 
(that is, the buy option) is the preferred choice if asset specificity is low, irrespective of 
whether uncertainty is high or low. Nevertheless, uncertainty does detennine whether 
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long term contracts or the hierarchy (that is, the make option) is chosen if asset 
specificity is high. 
Table 4.4: The choice between asset specificity and uncertainty 
ASSET 
SPECIFICTY 
LOW DEGREE OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
HIGH DEGREE OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
Low MARKET MARKET 
High LONG-TERM CONTRACT HIERARCHY 
Source: Hendrikse (2003: 214). 
The research in this thesis is across a focused single industry in line with Lyons (1994) 
and it is possible to specify uncertainty in terms of both supply and demand. Firstly, 
the likelihood of changes to supply can be a measure for supply uncertainty. Secondly, 
the likelihood of changes to demand can be a measure for demand uncertainty. In this 
thesis, the measure of complexity is unnecessary given that uncertainty has been 
encapsulated in a focussed study of single industry, whereas the research by Masten 
was a single system. 
(d) Small Numbers 
The problem of opportunism is only apparent if there are small numbers of ex post 
trading partners reduced from many ex ante bidders. If large numbers of buyers and 
sellers exist in the market that regularly trade with one another then when one firm 
provides an inferior product or service the buyers can switch supplier. However, the 
option of supplier switching is not possible if the supplier has a pure (or scale) 
monopoly. From Figure 4.3 the human factors of bounded rationality and opportunism 
combine with the environmental factors of uncertainty plus complexity and small 
numbers exchange and lead to transaction costs. The measurement of small numbers is 
also possible with a study of an industry as opposed to a system. Small numbers 
exchange links back to the threat of opportunism and the hold-up problem. On a scale 
from low to high the number of suppliers can be used to assess whether the firm faces 
the threat of opportunism on the supply-side that is monopoly power. Similarly, on a 
scale from low to high the number of customers can be used to assess whether the firm 
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faces the threat of opportunism on the demand-side namely monopsony power. These 
measures have implications for how firms will plan, negotiate and safeguard contracts 
with the supplier-base and the customer-base. 
Overafl, the criticism often raised is the dimensions of the transactions and the human 
factors are difficult to measure (Dietrich, 1994: 68). Indeed, if variables are 
problematic to quantify, either in ordinal or cardinal terms, then this makes the 
calculation of make-or-buy an infeasible task and an empty exercise. Furthermore, the 
implicit assumption of a choice between markets and hierarchies is a redundant notion, 
especially if the precise measurement of the transaction costs is not possible. Perrow 
(1981) continues the attack by claiming the transaction costs arguments are 
inconsistent, that is both the firm and the market reproduce transaction cost and not 
only the market. Although the body of empirical studies has at least attempted to 
render this criticism as superfluous, it remains a valid point that research in transaction 
costs is problematic due to data quality and the need to use proxy variables. It is 
acknowledged in this thesis that a careful approach is required, which is developed in 
Chapter Five. 
As little or no data exists in published or official sources, original data needs to be 
collected for the purposes of the research. Whilst it is routine to use official data sets 
in economics this should not preclude the collection of data from other sources as 
happens in other academic disciplines involving behavioural research, for example 
experimental psychology (Borkowski and Anderson, 1976). Data collecting from 
primary sources is time-consuming and challenging and could lead to benefits such as 
the direct measuring of a variable rather than resorting to a proxy or an alternative 
viable. Transaction costs can be assessed through questionnaires (similar to the RPI 
and GDP measures elsewhere in the collection of primary economic data by official 
government agencies). There are difficult decisions concerning the choice of data, but 
these are not impossible decisions and therefore the research in this thesis should 
proceed. The next part of the section assesses the predictions of the transaction cost 
economics paradigm. 
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The main tests of the transaction cost approach 
The general hypothesis of the transaction cost framework is based on the paradigm 
make-or-buy issue (Shelanski and Klein, 1995: 336). In terms of this thesis the 
following hypothesis is tested on aerospace firms in the UK: 
H,,: Aerospace firms have a higher propensity to integrate activities, when 
transaction costs are positive that is, make. Or conversely, firms have a lower 
propensity to integrate activities, when transaction costs are zero that is, buy. 
H,: Aerospace firms do not relate the make-or-buy decision to the existence 
(or absence) of transaction costs. 
The null hypothesis states that positive transaction costs result in hierarchies and zero 
transaction costs result in markets. The alternative hypothesis states that transaction 
costs are unrelated to the make-or-buy decision. As a result the hypothesis is not a test 
of causality. Also, there are predictions made by transaction cost economics, which 
relate to the dimensions of the transactions, namely asset specificity, uncertainty or 
complexity and frequency, plus the issue of small number exchange. These predictions 
relate directly to the make-or-buy decision and contract design. In order to make the 
concept of transaction costs operational the predictions of the approach have to be 
assessed in more detail. The next step is to assess the predictions for asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency and small numbers. 
1. Asset specificity of investment: 
If asset specificity is low or where assets are general, then the decision is buy from the 
market or outsource. If asset specificity is high or where assets are specific, then the 
decision is make in the firm that is, in-houseý. Inputs requiring a specific production 
technology are more likely to be produced in-house (make). Hence: 
a. Non-specific and generic transactions, where k=0 (either occasional or 
recurrent) are efficiently organised by markets (buy). 
4 Outsourcing might occur on occasion if long term contracts are awarded to production investment in 
highly specific asset, for example PH for the RAF tankcr fleet. 
105 
b. Specific transactions that entail mixed or idiosyncratic investment, where 
k>0 (either occasional or recurrent) are organised internally (make). 
Asset specificity is expected to be a significant issue for UKAI, because of relation- 
specific investments. The prediction for UK aerospace is that firms are more likely to 
make components due to relatively high asset specificity and thus firms will tend to be 
vertically integrated. 
2. Frequency of the transaction: 
If frequency is low, then the decision is buy from the market. If frequency is high, then 
the decision is make for the firm. This decision is due to the high volume, which will 
result in lower unit costs of the component for the firm that makes in-house. 
However, specialist suppliers with high volume can also obtain economies of scale and 
scope and firms will buy from these firms depending on the asset specificity as shown 
in Table 4.3. 
a. If transactions arc non-specific or generic (k = 0), then it is efficient to 
organise via the market, whether transactions are occasional or recurrent (buy). 
b. If transactions are specific or bespoke (k > 0), then it is cfficicnt to 
organise via hierarchies, whether transactions are occasional/recurrent (make). 
The prediction for UK aerospace is that firms will make and buy because there are both 
specific and generic components required in the production process. 
3. Uncertainty in the transaction: (this is a proxy for bounded rationality) 
If uncertainty is low or certainty is present, then the decision is buy from the market. If 
uncertainty is high, then the decision is make in the firm. 
a. Under conditions of certainty and no complexity transactions are efficiently 
organised by markets (buy). 
b. Under conditions of great uncertainty and significant complexity, 
transactions are efficiently organised internally (make). 
In relation to uncertainty, two other hypotheses confirm that it is advantageous for the 
firm with high volume and technological uncertainty to make rather than buy in order 
to eliminate any potential scope for opportunism or hold-up from current or future 
suppliers, see Table 4.4. Hence: 
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c. Volume uncertainty. The experience of volume uncertainty leads to making 
rather than buying a component. 
d. Technological uncertainty. The experience of technological uncertainty 
increases the likelihood of making rather than buying a component. 
The issue of quasi-rents is similarly important in this respect. This is because the 
higher the saving from the market, then the more likely a firm will buy from the 
market. It is likely that this may be particularly true for large firms with multi-site, 
multi-products operations, where overhead cost may be higher than a smaller more 
flexible firm. There is limited evidence for this in the pilot survey, where suppliers or 
sub-contractors to BAE Systems were winning competitive tenders for small 
engineering work against other internal divisions or departments within BAE Systems 
on cost grounds (see Appendix 111). Ile prediction for UK aerospace is that firms are 
likely to make due to relatively high levels of uncertainty in the transaction. 
4. Small numbers exchange (this is a proxy for opportunism) 
If small numbers exist in the transaction, then the decision is make, since there is scope 
for opportunism resulting in the hold-up problem. If small numbers do not exist or 
there is a competitive market in operation, then the decision is buy from the market, 
because there is reduced scope for opportunism and little threat of hold-up: 
a. Small numbers supply or exchange increases the incentives to haggle and 
distort information, which is overcome by vertical integration (make). 
b. Large numbers supply or exchange decreases the incentives to haggle, 
posture and distort information, hence markets prevail (buy). 
The prediction is that UK aerospace firms will make due to small number exchange. 
The competitiveness of the supply market tends to increase the production cost 
advantage of suppliers. There are links back to what is produced in-house, other than 
project management skills and in turn this comes down to asset specificity. Therefore, 
if up to 70% is out-sourced by the larger suppliers, then the remaining 30% is likely to 
be where there is high asset specificity. Similarly with quasi-rents, the higher the 
supplier production cost advantage then the more likely the firm will buy rather than 
make a component. Indeed, this is why the up to 70% of the total value of BAE 
Systems aircraft is out-sourced to the market. There is a Williamson-based adage 
strongly in vogue in the UK aerospace industry, namely why make when you can buy? 
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Summary of the operational aspects of the transaction cost model 
In summary, there are three issues concerning the operational aspects of the 
transaction cost approach for this thesis: 
i. The definitions of the explanatory variables remain problematic, which makes 
data collection a difficult task. The best solution to this problem is to generate 
data using a customised questionnaire, which has the benefit of creating 
substantial and relevant data (see Monteverde and Teece, 1982 a). 
ii. The measurement of the transaction costs attributes is difficult and often 
requires proxy variables. The best solution to this problem is to measure the 
variables in a process or system (see Masten, 1984) and in a specific industry 
(see Lyons 1994). This has the benefit of creating consistent and robust data. 
iii. The transaction cost approach can specify a testable hypothesis, but these 
hypotheses are not a test of causality. 
Conclusions 
This Chapter has assessed the transaction cost model in terms of its methodology, 
hypotheses and the potential ways of applying it to the UKAL The section on the 
methodology of transaction costs has reinforced the importance of previous empirical 
studies to this thesis and shows asset specificity to be particularly important. The 
section on hypotheses has shown the importance of testing the make-or-buy decision 
and contract design as dependent variables. The section on the method of testing has 
confirmed it is challenging to overcome the measurement problems and criticisms of 
tautology, which has been levelled at the transaction cost approach. Notwithstanding, 
there are a number of micro-analytic studies, which have been undertaken using the 
transaction costs approach, which connects the transaction cost approach to the study 
of aerospace and defence (Masten, 1984). 
Overall, the remaining issue for this thesis is data collection. Official data sources 
provide breadth, whereas transaction cost data require depth, which usually has to be 
collected first-hand from the firm via a questionnaire survey. This Chapter has shown 
that the transaction approach has developed a testable model given in equation 4.3 for 
which the outcomes are shown in Table 4.1. Whilst significant problems of 
inconsistent measurement and the choice of dependent variable persist it is possible to 
operationalise the transaction cost approach. 
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In conclusion, the transaction cost model has been specified in this Chapter and the 
predictive nature of the approach has been assessed. The remainder of this thesis will 
concentrate on making operational the testing of the make-or-buy decision and 
contract design at the firm level. The thesis has collected a unique dataset in order to 
achieve this objective, which has been informed by three key studies identified above. 
Finally, this completes the first part of the thesis on transaction cost theory and 
methodology. The second part reports on the empirical study of the UK aerospace 
industry using the transaction cost approach. The next Chapter will analyse the 
population and sample of the original survey conducted for this thesis. 
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Part 11 
Empirical Results 
Chapter Five: 
Methodology and questionnaire 
Introduction 
This Chapter presents the research methodology of the survey and describes the 
questionnaire used to collect the primary data. The central feature of the research in 
this thesis is a large-scale, in-depth survey combined with a rigorous single industry 
analysis (Remenyi et aL, 1998: 43). The evidence required for this approach is 
obtained from both primary and secondary sources, namely an original questionnaire, 
plus published reports and company accounts, respectively (Fink and Kosecoff, 1998: 
39). These data are subject to statistical and econometric analysis and are used to test 
the two research questions. Namely, what determines the make-or-buy decision 
within an aerospace firm? And, what potential hold-up problem exists between 
aerospace firms in the supply chain from the perspective of contract design? 
There are three sections in this Chapter. Firstly, the research methodology is 
identified and the survey population of SBAC membership is documented. Secondly, 
the pilot survey is conducted and specified in terms of informing the design of the 
questionnaire. Thirdly, the survey sample is specified and each of the three parts' of 
the questionnaire is described in turn. The results from the questionnaire form the 
majority of Part Two of the thesis. The next section analyses the research 
methodology and assesses how to make the questionnaire operational. 
Research methodology 
The research methodology attempts to use both logical reasoning and empirical 
observation (Remenyi et aL, 1998: 43). This is in line with a positivistic approach and 
it is for this reason that one of the central research tools is the questionnaire survey. 
The positivistic research strategy is regarded as more appropriate in this context than 
the phenomenologiCa13 strategy, where the former is usually adopted by physical 
1 The three sections are as follows: Section A is company profile. Section B is company supply chain. 
Section C is company transactions. 2 According to Remenyi et aL (1998: 57) the 'logic of a traditional survey is strictly positivistic'. 3A phenomenological approach is usually adopted by the social sciences, Remenyi et aL (1998: 93). 
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sciences. This is because the actual research problems are examined using 
quantitative analysis, which can be used to observe and measure actual outcomes. As 
a result, a direct test of the null hypothesis is possible, using a positivistic approach. 
Whilst the majority of this research uses quantitative data, there is also analysis of 
qualitative data, where appropriate, especially in terms of contracts. However, in this 
thesis there is an additional need to generate original data to test the predictions of 
transaction costs since there are no available published data close enough to be a 
proxy at the firm level in the aerospace indust . 
The questionnaire survey information was gathered primarily by a postal questionnaire 
and supported by interviews with key respondents in selected companies. The 
aerospace companies selected for the survey were all members of the aerospace trade 
association namely the Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC). In 1997 
there were 187 full members of SBAC and 82 of these firms completed the 
questionnaire, which represents a response rate of 44%. The firms which completed 
the questionnaire include BAE Systems and Rolls Royce as well as four aerospace 
suppliers in the North West of England that participated in the pilot survey. In the 
SBAC population, the companies range from large multi-site, multi-product, multi- 
national aerospace companies, which occupy the position of prime contractor in the 
supply chain, to small and medium-sized service and component suppliers. The 
questionnaire has been designed to provide not only a detailed cross-section of the 
aerospace industry, but also longitudinal developments. This allows an analysis of 
dynamic changes, in addition to the static position at any point in time and as a result a 
questionnaire approach is a suitable data collection method. The full details of the 
questionnaire are developed later in this Chapter and a summary of the statistics is 
reported in Chapter Six. 
The secondary data field is generated from a number of business and economic 
sources. One of the main sources of information is the Financial Access Made Easy 
(FAME) CD-ROM database, which provides full company accounts and business 
4 This research has not ignored the theoretical contribution of economics. Indeed, the previous Chapter 
has shown the theoretical underpinning to be highly significant. However, to fully understand the 
research questions and the profound changes affecting the LJK aerospace industry at present, an 
empirical approach remains the most logical choice, which is nevertheless derived from a sound 
theoretical basis. 
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ratios for a wide range of UK companies from 1993 to 1998 5. From this database it is 
also possible to specify industry aggregates, which allows an assessment of 
profitability across different industries and check the accuracy of the responses from 
the survey. Other sources include published company reports and accounts for public 
limited companies, as well as company-produced product and service listings, 
especially from private limited companies. Company information on ownership and 
the year of company formation is located in Who Owns Whom and Dunn & 
Bradstreet, respectively. Data on aerospace companies has been obtained from 
SBAC, Jane's and AIRLINE, an aerospace research centre based at Warwick. Data on 
defence companies has been obtained from the MoD and the Defence Manufacturers 
Association (DMA). Aggregate economic information has been gathered from 
Economic Trends, the Employment Gazette and the Monthly Digest of Statistics. The 
research methodology is primarily empirical and positivistic, combining longitudinal 
and cross-scctional research with both primary and secondary data. The analysis uses 
statistical methods and econometric procedures to answer the research questions. 
The specific approach of the questionnaire technique is a method for analysing 
quantitative and qualitative issues in the UK aerospace supply chain (Symon and 
Cassell, 1998: 1-2). The main purpose of the questionnaire is to test the transaction 
cost model in an industry where there is no relevant published data. In the absence of 
any relevant data, the questionnaire has been designed to maximise the potential 
response rate, including closed-ended questions, making the questionnaire length 
relatively short and allowing anonymity and confidentiality of respondents (Remenyi 
et aL, 1998: 152). 
The main advantage of closed-crided questions, multiple-choice alternatives and 
Likert scaling is the ease and quickness of response. Companies are in business to 
make money, not to answer unsolicited questionnaires. 
According to Edwards et aL (1996: 25): 
"It takes considerably less effort to check a box, select an alternative or rate something 
on a 1-to-5 scale than to think of and write a narrative answer". 
Edwards et aL, (1996: 25). 
5 There is a disclosure lag for certain companies, which creates gaps in the database for the latest year, 
in this case 1998. As a result, few companies had reported the 1998 figures, but all reported 1997. 
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The closed-ended questions with response alternatives and Likert scales reduce the 
effort and time required completing a questionnaire. In addition, it communicates the 
same frame of reference for all those in the population and allows the answer to be 
more easily converted into quantitative variables. Closed-ended questions do have 
philosophical drawbacks, not least of which is that it can inhibit the questionnaire 
respondent from giving more detailed information and funnels the replies in a 
potentially pre-specified way. However, on the whole this approach is better suited 
for the purposes of the research, because it allows quantitative data to be gathered, in 
addition to those items, which ask demographic questions. 
Wherever possible non-committed responses were made available, for example, 
sometimes in order avoid prejudicing a response and allow special alternatives to be 
expressed. However, item branding, where respondents are instructed to skip 
questions, which may not be applicable was not included, since this increases the 
overall level of non-response. Indeed, many respondents replied with "not 
applicable" in any case, which justifies this decision. 
The number of points on the Likert scale was specified as ten and is within the 
conventional range of between 5 and 10. Whilst it is acknowledged that a greater 
number of points do not necessarily enhance the measurement responses, a decimal 
system was preferred to augment the ease of understanding for the respondent. 
Edwards et al. (1996: 25-26) recommend using five point scales, because it contains a 
neutral point or mid-point and is relatively concise. There is no definite conclusion 
covering the use of midpoints and a system based on ten has an intuitive logic. 
Furthermore, all items using the Likert scale response format are labelled with 
meaningftil anchors, for example 1 equals general and 10 equals specific. Likert 
scaling is the most used system in the literature and is preferred to either Thurstone 
scaling and semantic differential scaling in organisational surveys. Likert scaling does 
have drawbacks, including whether a scale of five in one firm is truly comparable with 
a scale of five in another. Also, Likert scaling does tend to be artificial and as a result 
potentially unable to capture the complexities of an issue. These issues were fully 
considered and it is nevertheless deemed suitable to use the Likert scaling, not least as 
it is the convention to do so in the empirical literature (Masten et al., 1991: 265). 
More compelling is the role of the Likert scales to be a genuine attempt to secure a 
true and accurate record of any given question, in spite of the limitations. 
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It is important to consider response bias with closed-ended items. For example, 
response order affects yea-saying or nay-saying, acquiescence and fatigue effects. In 
this questionnaire, response order effects are not a major issue since only a few 
questions have a listed reply. Where it does occur, respondents were requested to rank 
their replies to certain questions. Yea saying, nay saying and acquiescence are not 
considered a major problem in this type of questionnaire, because the questions are 
not directly assessing behaviour. Nevertheless, wherever possible items have included 
a neutral response as well as both negative and positive ones. Moreover, several 
questions have positively and negatively worded items; or balanced scale approach. 
Fatigue effects are overcome by making the questionnaire relatively brief, that is, 
between four to eight pages, where four is considered short and more than eight is 
considered long (Edwards et A, 1996: 25). 
Finally, the issue of the marginal make-or-buy decision was considered to be so 
important that the same question was deliberately asked twice in separate parts of the 
questionnaire. The marginal make-or-buy decision is where the firm is asked its 
strategy if the cost of making a component equals the costs of buying from a supplier. 
By receiving two responses from exactly the same question, the consistency of the 
respondent can be assessed. The importance of this question is that it is one of the 
dependent variables. 
Next the operational approach to transaction costs is developed in more detail as well 
as a consideration of the testing issues. The questionnaire survey undertaken for this 
research developed many of the techniques and methods of the previous studies 
outlined in Chapter Four. The premise of the work is a comparative assessment of in- 
house production costs against the costs of procurement from the market that is the 
make-or-buy decision. If the production costs of the firm are greater than procurement 
costs from the market, then a decision to buy is recommended. Whereas if the 
production costs of the firm are less than procurement costs from the market then a 
make decision is recommended. In the transaction costs literature, the make-or-by 
decision is associated with high asset specificity, considerable uncertainty and high 
frequency. The next section looks in detail at the population used in the survey. 
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The survey population 
The population of the study is determined by membership of the Society of British 
Aerospace Companies (SBAC), which is a UK-based industry trade association. The 
assumption made in this thesis is that the UKAI population is wholly accounted by the 
SBAC membership list. This is because all the prime contractors are represented, 
including BAE Systems plc (British Aerospace plc at the time), Rolls Royce plc and 
GEC-Marconi plc (now part of BAE Systems), as well as the majority of second tier 
suppliers and many third tier sub-contractors. In total, 187 companies were members 
of SBAC in 1997, ranging from organisations that are exclusively engaged in 
aerospace activity, for example, GEC-Marconi Avionics, to others where aerospace 
business represents only a small proportion of company turnover, for example, British 
Steel Engineering Steels (see Chapter Two). SBAC has estimated that the 
membership accounts for 70% of the value of UK aerospace markets 6. The remaining 
30% represent a particularly wide cross-section of companies outside of UKAL 
Whilst some of these unaccounted companies do not want to be a member of a 
specific trade association, others that are far removed from prime contractors 
presumably may not realise their indirect involvement with the aerospace supply 
chain. It is possible that the companies who comprise the residual 30% will be 
changing on a relatively frequent basis, as aerospace companies switch suppliers for a 
variety of reasons. Alternatively, when suppliers view other markets as potentially 
more profitable 7 then they will exit aerospace because of efficient market operations. 
To this end, the member companies of SBAC have attempted to generate more 
stability in the supply chain, as well as trust between suppliers, by the establishment of 
Supply Chain Relationships in Aerospace (SCRIA). This is a system for 
benchmarking in which participating companies agree to quality auditing; information 
sharing and greater co-operation with one another in return for more stable long term 
contracts. It is an essentially inquisitorial approach to supply chain management, 
rather than an exclusively adversarial or competitive one. The complexity of aircraft 
production tends to make this approach necessary. The findings from the SCIA 
6 The figure of 70% was confirmed in a conversation in March 1998 between the author and Keith 
Hayward, Head of Research at SBAC. 7 See Masten (1984: 404) on supplier switching in USA aerospace companies and Masten et aL (1991: 
265) for supplier switching in USA naval shipbuilding. 
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research are twofold. Firstly, that the supply chain in UK aerospace is larger than 
anticipated and shows considerable diversity of the supply chain. Secondly, that there 
is much co-operation between the firms in the supply chain, which has implications 
for contractual relationships. 
A great deal of the methodological literature is consumed by the importance of 
selecting the survey respondents. In this case the target population was identified as 
companies engaged in the UK aerospace industry. Since the SBAC membership 
covers 70% of the value of the UK aerospace industry (although not necessarily 70% 
of the actual companies) it was decided that this is a sufficient proportion of the 
population. Therefore, the study conducted a survey of the known 70%, rather than 
search for the residual 30%, which is an activity that SBAC itself is finding a difficult 
task9. This is due to the life cycle of companies in this latter category and the 
potential for 'hit and run' entry, where it may become more profitable to supply other 
industries, for example, motor vehicle manufacturing. As a result, it was considered 
more efficient for the survey to focus on the 70% majority rather than seeking to find 
the 30% minority of the value of the UK aerospace industry. Also, for reasons of 
confidentiality, the results were aggregated, so that no firm could be identified from 
the survey, which contributed to the increase in returns (Remenyi et aL, 1998: 156). 
This questionnaire approach adopted in this survey has advantages over simple 
random sampling, because the sample in question has a known and quantifiable value 
(Lyons, 1994: 261). This will also have the potential effect of reducing the sampling 
error of the sample size, especially if the major prime contractors all respond to the 
survey. Furthermore, due to the way the questions have been written, certain sub- 
groups can be analysed, for example civil and military aerospace companies. The use 
of stratifying the population by certain characteristics of each sub-group is important 
for testing and prediction. For example, one potential hypothesis states that defence 
firms and civilian firms in aerospace have identical transaction costs. The population 
will be split into two groups, where defence aerospace firms are the subject group and 
civilian aerospace firms are the control group. Hence, differences between the two 
8 This is due to market concentration and the dominance of large fmns such as BAE Systems and Rolls- 
Royce p1c. 
9 This information was given by Keith Hayward, formerly Head of Research at SBAC. 
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sub-groups will be assessed in terms of the predictions of transaction costs in order to 
accept or reject the null hypothesis. The next section assesses the contribution of the 
pilot study and its relevance in understanding the full population of aerospace firms 
and how it was used to inform the final questionnaire. 
The pflot survey 
The pilot survey was conducted before the full questionnaire was issued, in order to 
comply with the best practices of questionnaire design (Fink and Kosecoff, 1998: 10). 
The pilot survey has three primary functions, namely to determine if companies have 
collected the data required; to establish if companies are willing to disclose the 
information and to test the validity and importance of questions. The aerospace 
industry remains a highly competitive environment where UK companies compete in 
many exacting global markets, especially in North America. Appreciation of 
commercial sensitivity is a vitally important consideration for firms in civil markets 
and military secrecy is also vitally important for firms in defence markets. As a result, 
a meeting was requested with selected companies to discuss the overall questionnaire 
design. The aim was to make the questions as meaningful as possible and acceptable 
for these companies to participate and fully complete the form. 
The pilot study began in June 1998 when fourteen aerospace companies were 
contacted by letter requesting their participation in the study. The sample was chosen 
by geographic location, since all the companies which were contacted had registered 
addresses in the North West region of England according to the SBAC membership 
list of May 1998.10 The North West is a highly strategic region for UK aerospace. " 
In the area, British Aerospace plc comprises British Aerospace Defence (sites at 
Samlesbury and Warton plus Preston until 1990), British Aerospace Airbus (sites at 
Broughton and Chadderton), British Aerospace Regional Aircraft (a site at 
Woodford), British Aerospace Dynamics (sites at Chorley and Lostock), plus Ferranti 
International, also based in Oldham. Although British Aerospace plc (now BAE 
Systems) has its registered headquarters in Farnborough, it is clear that the North West 
region of England is a very important area for the aerospace industry as a whole. In 
10 This is accessed from the SBAC homepage on the Internet using http//: www. sbac. co. uk 
" The South East and the South West are also strategically important for the aerospace industry. 
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the defence sector, Warton is the final assembly point for the Hawk, Tornado and 
Typhoon, where defence accounted for 74.6% of the 1997 corporate turnover of 
British Aerospace p1c, (the biggest single aerospace company in the UK). It is for 
these compelling reasons that the North West region was chosen for the pilot study. 
From the fourteen companies that were contacted, four agreed to participate and of the 
remaining ten, three declined to participate and seven did not answer the letter. The 
latter companies were contacted by telephone, where two more companies agreed to 
participate, but in the final version of the questionnaire only and not the pilot. The 
response rate was 28.6% and overall the reaction from firms was mixed. However, 
where companies did agree to participate, then the co-operation was excellent and the 
answers given were full and very helpful. 
The problem of whom to send the pilot questionnaire was overcome by telephoning 
the companies prior to sending the letter and asking the company receptionist for the 
name of the most appropriate contact. Whilst the replies given were well meaning, 
the request to participate in the pilot study may not have been received by the 
appropriate employee. The issue of finding the appropriate personnel to complete 
questionnaires and surveys is highly significant and in part will determine the final 
response rate (Edwards et aL, 1996: 100). Obviously, the person with the appropriate 
knowledge and expertise needed to complete a questionnaire varies between 
companies. In part this was overcome in the final version of questionnaire through 
obtaining a complete list of companies and direct contact names supplied by SBAC 12 . 
The list of contact names contained those specific personnel who have responsibility 
to complete or co-ordinate the company reply to the quarterly SBAC questionnaire. 
As a result the final questionnaire was accurately targeted using an up-to-date mailing 
list, which improved the likelihood of increasing the response rate 13 . The lessons that 
were Icarnt from the pilot study was to be precise with the questions so that it is 
straightforward and reduce the length of the questionnaire to a maximum of seven 
pages. The full details of the four interviews are given in Appendix III. 
12 This list was provided courtesy of Keith Hayward, formerly Head of Research at SBAC. 13 It does not necessarily follow that the response rate should be higher with this list, but at least the 
questionnaire was received by a named person in the organisation, who often forwarded it to the most 
appropriate contact. The final response rate of almost 44% was acceptable and is partial evidence that a 
well-targeted questionnaire is vital for an acceptable response rate. 
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The pilot survey identified a number of key issues, which were relevant to the 
questionnaire itself. Firstly, companies are in position to disclose quantitative data as 
far back as 1992. Secondly, the Likert scale is acceptable between 1 and 10, although 
it is preferable to specify the exact range. For example, where I equals low and 10 
equals high, this must be labelled on the scale. Thirdly, due the general nature of 
certain questions, the use of terms such as most important customer is preferable to 
typical or average customer. Finally, the extensive use of tick boxes and tabulated 
responses would considerable reduce the time needed to reply and thereby increase the 
response rate. The next section assesses the questionnaire as a method of data 
collection. 
The questionnaire 
The lack of relevant published data makes the questionnaire an essential exercise in 
transaction cost approach (Lyons, 1994: 262-263). The aim is to establish the 
reasoning behind production and procurement decisions and to identify the supply 
chain in the aerospace industry. The population is divided into company size 
(turnover, profit and employees), company location and number of years the company 
has been trading. Since a large proportion of these data can be accessed from public 
sources, for example FAME it was decided not to ask all of these questions in the 
questionnaire. Otherwise, this would have increased the length of the questionnaire 
(and thereby decreases the likelihood of a response from any given company). 14 
In addition, the survey content has been extensively discussed with various senior 
procurement and production personnel at several BAE Systems and Rolls Royce sites 
throughout the UK. Visits were made to British Aerospace at Samlesbury, Stevenage 
and Warton, as well as visits to Rolls Royce at Derby, Filton and Hillingdon. These 
visits served two important functions. Firstly, an overall appreciation of the aerospace 
industry was gained at first hand. BAE Systems plc is one of Europe's biggest 
aerospace and defence companies and remains the largest single UK manufacturer of 
fixed-wing aircraft. Rolls Royce plc is one of the world's biggest engine 
manufacturers with a strong presence in both civil and military aero-engine markets in 
14 Edwards et a/. (1996: 100) suggest as a method for increasing replies rates of mail-out surveys: 'Keep 
the survey short (e. g. 4 pages or fewer) when possible'. This questionnaire ran to seven pages. 
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Europe, the Far East and North America. It remains the only aero-engine 
manufacturer in the LJK. Secondly, several personnel at both companies have made 
detailed comments on the questionnaire and provided general advice on the workings 
of the aerospace sector. In sum, the guidance was been given without prejudice and 
has enabled a detailed picture of the aerospace industry to be gained on both 
production and procurement issues (that is, make-or-buy and contract design). 
The final version of the questionnaire was created by a number of methods, including 
a pilot version, reference to published secondary sources, independent interviews and 
direct contact with senior personnel in the two major aerospace companies (that is, 
BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce). The outcome of this approach is that the survey 
generated meaningful data from the questionnaire. In particular, the key profile data 
from companies were accurate when checked against published secondary sources. 
Also, the transaction cost data were generally completed by firms, but this is unique 
information with no available external sources of data for corroboration. In turn, this 
situation presents a dilemma for the research, since it is not possible to independently 
verify the accuracy of the data. Hence, the quality of the pilot work, the questionnaire 
itself and contact with senior aerospace personnel assumes greater importance in order 
to establish the consistency of the information. 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections, namely company profile; company 
supply chain and company transactions. A copy of the questionnaire is shown in 
Appendix H. In the next part, each section is discussed in turn. 
Company Profile (Section A) 
Section A of the questionnaire is the factual part, which requires company-defining 
information on characteristics of the firm. That is, confirming known data on firms. 
Company name and principal areas of business are requested, as well as variables 
assessing company size, such as turnover and number of employees. The company is 
similarly categorised in terms of importance of aerospace business and military 
markets, with the most important customer and the most important suppliers also 
specified. The final question in this section tabulates the buy component of company 
business. By definition this will allow the make-or-buy decision to be assessed, along 
with the marginal make-or-buy decision. The questions are asked for both 1992 and 
1997 in order to estimate any differences over time. This longitudinal approach is 
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justified because there had been considerable changes in the aerospace industry in the 
previous five years. The difference of five years is not an arbitrary figure and allows 
recent changes over time to be assessed. Otherwise the questions would be almost 
exclusively cross-sectional in nature. The dates were chosen for the study because 
1997 was the last full year of data from when the questionnaires were issued in 1998. 
A five-year period back was chosen because this was considered a long enough time 
span to check the changes and any longer may be regarded as too long to compare like 
with like and have structural break problems with the data. 
Essentially, the answers to these questions should reveal considerable information 
about the type of company, its markets and the position in the supply matrix. The 
information can be used to establish the sub-groups within the sample, as well as to 
observe the overall pattern of business in the production of UK aerospace companies. 
Company Supply Chain (Section B) 
Section B of the questionnaire goes beyond the mainly descriptive approach in 
assessing the company and attempts to analyse the economic nature of the firm. 
Section A provides details of the dependent variable, namely the make-or-buy 
decision. (i. e., percentage of company turnover bought-out (and made in-house)). 
This approach is based on the measurement of the make-or-buy variables in Masten 
(1984: 404). The explanatory variables are written as asset specificity, uncertainty, 
frequency and small numbers, plus scale economies (from Section Q. Asset 
specificity is defined as human, physical, location and dedicated assets. Uncertainty is 
defined as unexpected changes in supply and demand. Small numbers are specified 
by companies in terms of low or high numbers in both intermediate (supply) markets 
and product (demand) markets. Economies of scale are specified in terms of cost 
advantage. Also, the pilot questionnaire helped define the transaction cost 
terminology and the questionnaire was designed so that it could be easily understood 
by aerospace firms. 
Company Transactions (Section C) 
Section C of the questionnaire attempts to categorise the type and frequency of 
contracts used by UK aerospace suppliers, with other suppliers and customers. In 
particular, the competitive nature of contracts is specified together with the duration of 
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contracts and type of contract along with other quality issues, such as names of key 
suppliers or customers, relating to how companies interact with each other. This 
provides an extensive range of descriptive analysis of transaction costs to be 
undertaken especially where certain variables are not easily quantifiable. For 
example, the type of contract used between aerospace companies and penalty clauses 
in contracts for late delivery or poor quality as well as discounts for bulk buying. The 
work by Lyons (1994: 267) is useful in confirming the way to generate data on 
contracts. The aerospace industry is a highly competitive industry, where quality is 
assumed to be a vital component of success. A priori reasoning suggests that these 
issues are addressed in the transactional exchange between firms in the supply chain, 
but this needs to be checked in greater detail to confirm if this is the case developed in 
Chapter Seven. The next section assesses the sample generated in the survey. 
Survey Sample 
A total of 187 aerospace companies 15 were sent a copy of the final questionnaire and a 
copy of this is contained in Appendix 11. In the end 82 completed returns 16 were 
received, which is a response rate of almost 44%. A figure of 44% is considered 
good, especially as most of the large aerospace firms replied, including BAE Systems 
and Rolls Royce. To obtain a figure of 44% the questionnaire was sent out three 
times, in line with conventional practice (Edwards et aL, 1998: 92). The first occasion 
was in July 1998, when all the companies were contacted and 42 completed replies 
were received. The second occasion was in September 1998, when 24 completed 
replies were received and the final occasion was in November 1998 when a further 16 
completed replies were received. Those replies not returned in the first wave were 
labelled as 'late' to see if there is a significant difference between the two groups (late 
accounted for 49% of the sample). However, analysis of the data shows there is no 
difference between when the questionnaire was received, late or otherwise. 
15 The original database from SBAC contained 192 companies. Three fmns had ceased trading (one of 
which was in receivership), one firm was not traced and it was not possible to locate a new address and 
another two firms were found to be one of the same. This left 187 remaining fmw. 16 Another thirteen companies responded by declining to participate. The reasons given actually 
revealed more information in itself. Whilst most cited the extreme pressures of time, others claimed 
they would like to respond, but felt unable to do so because the company was restructuring or being 
taken over. This outcome illustrates the continuing dynamic nature of the industry in terms of merger 
and exit. 
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Nevertheless, the technique of 'follow-up until you drop' as advocated by Edwards et 
aL (1996: 100) clearly made a difference. Without the follow-up reminders the 
response rate would have been only 22.5% and the higher the response rate the more 
acceptable the survey (Edwards et aL, 1996: 91). Edwards et aL (1996: 92) considers 
a response rate of around 50% is acceptable. However, given the length of the 
questionnaire of seven pages and the fact it was sent unsolicited 17 , then a response rate 
of almost 44% must be regarded as acceptable. Since a majority of the large firms 
replied then a high proportion of the value of supply chain is captured in the survey. 
Lyons also received less than 100 acceptable replies in his questionnaire on UK 
engineering sub-contractors, which represented a response rate of approximately 10%. 
Lyons considered this result to be acceptable as he captured close to 100 replies, an 
approach which is repeated in this thesis (Lyons, 1994: 260-261). 
In summary, the response rate of completed questionnaires is overall in line with 
standard procedures of this type (Edwards et aL 1996: 100 and Remenyi et aL, 1998: 
156). The total absolute number of responses is approaching 100 and beyond the 
problems of small number bias. The response rate is 44% of the total identified 
population. There are responses from all the major firms, which accounts for over 
75% of the direct employment in UKAI. Therefore, the outcome is that the 
questionnaire survey has been successful since the sample is sufficiently large enough 
to generate statistically meaningful results. The next section interprets the dependent 
and explanatory variables in the questionnaire. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the transaction cost model is cost of the transacting as 
shown in equation 4.3. The transaction costs can either be zero or greater than zero. 
This is a difficult variable to measure consistently across firms and industries. As a 
result, this variable is measured by the proxy variable make-or-buy. This proxy 
variable can take one of two forms. Firstly, there is the use of a dummy variable, 
where I is recorded for a decision to make and 0 is recorded for a decision to buy. 
Secondly, there is a use of a continuous variable where the percentage or proportion of 
the make-or-buy decisions is recorded. 
17 A covering letter of introduction was included from Keith Hayward, Head of Research at SBAC. 
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In fact, there are two measures of the make-or-buy dependent variable in this study. 
The first measure is a continuous variable, which specifies the percentage of 
components and sub-components used by the firm in manufacturing that have been 
bought-out from an external supplier. In other words, this is the extent to which a 
company will purchase from the market (buy) and the produce in-house (make). 
Where: 
1. Buy = percentage bought-out; Eq. 5.1 
2. Make = (100 minus percentage bought-out). Eq. 5.2 
The other measure is a dummy variable in response to the question: if the cost of 
making a component equals the cost of buying from a supplier do you make-or-buy. 
The transaction cost literature is very clear on this prediction (Masten, 1984: 405). If 
the cost to make a component equals the cost to buy, then a firm should always buy. 
Hence, there is no gain in making, if you can minimise costs by buying. Therefore, to 
be more specific with the transaction cost prediction, a firm will purchase from the 
market, if the cost to buy is equal to or less than the costs to make. 
There is another dependent variable in the analysis. The variable is the measure of the 
contract type. This measure is dichotomous variable, which specifies the type of 
contract. Hence: 
Contract with supplier =f (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency) Eq. 5.3 
Where: 
Contract with supplier =1 
No contract with supplier =0 
The point of this approach is to analyse if contract type can be modelled using the 
hostage model (Williamson, 1983: 522). This concept will be developed further in 
Chapter Nine, but it is important to state at this point that the independent variables 
are broadly the same in both models, in line with work by Lyons (1994: 262). It is 
only the independent variables that are different between the two types of model. 
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Independent variables 
The problem of measurement was introduced in Chapter Three and the same issue is 
revisited in this section. As almost all the independent variables can not be gained 
from published data then each must be included in the questionnaire. Also, the 
variables are conceptually difficult to observe and hence need to be measured directly 
using a Likert scale between 1 and 10. Asset specificity is usually regarded as the 
most important independent variable and is defined as the particular part of a market 
relationship, which is special to any given transaction. The different types of asset 
specificity are covered in the following questions outlined below (Shelanski and 
Klein, 1995: 340). The actual questionnaire numbers are given in brackets. 
There are four direct measures of asset specificity, comprising human, physical, 
dedicated and site asset specificity. 
(i). Human Asset Specificity: (question 10a) 
In order to capture human asset specificity, then a detailed question is needed that 
ranks the human capital of the employees. Hence, the following question is designed 
to capture asset specificity in terms of the labour input: 
"To what extent are the skills, knowledge and experience of your employees specific 
to your company9" 
(ii). Physical Asset Specificity: (question II a) 
To capture physical asset specificity, then a detailed question is needed that ranks the 
physical capital of the facilities. Hence, the following question is designed to capture 
asset specificity in terms of the physical input: 
"To what extent are the facilities and equipment of your production process specific to 
your company9" 
(iii). Dedicated Assets: (question 12a) 
To capture contractual asset specificity, then a detailed question is needed that ranks 
the legal aspect of the contract. Hence, the following question is designed to capture 
asset specificity in terms of the contract: 
"To what extent are the facilities and equipment of your employees specific to your 
company9" 
(iv). Site Asset Specificity: (question 12c) 
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Finally, to capture site asset specificity, then a detailed question is needed that ranks 
the site capital of the employees. Hence, the following question is designed to capture 
asset specificity in terms of the distance from the point of production: 
"How far from your most important customer is your main factory site located? " 
In sum, these four direct measures of asset specificity should generate a clear 
indication of the extent of the inherent transaction costs and in so doing overcome the 
measurement problems. Indeed, Masten (1984: 407) regarded the make-or-buy choice 
as central to the whole concept of transaction costs. However, as noted in Chapter 
Three, the measurement problems of transaction costs must not be ignored. To this 
end, there has been an attempt to define asset specificity as close to the Williamson 
original concept as possible. This is because it is necessary overcome the definitional 
problems of transaction costs and in order to make the concepts operational. 
Uncertainty is defined as the degree to which economic agents are unsure about the 
future or the actions of a third party involved in the transaction. In this study, 
uncertainty has been measured in terms of the supply of components and the demand 
for the products. 
(i). Uncertainty of the supply of components: (question 14a) 
In order to capture the inherent uncertainty of supply the following question is 
designed to show the changes in the supply of any given component: 
"What is the likelihood of unexpected changes in supply of your components? " 
(ii). Uncertainty of the demand for products: (question 13a) 
To capture the inherent uncertainty of demand the following question is designed to 
show the changes in the supply of any given product: 
"What is the likelihood of unexpected changes in demand for your products? " 
Complexity is related to uncertainty and is defined as how complicated the 
transactional arrangement. This is captured by questions on the extent of formal 
contract with suppliers and customers: 
(i). Complexity of contract with suppliers: (question 19a) 
"Do you usually have a formal contract with your suppliers? " 
A question of this nature is designed to capture the complexity of the transactions with 
suppliers. There are additional questions on type of contract, length of contract and the 
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number of suppliers, which generates a detailed picture on the complexity of the 
contract. These questions are linked to the hostage model and are dealt with in 
Chapter Nine. 
(ii). Complexity of contract with customers: (question 20a) 
"Do you usually have a formal contract with your customers? " 
This question is designed to capture the complexity of the transactions with 
customers. Once again there are questions on type of contract, length of contract and 
the number of suppliers. 
Frequency is defined as the regularity with which the transaction occurs. This is more 
difficult to measure directly. Although a Likert scaling is used again it is possible to 
design a question that uses absolute levels. However, in order to generate results that 
can be generalised across firms then the Likert scale was viewed as the preferred 
measure not least as it was also consistent with the other measures of the independent 
variables in this study. 
(i). Frequency of transactions: (question 15a) 
"Is your main business one-off or frequent repeat business? " 
This is designed to capture the frequency of the transactions. The range from one-off 
transactions to repeat business is an attempt to get consistency between firms and use 
terms that are in common business use in the UK. In particular, these terms were 
tested on firms in the pilot study and found to be acceptable to the respondents. 
Nevertheless, conceptually frequency remains a difficult term to make operational, 
since it can have different meanings to firms in the supply chain. 
The main independent variables are measured in such a way that generates continuous 
variables and links them to the dependent variable. The full descriptions of the 
variables are shown in Table 5.1 below. Column 1 rcfers to the question number in 
the actual questionnaire (see Appendix R); column 2 gives the basis of the question; 
column 3 gives the variable range and column 4 the link to the relevant aspect of 
transaction cost theory. 
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5.1: A summary of the questionnaire variables 
Question 
Number 
Question 
Detail 
Variable 
Range 
Transaction Cost 
Relevance 
1 Company name Descriptive Firm identifier 
2a Area of business Descriptive Core competence 
2b Product price <; EI to >Elmillion Size of firm 
3a Turnover in 1997 f millions Size of firm 
3b Turnover in 1992 f millions Size of firm 
4a Employees in 1997 Thousands (staff) Size of firm 
4b Employees in 1992 Thousands (staff) Size of firm 
5a Aerospace business: 1997 0 to 100% Type of firm 
5b Aerospace business: 1992 0 to 100% Type of firm 
6a Military business: 1997 0 to 100% Type of firm 
6b Military business: 1992 0 to 100% Type of firm 
7 Most important customer Descriptive Bi-lateral measure 
8 Most important supplier Descriptive Bi-lateral measure 
9 Bought-out value 0 to 100% Dependent variable 
10a Employee specificity I to 10 Measure of k 
10b Change in 1 Oa since 1992 up/down/same Explanatory change 
10c Examples of 10a Descriptive Core competence 
11a Facility asset specificity 1 to 10 Measure of k 
11b Change in 11 a since 1992 up/down/same Explanatory change 
11c Examples of 11 a Descriptive Core competence 
11d Sub-contract-high demand yes/no Boundary of firm 
11e Sub-contract-low demand yes/no Boundary of firm 
12a Dedicated specificity 1 to 10 Measure of k 
12b Change in 12a since 1992 up/down/same Explanatory change 
12c Location asset specificity number of miles Measure of k 
12d Proximity to customer yes/no Mine-mouth 
13a Demand uncertainty 1 to 10 Explaining variable 
13b Change in 13a since 1992 up/down/same Explanatory change 
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13c Delivery time day/month/year Boundary of firm 
14a Supply uncertainty 1 to 10 Explaining variable 
14b Change in 14a since 1992 up/down/same Explanatory change 
14c Reliability of suppliers yes/no Boundary of firm 
15a Frequency of business I to 10 Explanatory variable 
15b, Change in 15a Up/down/same Explanatory change 
15c Change in order size Yes/no Boundary of firm 
16a Supplier numbers I to 10 Explanatory variable 
16b Change in 16a Up/down/same Explanatory change 
16c 75% of suppliers From 1 to> 1 Integration measure 
16d Purchases from firm in Q8 0 to 100% Boundary of firm 
17a Customer numbers 1 to 10 Explanatory variable 
17b Change in 17a since 1992 Up/down/same Explanatory change 
17c 75% of customers From I to> I Integration measure 
17d sales to firm in Q7 0 to 100% Boundary of firm 
18a Marginal make-or-buy Make = 1; buy 
0 
Dependent variable 
18b Supplier switching Descriptive Cost of transaction 
19a Supplier contract Yes/no/sometime Finn/market 
19b Contract details Descriptive Measure of s 
20a Customer contract Yes/no/sometime Finn/market 
20b Contract details Descriptive Measure of s 
21a Supplier cost advantage yes/no sometime Cost of transaction 
21b size of cost advantage <5% to 20%+ Cost of transaction 
22a Supplier cost discounts yes/no/sometime Cost of transaction 
22b size of cost discounts < 5% to 20%+ Cost of transaction 
22c Marginal make-or-buy make = 1; buy =0 Dependent variable 
Where k is a measure of asset specificity and s is a measure of safeguards. 
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See Chapter Four for details of applying the transaction cost model. The conclusions 
form the final part of this Chapter and assess the outcome of the pilot study and the 
questionnaire survey. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the analysis of the population shows that the firms in the survey are 
broadly representative of the UK aerospace industry and the statistical data generated 
from the questionnaire is acceptable. The pilot version of the questionnaire and direct 
interviews with the leading UK aerospace firms confirm that the design of the 
questionnaire proved successful in generating a large and meaningful set of data, 
which is capable of assessing the UK aerospace industry in line with the transaction 
cost model. The response rate of 44% makes the econometric research representative. 
Moreover, an attempt to make operational the transaction cost approach is consistent 
with the previous studies in Chapter Three and the model developed in Chapter Four. 
To this end the methodology and the data draws from a reliable framework and 
coherent body of work from transaction costs economics. 
In sum, the methodology of the questionnaire is an important consideration when 
assessing the results in the context of the transaction cost approach. It is also very 
useful for setting the UK aerospace firms in the economic environment of the actual 
operation of the industry. This Chapter has defined the population of the survey, 
demonstrated that the pilot is acceptable and shown that the sample meets an 
acceptable response rate, which is representative of the population as a whole. Also, 
the Chapter has shown the difficulties of measuring the theoretical variables under the 
transaction cost approach and offered solutions in order to make the theory become 
operational for the purposes of the survey. The following Chapters in the thesis will 
begin to assess the model and empirically test various hypotheses. The next Chapter 
presents the statistical analysis of UK aerospace at the industry level. 
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Chapter Six: 
Empirical results 1: industry level 
Introduction 
This Chapter begins the empirical testing of the transaction costs approach to the UK 
aerospace industry. In general, the questionnaire was designed to capture quantitative 
and qualitative data on the UKA1, which are not published elsewhere. Quantitative 
and qualitative data are used for two purposes. Firstly, to assess the diagnostics of the 
data set for robustness and accuracy. This is an important task, since mistakes in data 
preparation can lead to poor results and incorrect conclusions. Secondly, to assess 
company profiles of the UK aerospace industry and to develop the empirical themes 
of the thesis. 
There are three sections in this Chapter. The first conducts the diagnostic checks of 
the dataset from the aerospace questionnaire, since it is vital to establish that the data 
are robust and statistically sound. The second section assesses the company profiles 
of the organisations that returned the questionnaire in order to give a clear 
representation of the participating firms. The final section investigates the qualitative 
statistics in the dataset and uses cross-tabulations. The next section assesses the data 
generated from the questionnaire and performs the relevant diagnostic checks on the 
survey data. 
Diagnostic checks on the questionnaire data 
The summary statistics for database are shown in Table 6.1 listed by variable codes. 
The description of the variables by question is listed previously in Table 5.1. In total 
there are 82 completed questionnaires and 94 variables in each. This gives a 
maximum 82 by 94 matrix, which has over 7,700 observations. On a descriptive level 
most of the variables have 82 observations; if there is less than 82 then the specific 
question was not completed or did not require a response from the firm. 
Table 6.1 shows each variable code as listed in the first column and in sequence with 
the questionnaire itself (see Appendix II). Four parameters are presented for each 
variable, which are the minimum and maximum value, the mean and the standard 
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deviation. This is the conventional way to report descriptive statistics (Koop, 2000: 
18). Overall, the diagnostic checks for the database reveal the data to be satisfactory. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the key questionnaire variables 
Variable Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Code Description Value Value Value Deviation 
Pl. Price 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.11 
Under EI 
P2 Price fl. to 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.47 
fl, OOO 
P3 Price fl, 000 to 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49 
L100,000 
P4 Price under EI 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 
million 
P5 Price over 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 
fl. million 
T97* Turnover 1997 1.10 8546 234.76 1074.97 
f million 
T92* Turnover 1992 0.75 11508 270.99 1426.36 
f million 
E97 Employees in 14.00 43400 1818.53 6866.89 
1997 
E92 Employees in 5.00 87400 2544.28 11401.53 
1992 
A97 Aerospace % in 2.00 100 71.52 29.27 
1997 
A92 Aerospace % in 0.00 100.00 67.03 30.47 
1992 
M97 Military % in 0.00 100.00 27.51 29.89 
1997 
M92 Military % in 0.00 100.00 29.81 30.70 
1992 
B097* Bought-out % in 1.00 100.00 53.88 30.81 
1997 
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B092* Bought-out%in 1.00 100.00 50.11 29.65 
1992 
CA97* CivilAero%in 1.00 100.00 54.23 31.72 
1997 
CA92* Civil Aero % in 1.00 100.00 50.64 31.88 
1992 
MA97* Military Aero % 1 . 00 100.00 47.95 33.12 
in 1997 
MA92* Military Aero % 1.00 100.00 47.15 30.83 
in 1992 
EMPAS Employment 1.00 10.00 7.41 1.80 
Asset specificity 
FACAS Facility Asset 1.00 10.00 6.51 2.83 
specificity 
SUBHIGH Sub-contract in 0.00 1.00 0.4024 0.49 
high demand 
SUBLOW Sub-contract in 0.00 1.00 0.1585 0.37 
low demand 
DEDAS Dedicated Asset 1.00 10.00 6.19 2.86 
specificity 
LOCATION Location Asset 0.00 7000.00 661.91 1478.89 
specificity 
CLOSELOC Benefits of close 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 
location 
DEMDEL Demand 1.00 10.00 6.21 2.37 
uncertainty 
TIME Time between 1.00 1000.00 201.34 220.30 
order & delivery 
SUPDEL supply 1.00 10.00 4.89 2.36 
uncertainty 
SUPRELI Supplier 0.00 1.00 0.84 0.36 
reliability 
134 
ONEOFF Level of - 1.00 10.00 7.00 2.49 
frequency 
ORDER Changes to 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 
order size 
SUPNUM Small number of 1.00 10.00 4.91 2.68 
suppliers 
SUP75 Number of 1.00 200.00 18.01 27.62 
suppliers 
SuPlImp % suppliers 1.00 98 29.66 22.76 
most important 
CUSNUM Small number of 1.00 10.00 5.08 2.77 
customers 
CUS75 Number of 1.00 300.00 20.67 37.27 
customers 
CUSIMP % customers 4.00 100.00 27.98 21-53 
most important 
MAKE Make from 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.49 
make-or-buy 
BUY Buy from 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49 
make-or-buy 
LOVYT Low price 1.00 4.00 2.62 1.21 
HIGHQ High quality 1.00 4.00 1.96 0.91 
DELDATE Delivery date 1.00 4.00 2.80 0.95 
SUPREL Supplier 1.00 4.00 2.61 1.20 
reliability 
SUPCONYE Supplier 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.50 
contract 
SUPCONP Penalties in 0.00 2.00 0.69 0.75 
supplier contract 
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CUSCONY Customer 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.46 
contract 
CUSCONO No customer 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.19 
contract 
CUSCONP Penalties in 0.00 2.00 1.07 0.71 
customers 
SUPCAYES Supplier cost 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41 
advantage 
SUPCANO No supplier cost 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 
advantage 
CUSCAYES Customer cost 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.47 
advantage 
CUSCANO No customer 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47 
cost advantage 
* Lcss than 82 responscs to this variablc. 
The majority of the data reported in Table 6.1 are codes or percentages in order to 
simplify the information. Hence, the minimum and maximum values plus the mean 
and standard deviation are generally constrained between 0 and 100 if representing a 
percentage or between 0 and 10 if representing a Likert scale. 
The asterisk on 8 of the 53 variables in the first column identifies the number of cases 
for which there were not 82 responses. In part this confinns the value of a good pilot 
questionnaire and interviews, which eliminated many difficult questions for the 
respondents. It also shows that the questionnaire was generally well designed as once 
a respondent started the questionnaire then it could be completed by almost all those 
who started. The set of questions with the worst response rate was the questions on 
the percentage of components bought-out by from external supplier in Section A. 
Unlike nearly all the other questions, this question did require a certain degree of 
specialist knowledge or extra time to research the answer. Hence, approximately 83% 
of the respondents answered this question. In addition, not all of the 82 respondents 
responded to some of the contract questions in Section C. This is because there were 
a number of conditional questions, which if answered in the negative as 'no' meant 
the respondent had to move onto the next question and leave remaining parts of the 
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question blank. Otherwise, the completion rate of the questionnaire by the 
respondents was generally very good and indeed a perfectly completed dataset is rare 
in statistical terms. Also, SPSS can cope with limited missing answers in any case. 
The second column details the unit of measurement for each of the 53 variables in the 
dataset. Many of the variables are coded using a binary code (0 or 1) or a Likert scale 
(I to 10) with others based on percentages (0 to 100). The detail of each variable is 
shown in Chapter Five. At this stage is worth stating that the dataset is dominated by 
two responses, BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, but the aim of the thesis is to assess 
the UK aerospace industry as a whole rather than separate these two cases out from 
the rest of the sample. 
The next two columns in Table 6.1 are the minimum and maximum values of the 
recorded variables. These have been carefully checked for data entry errors and all 
the variables have the expected range. This is especially relevant for the dummy 
variables usually between 0.00 and 1.00 and the variables, which register a Likert 
scale in this questionnaire between 0.00 and 10.00. All these columns conform to the 
expected values of the data input (Field, 2000: 6). 
It is conventional in statistics to present two descriptive measures of the dataset, 
namely, the mean and the standard deviation (Koop, 2000: 20). These form the final 
two columns in Table 6.1. The arithmetical mean or statistical average is the sum of 
the variables divided by the sample size. These results are discussed elsewhere in this 
Chapter and others. The standard deviation is a common measure of dispersion, 
which can used as a comparison between more than one standard deviation. The 
standard deviation of the dependent variable MAKE and BUY are satisfactory and as 
expected. However, the standard deviation is greater than the mean for BUY, but not 
for MAKE, which suggests that the BUY variable is more skewed than MAKE. The 
standard deviation is less than the mean for the main independent variables DEDAS, 
EMPAS, FACAS, DEMDEL, SUPDEL, ONEOFF, SUPNUM and CUSNUM and 
hence this result shows the mean to be generally representative of the data. The 
standard deviations for the variables are mixed showing that many of the mean values 
are representative of the data and others are not. For example, the turnover figures 
(T97 and T92) and employee number (E97 and E92) values for standard deviations 
show the mean not to be representative, but may reflect a wide spread of firms in the 
supply chain as expected given the concentration ratio reported in Chapter Two. 
Since these are variables on a Likert scale then another interesting method of analysis 
137 
is to assess the frequencies, which is discussed elsewhere in this Chapter. The next 
part of the Chapter assesses the variables in Table 6.1 in greater detail. That is, from 
the questionnaire, section I gains infonnation on the company profile, section 2 on 
company transactions and 3, on company contracts. The relevant variable code from 
Table 6.1 is included in the title of the sub-heading. The section to follow is the first 
in a series that assesses each of the variables in the dataset. Initially, the pricing 
variables in the survey are analysed. 
Pricing Profile (P1, P2, P3, P4 and P5) 
The price profile is a descriptive account of the range of the unit price of the most 
important product by value of sales. Whilst this shows the range of unit price from 
aerospace fasteners (p < fl) to finished aircraft (p > El million) the main analysis is to 
be able to differentiate between aerospace suppliers in terms of price and to chart any 
potential differences. The price profile of the aerospace companies is a way to 
differentiate between firms in the population by a pricing characteristic of the most 
important product or service by value of sales. In this particular case it is also a proxy 
for position in the supply chain, because the supply of aerospace products is highly 
stratified in price terms and this is one way to identify the structure. The unit price of 
aircraft is generally in excess of El million and major sub-components usually have a 
cost between E100,000 and El million (and occasionally above El million). Only the 
main specialised aerospace assembly companies have a technical and financial ability 
to supply the more expensive items. A priori this helps to explain why transaction 
costs analysis could be a useful methodology, since it emphasizes asset specificity and 
uncertainty amongst other features of the transaction. Minor parts and smaller 
components have a range up to approximately f 100,000 and these can be supplied by 
firms which specialise in aerospace or indeed by more general engineering suppliers, 
although even relatively minor parts often require highly specialist knowledge, 
expertise, machinery or tooling. For example, aerospace paint and other coatings 
require advanced cryogenic properties to withstand extremes of temperature and rapid 
change in temperature. There tends to be more domestic competition and even 
limited supplier switching in this part of the supply chain than in the prime 
contractors. Thereby, even specialist aerospace paint manufacturers face competitive 
elements in supply. However, this pricing variable is not a continuous variable, as can 
be seen from the selection of the scale of the price bands, which arc not identical, but 
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are designed to be broadly representative. As a result, this variable is not intended as 
a continuous scale variable, but is it meant to be indicative of the supply chain and to 
differentiate between firms in terms of a position in the range. 
In the questionnaire, the companies were asked to select the unit price of the most 
important product by sales value. All the 82 companies replied and showed a wide 
spread of prices from less than El to more than El million. This is important in the 
aerospace industry because the unit price of aircraft and spacecraft is relatively high, 
certainly in comparison with mass production, for example, motor vehicles where unit 
cost is measured in ten thousands and not millions of pounds sterling. The industry, 
which is most closely related to aerospace in this respect is shipbuilding, where there 
is also a wide spread of prices for components and the final product (Masten et aL, 
1991: 2). Whilst it is difficult to show whethcr the information gathercd is totally 
reliable it is worth noting that this particular technique is in line with the questionnaire 
designed by Lyons (1994: 274-278). 
Table 6.2 illustrates the diversity of price bands in the aerospace supply chain and 
differentiates between different characteristics of the suppliers, where all 82 
respondents replied to this question. For example, only one in four of the firms have a 
unit price in excess of E100,000, which confirms that aerospace production is a 
composite of many parts supplied by many different firms. Approximately, a third of 
suppliers supply products under E1,000; just over a third supply products between 
fl, 000 and E100,000 million; and fewer thanl4% over El million. 
Table 6.2: Unit price profile of most important product by value of sales 
Price band Number (n) Percentage Example 
Less than El 1 1.2 Fasteners 
El to E999 28 34.2 Paint 
fl, OOO to E99,999 31 37.8 Nacelles 
; C100,000 to E999,999 11 13.4 Aero-engines 
More than; Elmillion 11 13.4 Aircraft 
Total 82 100.0 
In Me Imal column there is an indicative example of the type of product in the given 
price range. The only company which is located in the range of less than El is Hi- 
Shear and this firm manufactures aerospace fasteners. This is clearly an example of a 
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low unit price product with a well-defined specification where firms buy off-the-shelf 
from market firms. Transaction cost economics would predict that this type of 
component would tend to be bought from the market, because asset specificity is low 
even though frequency is high (see Table 4.3). As expected, firms that assemble 
aircraft dominate the other end of the scale where the unit price is more than El 
million. This is a good indication of the scale of the cost of aircraft, both military and 
civilian'. These firms include BAE Systems, Britten-Norman, GKN-Westland, 
Raytheon, and Rolls-Royce, where the latter is a prime contractor for aero-engines. In 
this category there is limited scope for domestic competition following post-war 
merger and acquisition activity but other major rivals tend to be from overseas. Major 
suppliers of sub-components are in the next tier of price profile (less than El million, 
more than E100,000) and include Dowty, Martin Baker, Matra-BAe, Smiths and 
Vickers. These companies are specific suppliers of equipment, which tend to have a 
relatively low alternative use, such as weapons. The clear example is Martin Baker 
that is a manufacturer of ejection seats, mainly for military aircraft. The remaining 
categories have suppliers of specialist aerospace parts and components such as 
avionics and metal parts, as well as generic parts that do have alternative uses in other 
manufacturing industries; hence it is divided into aerospace and general engineering. 
Company Turnover (T97 and T92) 
The next method to differentiate the sample is company turnover, which can be used 
as a proxy for firm size. From Table 6.3, the mean figure has declined from E271 
million in 1992 to E235 million in 1997 in current prices, which is broadly in line with 
the SBAC data in Table 2.5. The retail price index (RPI) increased cumulatively by 
13.9% between 1992 and 1997 2. In real terms this is a decrease in the mean annual 
turnover of 24%, which represents a weak performance relative to previous years, 
albeit in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. It is worth emphasising 
that a proportion of the company turnover for all the firms is not aerospace-related, 
since other business activity is included in these figures 3. That is, many firms in the 
sample are conglomerate organisations and have diversified market interests. Table 
1 As a generalisation, military aircraft tend to be more expensive than civilian aircraft, due to more 
avionics equipment and higher specifications and engineering calibrations. 2 Source: Barclays Economic Review, Quarter One, 1998. 
3 Table 7.2 in the next Chapter shows the proportion of aerospace turnover for both 1992 and 1997, 
which is 67.0% and 71.5%, respectively. 
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6.3 shows a wide spread of company turnover as the standard deviation is very large 
relative to the mean (Field, 2000: 7): hence the mean is not fully representative of the 
data, which at least confirms there is a wide spread of data observations. 
Table 6.3: Company turnover of sample 82 companies (L million) current prices 
Type 1992 1997 
Total 19,241 18,781 
Mean 271 235 
Standard Deviation 1,426 1,075 
Company Employment (E97 and E92) 
Another method to differentiate the sample is company employment, which again is a 
proxy for firm size. From Table 6.4 the mean figure has declined from 2,544 
employees in 1992 to 1,819 in 199 7, which is broadly in line with the SBAC data in 
Table 2.5. This is indicative of the decline in the aerospace employment in the 1990s, 
in part as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. This is shown in Table 6.4 
below, which illustrates the rapid decline of employment in the sample companies of 
28.5% cumulatively over the five-year period from 1992 to 1997 inclusive (see 
Chapter Two for trends and changes in the UK aerospace industry). Once more, 
Table 6.4 shows a wide spread of company employees as the standard deviation is 
very large relative to the mean (Field, 2000: 6). As with company turnover this is 
indicative of the wide array of data observations. The largest two finns have a large 
number of employees (Le. BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) and the remaining firms 
significantly fewer employees as the sample from the population is heterogeneous. 
Table 6.4: Company employees (number of employees) of the sample 82 
Type 1992 1997 
Total 208,631 149,120 
Mean 2,544 1,819 
Standard Deviation 11,401 6,867 
The employment profile attempts to show the total size of the companies surveyed. 
This approach captures a proportion of employees who are not involved with 
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aerospace and does not include those employees of aerospace firms not in the survey. 
However, it does provide an indication of the overall aerospace industry employment 
in 1992 and 1997. The total sample employment 1992 was 208,863, with mean 
employment 1992 equal to 2,544. Whereas total employment in 1997 was 149,120 
with mean employment 1997 equal to 1,819 employees although approximately 21% 
of these are indirectly employed in aerospace and not captured by the SBAC figures. 
In 1997 there were 140,000 people employed in the UKAI using SBAC figures, which 
confirms that the survey has captured a large proportion of the total industry 
employment as well as indicating some problems over definitions where large 
conglomerate firms are also involved with non-aerospace activity (SBAC, 2005). 
Precisely what proportion is captured is difficult to state with certainty given the 
conglomerate nature of many firms in the sample that have business interests other 
than aerospace. It is significant that the total employment difference between 1992 
and 1997 is 59,511 or a reduction of 28.5%. The mean employment difference 
between 1992 and 1997 is 726. The decline in the figures can be explained by a two 
factors. Firstly, there could be a drop in demand for aerospace output since there is a 
decrease in turnover identified in the sample of firms as shown in Table 6.3. 
Secondly, capital may be replacing labour and accounting for some of the productivity 
gains. Improvements in production processes and company organisation may also 
account for increases in productivity. 
Aerospace percentage of turnover (A97 and A92) 
An assessment of company turnover specific to aerospace between 1992 and 1997 
reveals a shift away from aerospace business. This can be explained by either an exit 
strategy from aerospace; or that non-aerospace business is getting larger as a 
proportion of the total as firms diversify. Given the decline in general aerospace 
employment, it would appear that the shift is due to a corporate strategy of diversity, 
because of the overall decline in aerospace activity. In other words, there is a 
substitution effect in favour of non-aerospace business. If this assertion is correct, 
then it could indicate relatively low asset specificity in the aerospace industry, 
because of the transferability of resources: hence, aerospace as a percentage of total 
business in 1992 was 71.5%, whereas by 1997 it was 67.0%. The non-aerospace 
business covers an array of activity, which includes many manufacturing and service 
sector industries. Indeed, aerospace companies could be diversifying into other areas 
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because there is a competitive advantage in logistics or quality. As a strategy to 
spread risk in a declining market, this could possibly account for the 4.5 percentage- 
point drop in aerospace activity (expressed as a percentage of total business in the 
industry as a whole). This result is noteworthy and indicates a shift in the industry. 
Finally, from the previous results it is possible to approximate the proportion of the 
aerospace industry, which has been captured by the sample. In 1997 there were 
150,000 directly employed in the UK aerospace industry (SBAC, 1998). The survey 
captured 149,120 employees, but if only 67% of all business was in aerospace then it 
is possible to conclude that some 99,910 employees from the UK aerospace industry 
as a rough order of magnitude were captured by the sample. SBAC also claim that 
there is an indirect employment multiplier of between 2 and 3 culminating in the total 
UK aerospace workforce of some 350,000. This complicates the sample somewhat, 
because although all firms in the same are members of SBAC some of the 
employment may be actually indirect (e. g. British Steel). The employment multiplier 
employed by SBAC is satisfactory and for the purposes of this thesis it is acceptable 
to accurately conclude that the sample has captured approaching 70% of the UK 
aerospace industry. This type of conclusion can be stated with much validity given 
that all the major firms in the industry as shown in Table 2.8 are represented in the 
sample. 
Military percentage of turnover (M97 and M92) 
Similar to the analysis above, an assessment of the percentage of military turnover 
between 1992 and 1997 reveals a shift away from military business. Once more, this 
can be explained by either an exit strategy from military; or that civilian business is 
getting larger as a proportion of the total as firms diversify. It is likely to be the 
former, reflecting the relative decline in military business since the end of the Cold 
War. However, concealed within this analysis is the possibility of both exit by some 
firms and defence consolidation by a few large firms, such as BAE Systems, who will 
engage in vertical and horizontal merger on the basis of a high-proflle business 
reputation. Military production as a percentage of total business in 1992 was 29.8%, 
whereas by 1997 the percentage of total business was 27.5%. The relatively small 
decline in part reflects the long-term nature of military contracts with procurement 
agencies, although the result is not surprising given the end of the Cold War. This 
survey is only over five years, where the life cycle of military contracts is over a much 
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longer period often twenty-five years, which may reflect asset specificity and long 
terins contracts. The following sections will look at the transaction characteristics of 
asset specificity, frequency, uncertainty, small numbers and also economies of scale 
in order to link the questionnaire with the transaction cost model. 
Asset speciflcity (Empas, Facas, Dedas and Location) 
According to Williamson asset specificity can be measured in a number of ways, 
namely, human, physical, facility and location asset specificity, which presents 
research methodology with measurement difficulties (Williamson, 1985: 55). Each 
way is described detailed below with the appropriate variable response and the 
relevant make-or-buy prediction. 
The measurement of asset specificity is a problem in transaction costs, because the 
variables are difficult to observe directly. The difficulty was overcome by developing 
a Likert scaling, which allows the respondent to rank the reply from I to 10. This 
approach was adopted, because there is no other way to directly measure the 
variables. There is little or no published data on transaction cost variables as the data 
are invariably below the level of markets and prices usually recorded by firms, 
industry organisations and government. The transaction cost approach predicts make 
if the Likert scale is high for human, physical and dedicated asset specificity. 
Location asset specificity records the proximity of the firm to buyers and customers. 
Table 6.5: Asset specificity predictions 
Variable 
Type 
Variable 
Response 
Make 
Prediction 
Buy 
Prediction 
Human asset specificity I to 10 High Low 
Physical asset specificity 1 to 10 High Low 
Dedicated asset specificity 1 to 10 High Low 
Location asset specificity (buyer) 0 or 1 1 0 
Location asset specificity (customer) 0 or 1 1 0 
A priori, if there is more asset specificity over the period it should be possible to see if 
this shows in the data. This remains a problematic feature of the transaction cost 
approach, as otherwise all data collected will only be cross-sectional in nature. The 
different types of asset specificity have caused measurement problems in the literature 
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as shown in Chapter Four, which is why the studies have tended to focus on a closed 
factory system (Masten 1984: 404). The aim has been to measure all aspects of asset 
specificity directly using a Likert scale, which will build up a composite picture of the 
interaction between the factors of production across an entire industry. A Likert scale 
is a response range on the questionnaire and is used when no direct unit measurement 
is available (Black, 1999: 227). 
The relatively high score on employment asset specificity suggests aerospace 
employees tend to be highly qualified technicians, scientists and engineers, with a 
very specific skill base. This is why labour hoarding is a continuing issue, since it 
minimises the costs of search, recruitment and training, although this specific analysis 
is beyond the scope of the thesis. The costs of hoarding specific labour are less costly 
than a 'hire and fire' policy with subsequent added training costs. This outcome 
makes the transaction cost approach highly significant, because an aerospace firm will 
need to retain staff for long pcriods due to the high costs of training and recruitment. 
However, the transaction cost approach as applied here can be criticised as generating 
a blind hypothesis, in which the results cannot be compared with other sectors or 
industries. Such evaluation is accepted and hence the results can only be ordinal and 
intra-group, comparisons rather than cardinal inter-group analysis. The results for all 
the asset specificity variables are shown in Table 6.6, where columns 3,4 and 5 sum 
to 100% for employment, facilities and dedicated asset specificity. 
Table 6.6: Summary of asset specificity results 
Type of Asset 
specificity 
Asset 
Specificity 
Increased 
(%) 
Decreased 
M 
Unchanged 
(%) 
Employment 7.4 28.0 11.0 61.0 
Facilities 6.5 28.5 3.5 68.0 
Dedicated 6.2 44.0 1.2 54.8 
The employment asset specificity in 1997 has a mean value of 7.4 on the Likert scale. 
Over 60% of respondents answered that there had been no change to employment 
asset specificity since the comparator date of 1992. A significant proportion of 28% 
answered that employment asset specificity had increased perhaps reflecting increased 
specialisation in the skills profile of a high-tech industry. As stated above, the 
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employment asset specificity is difficult to compare against other industries, because 
the relevant data does not exist. However, it is possible to use the data as yardstick 
evidence and state that on the scale, employment assets specificity for aerospace is 
greater than both facility and dedicated assets. 
Facility and equipment asset specificity has a high score at 6.5 on the Likert scale, but 
is less then employment asset specificity. This possibly indicates there is slightly 
more scope for flexibility in the facilities even with aerospace technology. Again 
some 28% of the respondents answered that there is increased facility and equipment 
asset specificity. However, 68% answered that facility and equipment asset 
specificity is unchanged, which is surprising given a prior understanding of 
technological change in the aerospace industry. Increases in facilities asset specificity 
are at the same rate as employment asset specificity, but decreases are lower. 
Dedicated asset specificity is approximately the same as facility and equipment asset 
specificity. Significantly, there has been a rise in dedicated asset specificity in the 
five years between 1992 and 1997 possibly as a result of firms attempting to avoid the 
hold-up problem with vendors. This outcome suggests that there is an increasing 
willingness between aerospace suppliers to enter contracts with more binding 
conditions and relates to the issue of contract type and contract design. 
Dedicated asset specificity in 1997 is 6.2 with 44% of the answers claiming that there 
has been increased dedicated asset specificity and just over half answering no change. 
This is significant for contracts since it is possible evidence that customers are 
manipulating the supply chains by binding suppliers to the dedicated assets. 
As for location asset specificity, aerospace is a national and global industry and 
therefore location does not appear to be a major factor, as with the 'mine-mouth' 
location of electricity generation next to coal mines (Joskow, 1987: 170). Hence, the 
most important export customer is on average 3,400 miles away and the most 
important UK customer is on average 146 miles away. However, a total of 15 firms 
(18.3%) would benefit from being closer to the most important customer, but only 
three of the fifteen companies are where the customer is overseas. For these 15 
companies, a close proximity is important, since the majority of these firms are small 
to medium sized component suppliers. For the remaining firms, location is not a 
major issue to consider, especially when the most important customer is located in 
another country. At this level, employment, facilities and dedicated assets are all 
more important in aerospace than location. Overall, this analysis is further evidence 
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that the transaction cost is relevant to aerospace as it draws out the importance of 
supply chain management, investment planning and diversity of customers to asset 
specificity. Whilst this is likely to be true for other industries such as shipbuilding, it 
nevertheless shows that assets specificity is an important consideration in the UK 
aerospace industry. 
Uncertainty (Demdel and supdel) 
The uncertainty variable has been divided into demand uncertainty and supply 
uncertainty, as shown in Table 6.7. Uncertainty is also a difficult variable difficult to 
measure and so a Likert scaling was developed similar to asset specificity (see 
Chapter Four). 
Table 6.7: Uncertainty predictions 
Variable 
Type 
Variable 
Response 
Make 
Prediction 
Buy 
Prediction 
Demand uncertainty I to 10 High Low 
Lead-times dd/mm/yy Long Short 
Supply uncertainty I to 10 High Low 
Reliability 0 to 1 No Yes 
The main issues of measurement centre on the abstract concept of uncertainty and 
how it affects the decision-making process. The way this has been interpreted is in 
terms of supply and demand in order to generate data from both sides of the market. 
Table 6.8 is a summary of the uncertainty measurements. 
Table 6.8: Summary of uncertainty results 
Typeof 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty 
Level 
Increased 
(%) 
Decreased 
(%) 
Unchanged 
M 
Demand 6.2 35.5 3.7 60.9 
Supply 4.9 30.5 6.1 63.4 
The demand change is one proxy for uncertainty and appears to be relatively 
important, since the demand change in 1997 on the Likert scale is 6.2. The figure is 
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towards the higher end of the scale, which suggests that there is a degree of 
uncertainty on the demand-side. The level of demand uncertainty has increased by 
over a third (35.4%), whereas it is unchanged in almost 61% of the recorded cases. 
Decreased demand change is comparatively small at 3.7%. These results are expected 
given the recent stability following the initial upheavals after end of the Cold War. 
Supply change is another proxy for uncertainty and initially appears to be less 
important than demand as it is under 5.0 on the Likert scale. The level of increased 
supply change is 30.5% with almost two thirds unchanged (63.4%). Once again the 
decreased supply change is relatively small at 6.1 %. 
Similarly, over 84% of respondents regard suppliers as reliable; or alternatively 16% 
of respondents regard suppliers as unreliable. This result is indicative of a high level 
of trust and co-operation between firms in the aerospace supply chain, which may not 
be apparent in other industries, although a 16% response of no trust is not a trivial 
amount, either. 
On a related supply issue, the time difference between order and delivery is 201 days 
or six and a half months, where the range is from one day to a thousand days. The 
analysis confirms the relatively long contract length in aerospace and the need for 
contracts as opposed to spot markets. However, given the high technology status of 
the aerospace industry it is practical to expect quite long contracts over years and 
months rather than days or weeks. Even so, aerospace firms still use the spot markets 
for raw materials such as aluminiurn on the London Metal Exchange (LME) and oil 
on the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). In addition, finns such as BAE 
Systems and Rolls-Royce hedge using futures and options for commodities (e. g. oil 
and aluminium), currency (e. g. E, $ and IE) and capital on the global financial markets 
(e. g. UK or US interest rates). Typically 3 to 6 months forward contracts are used to 
neutralise the risk of price movements, which coincides with contract length identified 
in the survey. 
Frequency (One-off) 
The frequency variable is specific in the transaction cost literature, but there are also 
related measurement problems with the variable. The issue of measurement has been 
overcome using the standard Likert scale, as with other variables in the survey. If a 
component or service is required occasionally then the firm is advised to use the 
market and buy from market firms who generate economies of scale (i. e. buy option). 
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If there is frequent use of a component or service then the firm is advised to 
internalise the product or process (Le. make option). Otherwise, the firm is exposed 
to the hold-up problem, where suppliers act opportunistically. According to 
Worthington, et aL (2005: 38) firms are more likely to make if the transaction is 
frequently occurring, because the firm can generate internal economies of scale in 
production for the component or part. The predictions of the frequency variable are 
shown in Table 6.9 below, which are used in Chapter Eight and draw upon the work 
by Williamson (1985: 52). 
Table 6.9: Frequency predictions 
Variable 
Type 
Variable 
Response 
Make 
Prediction 
Buy 
Prediction 
Frequency 1 to 10 High Low 
Magnitude change 0 or I No Yes 
Table 6.10 shows the frequency level in 1997 is relatively high at 7.0. The transaction 
cost prediction is for a make decision in this situation. This result would suggest that 
aerospace firms tend to make in-house, which confirms evidence from the marginal 
make-or-buy decision and show that firms are more likely to be vertically integrated 4. 
In almost 30% of the recorded cases frequency increased, with unchanged frequency 
at nearly two thirds (64.6%). Finally, the variable of frequency needs to be taken in 
context with asset specificity as shown in Table 4.3. Transaction costs predicts that if 
there is significant asset specificity then the firm will make whether frequency is high 
or low. 
Table 6.10: Summary of frequency result 
Type of 
Frequency 
Frequency 
Level 
Increased 
(%) 
Decreased 
(%) 
Unchanged 
(%) 
Frequency 7.0 29.3 6.1 64.6 
4 That is, two thirds of fmm replied make to the question do you make-or-buy if the costs of make 
equal the costs of buy, when Masten predicts that in theory the answer should always be buy (Masten 
1984: 407). 
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In a related area to frequency, over 35% of customers change the magnitude of an 
order at short notice, as opposed to 65% who do not change the magnitude of an order 
at short notice. One way to interpret this information is to suggest that aerospace 
supply chain is varied and contains both spot markets as well as more complex 
contracting along a continuum as suggested in Chapter Four (Williamson, 1985: 20). 
However, the problem with the frequency result is there are no yardstick comparisons 
for a single result unlike asset specificity where there are several measures. 
Small numbers (Supnum and Cusnum) 
The small numbers exchange is related to the concept of opportunism (Williamson, 
1975: 47). The issue of small numbers exchange has been modelled in terms of 
assessing the number of suppliers on the supply-side and the number of customers on 
the demand-side. There is the possibility of using a hostage model in this context 
(Williamson, 1983: 520). The implications of this small numbers exchange relate to 
make-or-buy through the issue of opportunism and the organisational failure 
framework in Figure 4.3. Williamson also states that when there is a large pool of 
potential bidders for a contract at the beginning, this situation may be effectively 
reduced to small numbers supply condition once the contract has been awarded 
(Williamson, 1975: 10). The situation of small number exchange can be caused by 
first mover advantage 5 or reputation effects (ex ante small numbers) and incumbency 
effects (ex post small numbers). Williamson defines the small numbers problem in 
terms of the human behaviour of opportunism. Faced with small numbers supply, 
vendors will use this to an advantage in exchange. This variable is difficult to define 
and again a Likert scaling was used in an attempt to overcome the problem of 
measurement. The small numbers variables are composed as follows in Table 6.11 
and show the importance of small number to the prediction of make-or-buy and 
ultimately the production-procurement decision. 
5 The first mover advantage in game theoretic terms is the battle of the sexes game. In this game the 
players are non-cooperative, but there is an absence of conflict. In aerospace this has been modelled by 
Jackson (2003: 87-89) in terms of decision-making between the MoD and the UK DIB. 
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Table 6.11: Small numbers predictions 
Variable 
Type 
Variable 
Response 
Make 
Prediction 
Buy 
Prediction 
Supplier number I to 10 Low High 
Single supplier 0 or I Yes No 
Customer number I to 10 Low High 
Single customer 0 or I Yes No 
This section on small number exchange is related to opportunism and there is also a 
connection with monopoly power. The small number variable could capture the 
monopoly power in the transaction. If this is th6 case, then transaction costs can use 
small numbers exchange as a proxy for monopoly power and thereby eliminate the 
need to assess the use of monopoly power arguments in this context. In particular, the 
monopoly power argument could become a special case within the overall transaction 
cost paradigm, if small number exchange is shown to be significant. 
Table 6.12: Summary of Small Number result 
Type of Small 
Number 
Level of Small 
Number 
Increased 
(%) 
Decreased 
(%) 
Unchanged 
(%) 
Supplier 4.9 15.8 36.6 47.6 
Customer 4.9 25.6 23.2 51.2 
Supplier numbers is a proxy for small numbers exchange and the supplier number in 
1997 is almost at the mid-point of 4.9 on the Likert scale. The supplier number only 
increased by 15.8% and over a third there was decreased supplier number change 
(36.6%) with just under half no change (47.6%). 
Customer number is another proxy for small numbers exchange. Again the customer 
number in 1997 is just under half at 4.9. A quarter of the recorded cases had 
increased customer number change (25.6%), almost another quarter noted decreased 
demand change (23.2%), whereas the remaining half of the cases were actually 
unchanged (51.2%). 
In related terms, the mean number of firms that account for 75% of suppliers is 18. 
This result has implications for the level of indirect employment. Although this 
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aspect of the research is beyond the scope of this thesis the number of firms which 
account for the remaining 25% of suppliers would be relevant as it would give insight 
into the indirect employment multiplier of the aerospace industry. On average, the 
most important supplier accounts for 29.6% of all the purchases made by the firm. 
This also has implications for purchasing strategy in terms of reliance on a single 
supplier. It may also suggest that there is monopoly power in certain parts of the 
supply chain given that some firms have some price leverage in the market. 
Similarly, the mean number of firms that account for 75% of customers is 21. On 
average, the most important customer accounts for 28.0% of all sales, implying there 
may be a certain degree of monopsony power in the markets. For example, aerospace 
firms may face a monopsony buyer such as the UK MoD. 
Economies of scale (Supcayes) 
The issue of economies of scale is developed by Lyons (1994,1995) and is important 
to efficient transaction cost minimising. Worthington et aL, identify two types of 
economies identified with the make-or-buy decision (Worthington et aL, 2005: 40). 
The first is production cost economies of scale. This occurs when the firm buys from 
the market where its demand is small relative to total market. The market can pool 
the demand from all sources and gain sufficient economies of scale to reduce unit 
costs for all concerned such as ball-bearings and aerospace fasteners. The second is 
governance economies of scope, where the firm can generate cost savings through 
governance of many similar contracts. For example, governance economies may be 
gained through experience or logistics of multiple project management such as BAE 
Systems that currently manage projects in land, sea and air systems, but the company 
heritage is aircraft production. The economies of production scale are considered 
below, but the economies of scope are also important in aerospace. The latter concept 
is not included as it is more difficult to measure than the former concept. The 
economies of scale variables are presented in Table 6.13. 
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Table 6.13: Predictions relating to economies of scale 
Variable 
Type 
Variable 
Response 
Make 
Prediction 
Buy 
Prediction 
Supplier has a cost advantage 1 to 10 High Low 
Core competencies 0 or I Yes No 
Supplier offers cost discount I to 10 Low High 
Make = Buy 0 or I 1 0 
In more detail, if the supplier has an advantage (over the purchasing firm) then the 
purchasing firm is more likely to make in order to avoid the hostage problem. 
Conversely, if the supplier advantage is low then the purchasing firm is more likely to 
buy from the market as there is reduced scope for opportunism by the supplier. In 
related terms, if the supplier discount is low then the purchasing firm is likely to make 
in-house, but if the supplier discount is high then the finn is likely to buy and share 
the gains from the economies of scale from a supplier that is presumably supplying 
many different firms with the same or similar component. Also, if the firm has a core 
competence in producing the component then the firm is more likely to make than 
buy. The make equals buy variable is the marginal make-or-buy decision. Masten 
(1984: 405) predicts that if the cost of make equals the cost of buy then the firm 
should buy. However, as seen earlier in this Chapter (where two-thirds of firms 
replied make when the predication is buy) this is not always the case, which is an 
issue developed in the make-or-buy section below (Williamson, 1985: 96). 
Sub-contracting (Subhigh and Sublow) 
As expected more firms sub-contract work in periods of high demand than in periods 
of low demand. This situation could simply be an industry-wide custom and practice 
or reveal that aerospace suppliers operate at or close to full capacity even in periods of 
low demand. As a result, in periods of high demand firms are forced to sub-contract 
in order to meet demand. In periods of high demand they do not expand to meet the 
change, merely use the market in an attempt to minimise transaction costs. Hence, 
40% of firms in the sample sub-contract in high demand, whereas only 15% sub- 
contract in low demand. This can be interpreted in a number of ways. Firstly, there is 
not the capacity in some firms to expand in periods of high demand, hence 40% of 
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firms sub-contract in high demand. Secondly, some firms do not have the 
organisational skills to sub-contract in low demand; hence only about 15% of firms 
still sub-contract in periods of low demand, which has implications for levels of 
aerospace industry capacity both now and in the future. These results could also 
contribute in explaining the reduction in the mean number of employees in Tables 6.3 
and 6.4. If firms outsource more and more then the size of the aerospace firm will 
decrease as appears to be happening in the UK aerospace industry. 
Make-or-buy (MAKE and BUY) 
The marginal make-or-buy decision reveals aerospace suppliers prefer make to buy by 
a ratio of two to one. This is clearly against the general predictions of the transaction 
cost framework, which predicts that when make equals buy a firm will always buy 
(Williamson, 1985: 96). The basis for the logic is why make when you can buy? 
However, this finding is an original contribution to the empirical transaction cost 
literature, because firms are not buying when make equals buy. That is, 62% of firms 
in the sample make (when the costs of make equal the costs of buy); whereas 38% 
will buy under the same conditions. There are suggestions at Rolls-Royce 6 that the 
two thirds-one thirds split in favour of make is not surprising given the high levels of 
sunk costs that aerospace suppliers have to invest. Therefore, given the huge sunk 
costs, firms are always likely to make rather than buy, implicitly confirming the 
existence of asset specificity. This could also be linked to the transaction cost 
relationship between asset specificity and frequency, which predicts that a firm will 
make when there is significant asset specificity whether or not frequency is high or 
low. In other words, there may be a predisposition in favour of make in the 
transaction cost model and in reality. 
The transaction cost maxim of why make when you can buy may in fact be inverted in 
practice, if not in theory. Consequently, some of the results from the dataset may be 
contradicting elements of the transaction cost predictions. Therefore, whilst there is a 
trend in aerospace (as with other engineering industries) to outsource there is 
resistance to the process from within firms. This outcome may result from inertia to 
change within large organisations; or indeed a realisation that if too much sub- 
contracting occurs then the 'hollowing-out' of the firm could have serious 
6 These remarks were made in an interview with the author to a senior Rolls Royce procurement 
director in March 2002. 
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implications for the aerospace firm in the future (Jackson, 2004: 520). That is, there 
are concerns about long term security of supply from the original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) and problems of switching supply back in-house if suppliers 
become too expensive or indeed unreliable in the future. This scenario is especially 
where long product life cycles are involved as with aerospace. The next section 
explores the use of cross tabulations from the data set. 
Cross tabulations 
The cross tabulation exercise has two purposes for testing and predictions. Firstly, it 
shows how respondents have answered on two or more questions at the same time and 
identifies the joint distribution of variables. Secondly, it presents the data in a 
straightforward way using a matrix form. There are a number of potential cross 
tabulations that can be performed from the data, which can be insightful for the 
remainder of the thesis. The general cross tabulation procedure is to analyse the 
frequencies in a given data set. It is used to analyse sub-sets of the data, where the 
variables are organised in rows and columns. 
Table 6.14: Cross tabulations for asset specificity and make 
Asset specificity EMPAS: MAKE FACAS: MAKE DEDAS: MAKE 
I 0(l) 0(5) 2(4) 
2 0(l) 3(l) 5(4) 
3 1 (1) 3(5) 3(2) 
4 l(O) 2(2) 0(0) 
5 6(l) 5(3) g(l) 
6 2(l) 5(0) 3(6) 
7 11(10) 11(3) 9(1) 
8 18(10) 3(5) 4(7) 
9 5(4) 8(3) 10(3) 
10 7(2) 11(4) 6(3) 
Total 51(31) 51(31) 51(31) 
'I he ligures in brackets refer to the BUY variable. 
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The analysis conducted here uses non-parametric tests, which are concerned with 
counts for category data (Green, 2000: 845-846). The actual test is tile Pearson Chi- 
square test that generates a decision to accept or reject the null hypothesis of avoiding 
a Type I error, where a Type I error is rejecting a true hypothesis. By not rejecting a 
true hypothesis, by definition the decision-maker is accepting a true hypothesis. 
The first set of cross tabulations to be reported compare the three main asset 
specificity explanatory variables (EMPAS, FACAS and DEDAS) with the dependent 
variable make (MAKE) for the entire sample. The three asset specificity variables 
have a Likert scale (I to 10) and the make variable is binary (0 or I). 
The transaction cost approach predicts that the BUY responses should appear 
proportionately more frequently from I to 5 on the Likert scale and the MAKE 
responses proportionately more frequently from 6 to 10 on the Likert scale. The 
following diagrams, namely Figures 6.1 to 6.3 attempts to do this for three of the asset 
specificity variables against the dependent variable of MAKE (and BUY). 
Figure 6.1: Histogram of MAKE cross tabulation with EMPAS 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I El MAKE 
0 BUY 
I 
Broadly, there seerns to be some confirmation that the BUY variable is more 
prevalent at the lower end of the Likert scale and tile MAKE variable is at tile higher 
end with the employment asset specificity (EMPAS). However, on Figure 6.1 tile 
MAKE variable starts to be larger than BUY at the scale 4. 
Using the Pearson Chi-square test of association with the relationship between 
EMPAS and MAKE, the result is that the value of 7.71 is insignificant with 9 degrees 
of freedom. The asymptotic significance (two-sided) result is 0.564. This means 
there is a 56.4% chance of a Type I Error and therefore this relationship is not 
accepted. This result is surprising since transaction Costs Would predict a make 
decision with high asset specificity, in this case employment asset specificity. 
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In terms of FACAS and the MAKE and BUY variables there seems to be some 
confirmation that the BUY variable is more prevalent at the lower end of the Likert 
scale and the MAKE variable is at the higher end with the facility asset specificity 
(FACAS). However, on Figure 6.2 the MAKE variable starts to be larger than BUY 
at the scale 5. 
Figure 6.2: Histogram of MAKE cross tabulation with FACAS 
12 
10 
8 
6 13 MAKE 
4-1 
EBUY 
2- 
nr 
Using the Pearson Chi-square test of association with the relationship between MAKE 
and FACAS the result is that the value of 18.854 is significant with 9 degrees of 
freedom. The asymptotic significance (two-sided) result is 0.026. This means there is 
only a 2.6% chance of a Type I Error and therefore tills relationship is provisionally 
accepted at the 97.5% confidence interval. 
In Figure 6.3, there does not seem to be any confinnation that the BUY variable is 
more prevalent at the lower end of the Likert scale although the MAKE variable is at 
the higher end with the employment asset specificity (EMPAS). In fact, tile MAKE 
variable starts to be larger than BUY at the scale 2 and continues to be throughout tile 
remainder of the scale. 
Figure 6.3: Histogram of MAKE cross tabulation with DEDAS 
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Using the Pearson Chi-square test of association with the relationship between 
DEDAS and MAKE the result is that the value of 16.467 is significant with 9 degrees 
of freedom. The asymptotic significance (two-sided) result is 0.036. This means 
there is only a 3.6% chance of a Type I Error and therefore this relationship is 
provisionally accepted at a 95% confidence level. 
In essence, the cross tabulations have shown visually and statistically that there is a 
relationship between the dependent variable MAKE and two of the asset specificity 
variables (EMPAS and DEDAS) in line with the predictions of the transaction cost 
approach. The next stage is to search for more statistical relationships in the dataset 
between the dependent variable MAKE and other (generally explanatory) variables. 
There is a statistically significant cross tabulation between MAKE and the variable 
CA97, which is the proportion of civil aerospace production in 1997. The Pearson 
Chi-square test of association with this relationship shows that the value of 39.864 is 
significant albeit with 26 degrees of freedom. The asymptotic significance (two- 
sided) result is 0.040. This means there is only a 4% chance of a Type I Error and 
therefore this relationship is accepted with a 95% confidence interval. This result can 
be interpreted to mean that there is strong evidence linking civil aerospace producers 
with a propensity to make (rather than buy). Such a result is confirmed with MAKE 
and CA92, which is significant at between the 90% and 95% confidence intervals as 
there is only an 8.5% probability of a Type I Error. Similarly, MAKE and MA97 is 
significant at the 95% confidence level as there is only a 4.2% probability of a Type I 
Error. Significantly, there is also a strong cross tabulation between MAKE and 
MILCIV where the value is significant at 5.542 with 1 degree of freedom and the 
Pearson Chi-square test is 0.019. Hence, there is only a 1.9% probability of a Type I 
Error with between 95% and 99% confidence intervals. 
Next, there is a statistically significant cross tabulation between MAKE and the 
variable HIGHQ, which is the variable where quality is an important reason for 
switching supplier. The Pearson Chi-square test of association with this relationship 
shows that the value of 7.130 is significant with 3 degrees of freedom. The 
asymptotic significance (two-sided) result is 0.068. This means there is only a 6.8% 
chance of a Type I Error and therefore this relationship is accepted with between a 
95% and a 99% confidence interval. This result can be interpreted to mean that there 
is strong evidence linking quality of the component with the propensity to make 
(rather than buy). 
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Finally, Marm-Whitney non-parametric tests were conducted on the four main asset 
specificity variables (EMPAS, FACAS, DEDAS and LOCATION) for SIZE (dummy 
variable for firm size), MILCIV (dummy variable for military firm), MAKE (dummy 
variable for make firm), AERONON (dummy variable for aerospace suppliers) and 
CUSCONYES (dummy variable for contract with customer). The dummy variables 
were determined by assigning zero to those firms in the data set which are military 
and one for those which are civilian and the same procedure for those firms which are 
large or small, make or buy and aerospace firms or not, respectively. The significant 
results are reported in Table 6.1 S. 
Table 6.15: Results of wider cross-tabulations: asset specificity 
First Explanatory Numbers in each Asymptotic Confidence 
Variable Variable category Signiflcance Interval(s) 
SIZE DEDAS 31 Large firms; 0.015 95% to 99% 
51 SME firms 
MILCIV FACAS 20 Military firms; 0.074 90% to 95% 
62 Civil finns 
MAKE FACAS 51 Make firms 0.045 95% 
31 Buy firms 
AERONON FACAS 57 aerospace firms 0.014 95% to 99% 
25 non-aerospace 
finns 
The results show that facilities asset specificity is significant in three cases, namely 
MILCIV, MAKE and AERONON. In other words, facility asset specificity is 
important to military firms, aerospace firms and firms that make (as opposed to buy). 
Similarly, Table 6.15 shows that dedicated asset specificity is importantly related to 
large fimis. A parallel exercise was conducted with contract decision. In particular, 
the variable CUSCONYES, which is the outcome of a formal written contract with a 
customer (as opposed to a supplier). The results are shown in Table 6.16 below. 
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Table 6.16: Results of wider cross-tabulations: contract type 
First Explanatory Numbers in each Asymptotic Confidence 
Variable Variable category Significance Interval(s) 
CUSCONYES TIME Various, too 0.092 90% to 95% 
numerous to specify 
CUSCONYES SIZE 31 Large firms; 0.001 99% 
51 SME firms 
CUSCONYES MILIV 20 Military firms 0.084 90% to 95% 
62 Civil firms 
The results show that length of contract is related to whether the firm has a formal 
written contract with the customer. In other words, those firms with a longer term 
contracts will tend to have a formal written contract with customers. Similarly, the 
results show that large firms and military firms will tend to have a formal written 
contract with customers in an attempt to overcome the hold-up problem. 
Conclusions 
The results presented in this Chapter are based largely on descriptive statistics and as 
a conscqucncc thcrc has becn a dcgrec of intcrpretation and bcnchmarking in the 
analysis. NcvcrthcIcss arc a numbcr of conclusions, which can bc drawn from the 
analysis. Firstly, there is evidence to show that asset specificity is relevant to the UK 
aerospace industry and facilities and employment specificity in particular. Hence, the 
reason to assess the aerospace industry via transaction cost has gained more 
credibility, which is also shown in the cross-tabulation results. Secondly, there is 
considerable evidence to show co-operation between firms in the supply chain, but 
that there is also a role for competition and 'arms-length' negotiation and contract 
design. This has potential implications for the assessing vertical integration in the 
aerospace industry. Thirdly, when make equals buy, UK aerospace firms generally 
prefer make due to sunk costs and this outcome runs counter to the predictions of 
transaction costs. The implications for the transaction cost approach are significant, 
since this may prove there is institutional bias against transaction costs, which are 
exogenous to the model. That is, the empirical results may actually refute the 
transaction cost theory. Fourthly, quality and reliability is preferred to cost savings 
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presumably because of huge safety considerations. There is a vital role for suppliers 
and sub-contracting in the industry that accounts for the linkage and complexity of the 
supply chain. Finally, there is evidence of tight cost margins, which is reflected in 
contract design. 
The overall findings from the results in comparison to the transaction cost predictions 
are that asset specificity is significant to military firms that aim to avoid the hold-up 
problem via long term contracts with customers. Dedicated assets are significant to 
large firms who also avoid the hold-up problem with long term contracts with 
customers. Facility asset specificity is significant for aerospace firms and military 
firms. Finally, contract length is significant when there is a formal written contract 
with customers. All these conclusions are supported by the results from the cross- 
tabulations. The next Chapter will begin to assess the qualitative data from the survey 
and analyse comparative data. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Empirical results 11: firm level 
Introduction 
The plan of this Chapter is to assess UK aerospace transactions in terms of the make- 
or-buy decision and contract type at the firm level. Make-or-buy and contract type are 
the two dependent variables in transaction cost economics and this Chapter identifies 
the features of each within organisations. There are three main parts to be considered. 
Firstly, there is an assessment of the aerospace chain using qualitative survey data for 
evidence of the buy decision. Secondly, there is an assessment of aerospace 
organisations using qualitative survey data for evidence of the make decision. 
Finally, qualitative survey data is used to assess aerospace contracts. Overall, aspects 
of transaction costs are addressed in relation to the organisational structure of the 
firm. The next section uses the survey to look at the aerospace supply chain. 
UK aerospace supply chain: evidence of the buy decision 
Prior to analysing the results, there needs to be confirmation that the sample is 
representative of the population as a whole. By taking the SBAC membership list as 
indicative of the population and then breaking this down into the various parts, it is 
possible to benchmark the sample generated in the survey with the wider population. 
Table 7.1 compares the number of companies in various categories for both the 
sample (total number is equal to 82) and the population as a whole (total number is 
equal to 187). As a consequence the sample can is viewed as largely representative of 
the population as a whole and also that each category is represented in the sample. 
This result is important for the overall pattern of the sample and indicates that there 
are a robust number of firms in the sample. This result is an important foundation for 
the rest of the thesis as it shows there is reliability in the data and further evidence of 
the sample matching the population is presented later in this Chapter. 
The UK aerospace supply chain is an important feature of the industry, because of 
make-or-buy decisions. In an industry with high asset specificity, firms achieve the 
goal of minimising transaction costs by make and buy, but the latter means a firm is 
then reliant on other firms where it is financially or logistically advantageous to buy. 
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Table 7.1: Comparison of aerospace suppliers in the sample and the population 
Tier Supplier Type Sample Population 
Primary Aircraft assembly 7.3 5.0 
Secondary Major sub-component 13.4 15.0 
Tertiary: Aerospace Aerospace components 57.3 55.0 
Tertiary: general General components 22.0 25.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
The supply chain connects many companies, in different locations and with other 
capabilities and expertise. Table 7.2 shows that there has been an increase in the 
importance of aerospace to companies in the survey, but a decline in the importance 
of defence in the post-Cold War period from 1992 to 1997. This may point towards a 
strategic decision by firms in the UK aerospace supply chain to channel existing 
expertise and asset specificity towards aerospace and civilian activity and divert away 
from military activity in view of the declining levels of military expenditure. Indeed, 
this substitution of military work to civilian aerospace work in general may have been 
an enforced necessity for the companies involved, as the lagged effect of declining 
military expenditure began to be a major issue. The increase in aerospace work could 
be where these firms have established a competitive advantage in supply. In addition, 
other strategies of exit, merger and a search for comPletely new markets are likely to 
be deployed even though the full effects are lagged often longer than a five-year 
period. 
Table 7.2 also confirms the five firm concentration ratio was stable between 1992 and 
1997 at around 70% of industry turnover as shown in Chapter Two. 
Table 7.2: Types of activity: percentage of industry turnover 
Type of activity 1992(%) 1997(%) 
Aerospace 67.0 71.5 
Top five finns 69.4 70.2 
Military 29.8 27.5 
The identification of the most important customer can be very insightful indeed, 
because this can identify the structure of the supply chain. Table 7.3 details the most 
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important customer from the survey in rank order, which is a good indicator of how 
the supply chain is inter-linked with important customers in aerospace. One in four of 
the suppliers have British Aerospace (now BAE Systems) as the most important 
customer and one in five have Rolls-Royce. These two companies are at the top of 
the supply chain although only one produces final aircraft. This situation is indicative 
of the dominance of the larger firms that are mainly the prime contractors, as well as 
the make-or-buy policies of the major prime contractors. A possible reason so many 
firms supply direct to British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce directly is because work is 
being out-sourced, which has historically been undertaken in one of the many sites of 
these two companies. Otherwise, the smaller companies would tend to supply to 
intermediate aerospace firms who in turn would pass on to the big two companies. In 
the pilot survey, there was further informal evidence of increasing levels of 
outsourcing by the largest companies had previously been undertaken in-house. 
Table 7.3: Most important customer to firms in the UK aerospace supply chain 
Name Number (n) Percentage 
British Aerospace 20 24.4 
Rolls-Royce 17 20.8 
MoD (including DERA) 12 14.6 
Other aerospace firnis* 6 7.3 
Shorts 5 6.1 
British Airways 5 6.1 
Boeing 5 6.1 
USA DoD 2 2.4 
Other firrns** 10 12.2 
Total 82 100.0 
* Other aerospace firms include Dowty, GKN-Westland and Damlier-Benz. 
** Other firms include BNFL, Coventry Press and Thames Water. 
One in seven firms supply the UK MoD directly, presumably with items such as 
spares, maintenance and small engineering work for the RAF. This is because major 
overhaul work, such as the mid-life update (MLU) for the Tornado tends to be 
undertaken by the defence manufactures, rather than the RAF itself The engineering 
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works of the RAF tend to specialise in smaller works programmes and leave the major 
work to the aerospace DIB. it is worth noting that 20% of respondents state that other 
aerospace firms and other (non-aerospace) firms account for the most important 
customer, which indicates there is diversity in the supply chain. Also, organisations 
in the US figure as well, because this is such a huge destination for global aerospace 
products. In spite of these markets being very difficult to penetrate the relatively large 
size and specialist knowledge of UK aerospace firms means there is potential to 
supply the large North American markets. 
Nevertheless, there still remains an interesting array of USA organisations in the list, 
such as Boeing and US DoD. This reflects the sheer scale of the American market, 
rather than free and open trade in global aerospace, since the USA markets tends to be 
supplied mainly by domestic American firms. In other words, industrial and 
competition policy in the US tends to favour American firms and insist on local 
content in the supply chain, which is known as the Buy-American Act, 1954. 
There are also many other non-aerospace firms that are the most important customer. 
An indication of the complexity of aircraft production is where expertise from outside 
the aerospace industry has a positive input. This situation can be viewed in two ways. 
Firstly, aerospace firms are dealing with such huge conglomerate suppliers that whilst 
the size of the aerospace contracts is big, they are not the biggest single contract in the 
portfolio of the supplier. Secondly, aerospace suppliers have developed generic skills 
of managing vast engineering projects, which are transferable across other areas of 
business. Indeed, one in eight companies has most important customers who are not 
aerospace firms. The other non-aerospace firms include a water utility company, a 
nuclear energy company and car manufacturers. 
Also, in the supply chain, the most important supplier in Table 7.4 is much less clear- 
cut and possibly less important to the aerospace industry. This conclusion is 
supported by the evidence of contractual relationships in Chapter Nine. So whilst 
companies were named, only the broad categories of suppliers such as metal suppliers 
(excluding British Steel) could be identified. There were a significant number of 
replies showing internal transfer as important, with all the ramifications this has for 
transfer pricing. Indeed, during the fieldwork for the questionnaire preparation one 
supplier suggested that they had benefited from competing directly with internal 
divisions of British Aerospace for work, which had historically been done in-house, 
hence reducing British Aerospace as the most important supplier. 
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Table 7.4: Most important supplier to firms in the UKAI supply chain 
Name Number (n) Percentage 
British Aerospace 2 2.4 
Rolls-Royce 3 3.7 
Boeing 3 3.7 
British Steel 3 3.7 
Internal transfer 6 7.3 
Metal suppliers 14 17.2 
Component suppliers 13 15.8 
Other (e. g. avionics, tyres) 26 31.6 
Various (n>l) 12 14.6 
Total 82 100.0 
Table 7.5 shows the supply chain as developed in Table 2.6. There are only a few 
prime contractors, double the number of sub-contractors and four times the numbers 
of third level suppliers (both aerospace and general). The structure found in Table 7.5 
is common in industrial economics and can be found in other industries such as 
ceramics (Jackson et aL, 2000: 8). 
Table 7.5: A breakdown of aerospace supply chain from the 82 in the sample 
Tier Supplier Type Number (n) Percentage 
Primary Aircraft assembly 6 7.3 
Secondary Major sub-component 11 13.4 
Tertiary: Aerospace Aerospace components 47 57.3 
Tertiary: general General components 18 22.0 
Total 82 1 00.0 
The primary group of major aerospace assembly companies comprises British 
Aerospace, Britten-Norman, GKN-Westland, Raytheon, Rolls Royce and Shorts. The 
secondary group of major suppliers of sub-assemblies comprises Aero and Industry, 
Airsys, British Airways, Centrax, Dowty, Honeywell, Hunting, Martin-Bakcr, Matra- 
BAe, and Marconi. All other firms in the sample are in the third category of 
aerospace suppliers. For ex=ple, Aerospace Metals and Hi-Share supply aerospace 
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components and British Aluminium, British Steel, Smiths and Vega supply generic 
component and parts, which confirms the pyramid effect. 
Table 7.6 shows another aspect of the supply chain. There are twice as many 
suppliers to airframe contractors, than to engine contractors; and four times as many 
suppliers to aircraft contractors than to avionics and electronics suppliers. On this 
occasion there is a sort of inverted pyramid effect on the supply chain, with heavier 
weighting towards airframe contractors, which is to be expected from a list of firms 
generated by SBAC. Also, airframe suppliers are ten times the numbers of indirect 
suppliers, but this underestimates the number of indirect suppliers. There is evidence 
in Chapter Five that the SBAC membership list captured only 70% of the value of the 
UK aerospace markets. As a result, the number of indirect suppliers is higher in the 
population of the aerospace supply chain as a whole, but not in the sample generated 
bySBAC. 
Table 7.6: A breakdown of aerospace supply from the 82 in the sample 
Aerospace supply Product Type Number (n) Percentage 
Direct Airframe 43 52.4 
Direct Aero-engine 22 26.8 
Direct Avionics/electronics 13 15.9 
Indirect Other components 4 4.9 
Total 82 100.0 
Table 7.7 compares the sample with the population defined by SBAC in order to 
compare the two groups. There are similarities between the two groups, but each has 
different features. 
The satnple has fewer firms that supply indirect components than the population, 
which in part may reflect the motivation of the respondents to complete the 
questionnaire. The next section assesses activity of firms in the aerospace industry. 
The next stage is to analyse the principal business activity of the aerospace suppliers 
in order to have a better concept of the industry. In turn this allows a focused 
transaction cost analysis of the UKAL 
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Table 7.7: Comparison of aerospace production between sample and population 
Aerospace link Product Type Sample Population 
Direct Airframe 52.4 45.0 
Direct Aero-engine 26.8 25.0 
Direct Avionics/electronics 15.9 20.0 
Indirect Other components 4.9 10.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Activity of firms in the aerospace industry: evidence of make 
In the questionnaire the firms were asked to list and rank the top three principal 
activities of the organisation. Principal activity I is the primary area of business by 
type of product, principal activity 2 is the secondary area of business and principal 
activity 3 is the tertiary area of business. The frequency chart of the results is shown 
in Table 7.8 below. 
Table 7.8: Principal aerospace business activity from the 82 in the sample 
General type 
Of activity 
Principal 
Activity 1 
Principal 
Activity 2 
Principal 
Activity 3 
Aircraft 7 2 0 
Engine 6 5 3 
Avionics* 11 6 0 
Sub-assembly 10 8 7 
Metalwork 19 17 11 
Components/ parts 22 22 20 
Maintenance/ services 5 2 13 
Jigs/ tools/ logistics 2 4 1 
Other work** 0 7 9 
Weapons 0 5 4 
None 0 4 14 
Total 82 82 82 
-AVIonIcs, electronics, radar, instruments. 
"Nuclear, oil, rail, land, computing, chemical, food processing and motor-sport. 
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The three main activities are well represented as expected namely aircraft, engines 
and avionics. There is also a good representation from firms engaged in the 
fabrication of parts, such as sub-assemblies, metalwork, components and parts. In 
addition, the machine tool industry is similarly represented, in activities such as jigs 
and tooling. This area of production is often crucial to the overall success of a 
manufacturing industry, such as UK aerospace. The category of other work is 
interesting not only for the variety of work undertaken for example, nuclear, oil, rail, 
chemical, food-processing and motor-sport, but also because firms are involved in this 
as principal activity 3. The outcome suggests that aerospace firms tend to fill capacity 
with other work, but remain as primarily aerospace firms as a result of specialisation. 
The finding is especially true for the expertise of aerospace firms in industries such as 
railways and even motor-sports production, such as Formula 1. For example there are 
spin-offs from the aerospace engine sector to the engines of Formula I racing cars. 
Also, in Table 7.8, the decreasing share of the category aircraft appears to show that 
firms tend to be aircraft manufacturers first and foremost or not at all. Indeed, this 
confirms that many firms are indeed highly specialised and form part of a supply 
chain such as jigs and tools plus the production of weapons. There is also evidence of 
a wide array of work being undertaken by firms generally in the supply chain with a 
great deal of activity. Weapons as an increasing function of principal activity may 
suggest that firms need expertise in aerospace and defence, in order to maintain a 
presence in the weapons industry. 
Table 7.9 presents the qualitative answers in rank order to the question what are the 
three occupational groups who have highly specific skills, knowledge and experience 
in the firm. Asset I in the Table is the most specific employee asset at the firm, asset 
2 is the second and 3 asset is the third. The aim of this question is to generate an 
appreciation for the range and type of skilled employees at aerospace firms. For 
example, specific jobs identified in metalwork include sheet metal workers and metal 
bonding; and specific jobs in technical support include technical publishers and 
computer software engineers. 
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Table 7.9: Employee asset specificity in aerospace 
Full job 
Description 
Asset I 
Number 
(n) 
Asset 1 
percent 
(%) 
Asset 2 
Number 
(n) 
Asset 2 
percent 
(%) 
Asset 3 
number 
(n) 
Asset 3 
Percent 
(%) 
Design/R&D 17 20.7 11 13.4 4 4.9 
Engineer various 15 18.3 13 15.9 11 13.4 
Moulder/fabricator 11 13.4 4 4.8 4 4.9 
Metalworker 10 12.2 7 8.5 7 8.5 
Sales/marketing 10 12.2 6 7.3 10 12.2 
Machining/CNC 7 8.5 8 9.8 1 13.4 
Quality/inspection 4 4.9 10 12.2 4 4.9 
Electric/electronics 3 3.7 1 1.2 3 3.7 
Technical support 3 3.7 7 8.5 6 7.3 
Procurement 2 2.4 3 3.7 2 2.4 
Other* 0 0.0 3 3.7 4 4.9 
None 0 0.0 9 11.0 16 19.5 
Total 82 100.0 82 100.0 82 100.0 
* This category includes chemistry, tribology and material stress. 
In Table 7.9 another important issue generated by the questionnaire is highlighted 
namely the exact tasks that are performed by the employees. Finns were asked to list 
and rank three important groups in the organisation which have highly specific skills, 
knowledge or experience. For a manufacturing industry such as aerospace it is 
expected that the various engineering disciplines are important such as metalwork and 
electronics. The category for design, drawing and R&D is also important. This is 
partly explained because aerospace is a dynamic and fast-moving industry with huge 
competitive pressures on the suppliers in terms of design and improvements to 
specifications and will account for comparative advantage over other nations. Indeed, 
design and R&D in general are extremely important to aerospace and can be used as a 
competitive weapon in a fierce market place. There are also a combination of 
commercial incentives and military imperatives to improve design, so this result 
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whilst not unique to aerospace' only serves to confirm the existing impression of the 
industry as a whole. Metal work, machining and milling is also very important, 
because this is still a production orientated and metal engineering dominated industry, 
in spite of the emphasis on design and R&D. 
Commercial disciplines such as sales, marketing and procurement also figure 
prominently in the list. This reflects the real market pressure on aerospace suppliers 
to reduce the cost of production and maximise the sales of the output. This is not 
achieved by itself in global markets, hence the need for commercial disciplines in the 
current aerospace industry. A counter-argument is this high proportion of commercial 
skills could simply reflect the job title or position of the employee who answered the 
questionnaire, rather than the importance of this function on the business. There is no 
evidence in support of the latter explanation and the questionnaires were targeted at 
those employees who complete the SBAC survey and thereby reduce the likelihood of 
bias in the responses (see Chapter Five). 
In summary, Table 7.9 shows which tasks are complex and taken as a whole are a 
composite of many sub-disciplines within engineering. There are a large number of 
skilled workers involved with metalwork and mechanical engineering as expected 
along-side electrical and technical engineering. Design and R&D features highly as 
does sales and procurement which all deal with the commercial realities of modem 
aerospace manufacturing. 
Table 7.10 shows the breakdown of the responses still further into individual areas of 
work associated with UK aerospace supply chain. In particular, the definition of 
engineer disciplines has been used here in the widest possible sense in order to 
capture the full magnitude of the skills and technical abilities required in the design, 
construction and assembly of modem aircraft programmes. In Table 7.10 certain sub- 
disciplines within the area such as general engineering and metallurgy have the 
highest number of categories. 
Table 7.10 shows the extent of the engineering disciplines in aerospace in alphabetical 
order. The disciplines range from metallurgy and mechanical engineering to design 
and R&D. Within these disciplines there is likely to be highly specialist skills and 
expertise that require expert training and education at both apprentice and university 
1 As previously stated a close comparison to aerospace in this respect is shipbuilding, but this could 
equally apply to pharmaceutical output as well. 
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level. This confirms that employee asset specificity will tend to be very high in 
aerospace in order to fulfil the highly technical functions of the various jobs. 
Table 7.10: Analysis of engineering disciplines in aerospace 
Engineering 
General 
Metallurgy 
Disciplines 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
Design 
R&D 
Technical 
Support 
Fabrication 
Moulding 
Airworthiness Bonding CNC CAD Airframe Braiding 
Cell Boring Core-makers CAM Avionics Ceramics 
Chemistry Deformation Fitter Control Engine Forging 
Cryogenics Forging Forge Design Project Glass 
Electrical Gear-cutting Furnace NDT Service Moulders 
Electronic Grinding Machining R&D Treatment Packer 
Filtration Jig-making Maintenance System Operatives 
Finite clement Milling Process TD Optimisers 
Fluid control Pipe-bending 
Heat shrink Pressing 
Mechanical Sheet-metal 
Pneumatic Stress 
Radiography Threading 
Software Turning 
Tribology Welding 
Facilities asset specificity is similarly likely to be high as the skilled engineers will 
also tend to need specialist equipment. The transaction cost approach has an 
emphasis on asset specificity, which is likely to be an appropriate to assess the 
industry as a whole given the very specific nature of the jobs and skills identified in 
the UK aerospace supply chain. That is, this section has found descriptive and 
qualitative evidence of the specific and complex nature of aerospace activity, which is 
indicative of facility and employment asset specificity. The next section assesses the 
role of contracts in the UK aerospace industry. 
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Contracts in aerospace 
This section develops an analysis of the contractual arrangements between aerospace 
firms in the industry in advance of Chapter Nine. In particular, the analysis will look 
at the tendency of firms to have contracts with suppliers and customers as well as 
aspects of incentives and penalties between firms that exchange goods and services. 
This approach is important because it builds a framework for assessing the 
transactional arrangements between firms and also allows the research to focus on 
trust and co-operation in the industry (Williamson, 1983: 537). In particular, 
contracts help to keep prices on track with long-term relationship between firms and 
provide safeguards for the parties involved. 
In addition, in order to test the transaction cost approach from other approaches the 
contract design aspect of exchange need to be assessed. The analysis will use the 
existence of a contract with suppliers and customers as a dependent variable in much 
the same way as make-or-buy. If a firm has a contract with a supplier, then it is 
predicted that the firm is protecting against threats; and if a firm has a contract with a 
customer then it is predicted that the firm is establishing commitments. The following 
two variables will be considered: 
1. Contract with supplier; where I= yes and 0= no. 
2. Contract with customer; where 1= yes and 0= no. 
In general terms a contract with a supplier may be entered into by a firm due to a lack 
of trust between the exchange partners. The lack of trust may be due to the 
unreliability of suppliers generally or because the buying firm needs to guarantee a 
source of supply. In a similar way, a contract with a customer may be desirable for a 
selling firm as it represents a form of commitment to buy from the customer now and 
possibly in the future. In other words, there may be a longer-term relationship 
between firms as opposed to the spot market. In this respect it is the role of the 
contract which is important not contracts per se. 
There is a potential paradox in this respect. Any firm in the supply chain will seek a 
contract with customers, but avoids a formal contract with suppliers as this is a barrier 
to supplier-switching. However, any supplying firm does not necessarily know if the 
customer is entering the contracts in order to facilitate long-term co-operation or 
because there is no trust between the trading partners. Similarly, any buying firm 
does not necessarily know if the supplier is entering the contract to build links with its 
customers or because it is aiming to hold its customer to hostage. 
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Contract with supplier (supeony, supcono and supconp) 
A contract with a supplier is only apparent in half the number of firms. From the 
survey, 53.5% of the firms in the sample had a contract with a supplier, 21.0% did not 
have a contract with a supplier and 25.5% of the firms sometimes had a contract with 
a supplier. Prima facie the result that only about half the firms in the sample appear 
to have a contract with a supplier may seem to be a low proportion. However, given 
the need for supplier-switching policies this is not unsurprising. Hence, aerospace 
firms may prefer so-called 'arms-length' relationships with suppliers in order to allow 
quicker supplier switching or to avoid inappropriate or cosy relationships. Although 
there is evidence elsewhere of trust and co-operation, it will not pay all aerospace 
firms to do this all the time and hence the desire to trade one supplier off against 
another on a cost basis and thereby not take out contracts. Asset specificity is 
important in this respect and also may positively increase the demand for contracts 
with suppliers in the aerospace industry. This situation is shown in Table 7.11. 
Table 7.11: The percentage of firms that have a contract with suppliers 
Response Percentage 
Yes 53.6 
No 21.0 
Sometimes 25.4 
Total 100.0 
Contract with customer (cuscony, cuscono and cusconp) 
The survey results show that a contract with the customer is more frequent than with 
the supplier. In the sample 69.5% of the firms had a contract with a customer and 
only 4% did not have a contract with a customer with 26.5% of the sample sometime 
entering a contract with a customer. Contracts with customers are different hence the 
desire to tie-in a customer with a formal written contract is paramount. The 
implication of these results is that finns have to be realistic about entering into 
contracts. The greater demand for contracts with customers than contracts with 
suppliers is straightforward, but there needs to be a great deal of negotiating between 
firms in the supply chain. That is, not all firms in the supply chain can use spot 
markets for purchases and contracts with customers, by definition. 
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TabIe 7.12: The percentage of firms that have a contract with customers 
Response Percentage 
Yes 69.5 
No 4.0 
Sometimes 26.5 
Total 100.0 
Asset specificity is important in this respect. Where asset specificity is low then spot 
markets can be used. Where there is high asset specificity then contracts (with 
incentive and penalty clauses) arc advisable. 
A comparison between Table 7.11 and Table 7.12 confirms that firms tend to have a 
contract with customers more than with suppliers. The next section considers the 
issue of discounting as a form of incentive contracts in the UK aerospace. 
Supplier Cost Discount (Supcayes and Supeano) 
The extent to which suppliers offer cost discounts for bulk buying is considered in this 
section. Table 7.13 shows that one in three suppliers offer discounts to customers and 
over half offer discounts sometimes. This suggests a significant degree of negotiation 
and bargaining between firms in the aerospace supply chain. Indeed, this is a method 
for signalling incentives in the market for aerospace parts and components. Also, it is 
indicative of a highly competitive market structure where discounts are seen as 
essential to business activity in building-up supplier relationships. 
Table 7.13: The percentage of suppliers offering cost discounts 
Response Percentage 
Yes 31.7 
No 11.0 
Sometimes 57.3 
Total 100.0 
If there is little or no scope to offer discounts then this situation could represent a 
more regulated form of exchange, where prices in contracts are not negotiable 
between the parties involved. The size of the cost advantage of the 64 firms where 
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suppliers offer discounts tends to be less than 10%, as shown in Table 7.14. The 
result is that there is only a small margin for cost advantage in the UK aerospace 
industry due in part to the competitive nature of the industry. Hence, discretion is 
used, but not for large amounts, as over 80% of the advantages are for 10% and less. 
This is potentially important for the make-or-buy decision, since large discounts may 
encourage firms to buy rather than make, but the evidence here is that the size of the 
discounts are generally not very high (that is, 80% of the discount in the sample are 
for less than 10%). In all the higher the available discount then the higher the 
propensity to buy. 
Table 7.14: The size of cost discounts offered by suppliers 
Cost Discounts Percentage 
Less than 5% 32.8 
Between 5% and 10% 48.4 
Between I I% and 20% 9.4 
More than 20% 9.4 
Total 100.0 
The conclusion to draw from Table 7.14 is that aerospace suppliers are operating in a 
highly competitive market and as a result these firms are unable to offer significant 
discounts not least because aerospace is generally a decreasing cost industry. 
Table 7.15 shows that one in five suppliers provides a cost advantage and one in three 
suppliers offer cost advantages sometimes for components previously made in-house. 
Under half offer no cost advantage, because the internal divisions of the buying firm 
are competitive. These findings suggest a significant degree of search costs for firms, 
which need to identify and select firms in the aerospace supply chain to provide the 
best deal for a component on cost, including other divisions within their own 
organisation and transfer pricing. This also has implications for both moral hazard 
and adverse selection in particular, where there is is hidden action and hidden 
information in the market exchange. The transaction cost approach gives due 
emphasis to bounded rationality and opportunism, which may be relevant in 
aerospace, where the scope for the hold-up problem is potentially significant. Full 
details of the supplier cost discount are shown in Table 7.1 S. 
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Table 7.15: The percentage of suppliers with a cost advantage 
Response Percentage 
Yes 20.7 
No 43.9 
Sometimes 35.4 
Total 100.0 
The size of the cost advantage to the firms where suppliers offer cost advantages tends 
to be less than 10% as shown in Table 7.16. Although a significant proportion of one 
in four does have a significant cost saving (over 10%) suggesting this type of firm 
should be considering outsourcing production as a fonn of cost reduction. Indeed, 
this type of firm often with sizeable overheads should consider its role in production 
and concentrate on design, project management or winning contracts from the MoD or 
large civilian airline companies, such as Boeing or Airbus. This can be assessed in 
terms of the boundaries for the firm and dcfining the core competencies for the 
organisation. Such evidence potentially reflects the small margins and profit in the 
supply chain, because there is limited scope for supplier cost advantage in spite of 
25% of cases where suppliers have a cost advantage over a firm where the component 
was previously made in-house. 
Table 7.16: The size of the cost advantage of the suppliers 
Cost Advantage Percentage 
Less than 5% 20.5 
Between 5% and 10% 53.8 
Between 11 % and 20% 20.5 
More than 20% 5.2 
Total 100.0 
Mean length of contract with supplier is almost two and a half years. This is less than 
the mean length of contract for customers, which is over three years and will be 
assessed later in this Chapter. 
The type of contract with suppliers is varied in this industry. Nearly 30% did not 
know what type of contract the company had with its suppliers, as shown in Table 
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7.17 below. It is important for the purposes of this research that a fixed price contract 
allows for price escalation to be incorporated, whereas a firm price contract has no 
price escalation allowed. 
Table 7.17: The frequency and percentage of supplier contract type 
Type Number (n) Percent 
Firm price 19 23.2 
Fixed price 31 37.8 
Both 8 9.8 
Unknown 24 29.2 
Total 82 100.0 
Table 7.18 shows the type of contract with customers, where over half of the contracts 
are a fixed price contract, which suggest the customers have a good degree of 
bargaining power. It may also result in the organisational structure of the firm as 
firms with more know-how of bargaining are more likely to procure from the market 
in order to generate cost savings. 
Table 7.18: The frequency and percentage of customer contract type 
Type Number (n) Percent 
Firm price 17 20.7 
Fixed price 45 54.9 
Both 12 14.6 
Unknown 8 9.8 
Total 82 100.0 
Finally, from the survey, the mean length of contract with customer is just over three 
years, which again is further evidence that the suppliers want to have definite 
contracts with customers as an attempt to build up trust, co-operation and a long term 
relationship with one another. It could also mean that buyers want to ensure that 
suppliers do not attempt to hold the firm hostage and engage in opportunistic 
behaviour. The implications of this for transaction costs are that contract design is 
important since it recognises the hold-up problem and opportunistic behaviour of 
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suppliers. Another way to assess the implications of long term contracts is as a form 
of protection between respective parties in the exchange; and this is also a method of 
risk sharing between partners. If this is the case then it is the role of the contract that 
is important. Overall, this section has identified the role and types of contracts 
employed in the UKAL This is applicable to transaction costs in terms of identifying 
commitments and threats within the hostage model. The next section assesses supply 
chain issues in the aerospace industry that have arisen from other responses in the 
questionnaire survey. 
Other supply-side issues 
The final section deals with some of the remaining supply-side issues covered in the 
questionnaire and which relate directly to the make-or-buy decision. Included in this 
is the level of sub-contracting in the industry, reliability of suppliers and proximity of 
location to suppliers. These issues are particularly prevalent in the UK and are 
assessed by industry forum aimed at improving performance, such as the Society of 
Motor Manufactures and Traders (SMMT) Industry Forum based in the West 
Midlands. SBAC scrvcs a similar function but thcrc is no industry forum in the UK 
aerospace industry even though other industries such as ceramics have followed the 
lead of the car production studies from SMMT. Table 7.19 details the answers to a 
number of survey questions where a binary response was required, namely yes or no. 
Table 7.19: Supplier switching and other issues in UK aerospace 
Supplier issue Yes (%) No (%) 
Do you sub-contract core activity in high 40.2 59.8 
levels of demand? 
Do you sub-contract core activity in low 15.9 84.1 
levels of demand? 
Do you consider your suppliers to be 84.1 15.9 
reliable overall? 
Would you benefit from a closer location 18.3 81.7 
to supplier? 
Do important customers change the 43.9 56.1 
magnitude of an order at short notice? 
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In terms of sub-contracting, some 40% of aerospace firms in the survey out-source a 
core activity in periods of high demand. This figure drops to around 16% in periods 
of low demand suggesting that out-sourcing remains a sensitive issue to firms during a 
downturn in business. That is, the make-or-buy plan is an important aspect of firm 
behaviour during a business cycle. The overwhelming majority of aerospace firms 
consider suppliers to be reliable, indicating a good and honest inter-firm relationship. 
Otherwise, transaction costs economics would predict more supplier-switching, if 
suppliers were not regarded as reliable. In this context, trust is considered as valuable 
and important. However, one in seven firms does not consider suppliers as reliable. 
This can be seen as dissatisfaction with the supply chain or an inability of the supply 
chain to cope with the extra demand as more of the larger aerospace companies 
continue to outsource. 
Less than 20% of suppliers would benefit from closer location to the most important 
customer. Therefore, it would appear that there is little scope for location asset 
specificity. However, other evidence contradicts this conclusion since there is a South 
West Association of aerospace suppliers, which benefit generally from close 
proximately to the Bristol area sites of Rolls Royce and British Aerospace. Also, 
there is a Lancashire Association of aerospace suppliers, which similarly benefits 
from close proximity to the British Aerospace sites at Warton near Preston and 
Chadderton, near Manchester. 
Following other questions, there is also a higher number of customers that change the 
magnitude of an order at short notice, perhaps reflecting uncertainty in the business 
relations. Long term planning has always been essential in the production of aircraft, 
but this may be partial evidence of a change in the nature of the business, which is 
conforming to the commercial pressures of other manufacturing industries. In the 
transaction cost literature the issue of switching supplier is considered important since 
the ability to switch supplier is a proxy for barriers to the make-or-buy decision (Klein 
et aL, 1978: 297). If there are no barriers to switch supplier then there is no hold-up 
problem or any prospect for opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, which makes the 
task of minimising transaction costs more straightforward. In the questionnaire the 
respondents were asked to rank the importance of the decision to switch supplier for 
any given component, once the decision to switch supplier has been made by the firm. 
The results are shown below: 
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1. High quality= 1.96 
2. Supplier reliability = 2.61 
3. Low price = 2.62 
4. Delivery date = 2.80 
5. Others include offsets, company strategy, risk share, follow-on contracts 
and sales, quality assurance, customer relationship and stock control 
Where 1= most important and 5= least important. 
The lower the number the higher the importance attached to the decision to switch 
supplier. The transaction cost literature would predict that low price would be the 
most important factor. However, the results confirm that the UK aerospace industry 
rates quality of suppliers very highly and reliability from suppliers above cost savings 
and delivery. The results from Supply Chain Relationships in Aerospace (SCRIA) 
also confirm this conclusion. This is an important finding for UKAI because it 
suggests that aerospace firms view transaction cost minimisation as one of a number 
of goals for the firm rather than as the only objective. 
There are three remaining issues to emerge from the statistical analysis. Firstly, the 
typical length of time between customer placing an order and delivery is just over six 
months. This shows the relatively long lead times in aerospace markets and indeed 
possible further evidence that co-operation is vital between links in the supply chain. 
Also, it may indicate that supplier switching may be very difficult for certain 
components, due to high asset specificity, especially dedicated assets. Whilst six 
months is not an indefinite tie-in, it is not a spot market either and shows the 
uncertainty and complexity of the markets. This is because exchange is far from 
instant and is permeated by times lags in production and delivery. 
Secondly, on the supply-side the mean number of suppliers that accounts for 75% of 
purchases is 18. This is indicative of the wide array of suppliers in the industry and 
the range for this variable is from I to 200, with a standard deviation of 28. However, 
the most important supplier accounts for 29.7% of purchases, which shows a high 
level of dependency. 
Finally, on the demand-side the mean number of customers that account for 75% of 
purchases is 21. The range for this variable is from 1 to 300, with a standard 
deviation of 37. The most important customer accounts for 28.0% of purchases. 
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Overall, these other supply-side issues indicate that when UK aerospace firms switch 
supplier it is not only to do with minimising transaction costs, but also supply chain 
relationships, including reliability and quality performance, where the latter concepts 
are not necessarily captured in the transaction cost approach. 
Conclusions 
There are a number of conclusions generated from this Chapter, which relate to the 
make-or-buy decision and contract design. Firstly, this Chapter confirms that in broad 
terms the dataset from the survey is representative of the wider population. Secondly, 
the role of the supply chain is important when testing the make-or-buy predictions; 
and the interaction between suppliers and customers is important when testing the role 
of contracts. 
The make-or-buy decision is produced within the framework of the UK aerospace 
supply chain. That is, the firm and the market need to be close substitutes in order for 
supplier-switching between making in-house and outsourcing to work relatively 
efficiently. The mere existence of a supply chain is not a sufficient condition for 
supplier-switching, but it is a necessary condition. Hence, this Chapter shows there is 
a well-defined aerospace supply chain in the UK capable of determining the make-or- 
buy decision of firms across various specialist markets, in spite of the dominance of 
the two main prime contractors (Le. BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce). The Chapter 
also considers the importance of asset specificity in line with general transaction cost 
predictions. Employee asset specificity is shown to be important for aerospace firms 
resulting in both specialist suppliers as well as firms retaining work in-house. 
The Chapter also highlights the importance of contractual arrangements between 
firms and supply-side consideration of sub-contracting in the industry. The 
conclusions are that a contract will augment the make-or-buy decision-making 
process. In particular, a contract with a customer is important in order to facilitate co- 
operation between the parties involved in the exchange, especially with a longer term 
contract. Furthermore, the contract process is improved if incentives are provided 
such as discounts. The next two Chapters attempt to use the database to test the 
central hypothesis of the transaction costs model outlined in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Econometric analysis of UK aerospace 1: make-or-buy 
Introduction 
This Chapter presents the empirical results from the test of vertical integration in the 
UK aerospace industry. The paradigm problem of make-or-buy will be examined in 
detail using econometric modelling techniques. In line with the transaction cost 
model and using the original data, this Chapter assesses four hypotheses using both a 
linear regression model and logistical function model. The four hypotheses are that 
one, UK aerospace firms; two, military firms; three, aerospace-specific firms and four, 
large firms are all likely to make due higher levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, 
complexity, frequency and small number. There are at least two dependent variables 
available for econometric analysis in this study. If the dependent variable is a 
continuous variable, then the test will use a linear regression and in this study the 
variable is the percentage of components bought-out by the firm. In the case of binary 
or dummy variable for the dependent variable, then the test will luse a 
logistic 
function, which in this study is both a make-or-buy variable and contract. In sum, this 
Chapter is concerned with make-or-buy as the dependent variable using the 
transaction cost approach. 
The Chapter assesses the organisational form as an equation under the transaction cost 
approach. The model is presented next and then the central hypothesis and a 
discussion of the dependent variables. The regression and logit analysis results are 
assessed and comparisons between the two approaches are made. Finally, there will 
be a discussion of the results. The next section begins the process by assessing the 
organisational form of the equation that is the make-or-buy decision. 
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Organisational form 
As developed in Chapter Four, the transaction cost approach in this thesis is a test of 
vertical integration and attempts to predict when it is advantageous for a firm to use 
the internal mode of organisation (hierarchy), as opposed to the external mode of 
organisation (market). It assesses how a firm can minimise the cost of transacting via 
the make-or-buy decision, using the market (buy) and hierarchy (make), respectively. 
It also attempts to assess whether the hostage model can be applied to industrial 
organisation, which follows in Chapter Nine. This approach uses contracts as an 
important feature of the analysis and shows how relationships in exchange can affect 
incentives in transactions. 
In general, the relationship takes the functional form in equation 8.1, with 
organisational configuration as the dependent variable (Form) and human and 
environmental factors as explanatory variables: 
Form= f (AS, U, F) Eq. 8.1 
Where: 
Form = organisational form of the firm 
AS = asset specificity 
U uncertainty and complexity 
F frequency 
Organisational form can be viewed as vertical integration or the boundary between the 
firm and the market, which is defined by the make-or-buy decision. This 
configuration reflects transaction cost minimisation. According to Williamson (1985: 
291), the organisational form of the firm depends on environmental factors such as 
asset specificity and the two behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Bounded rationality is captured in equation 8.1 through the uncertainty 
and complexity variable. Opportunism is related to small number exchange, since 
economic agents will tend to act in a self-interested way that can ultimately result in 
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the hold-up problem and hostage taking. This can be seen as another independent 
variable, which can be included in the model. As a result, equation 8.1 can be 
rewritten from the basic form to the form in equation 8.2, which attempts to capture 
opportunism through the variable for small number exchange (SN), where the 
predicted sign is positive. 
Fonn = f(AS, U, F, SN) 
Where: 
SN = Small number exchange 
Eq. 8.2 
As shown in Chapter Four, the organisational form as the dependent variable can be 
substituted by make-or-buy as an acceptable proxy variable (see equation 4.3) and 
equation 8.1 and equation 8.2 are tested in this thesis since these equations are the 
most accurate representation of the transaction cost model (Williamson, 1975 and 
1985). The dependent variable can be modelled as a continuous variable' or as a 
dichotomous or binary variable. In the former approach, transaction costs can be seen 
as an on-going or continuous choice and distinguishes between the percentage of 
make and buy in an organisation. There are similarities between a linear and a 
logistic regression, but where the dependent variable is dichotomous, then the 
assumption of a linear relationship is violated (Field, 2000: 164). The logistic 
regression has the effect of turning a non-linear relationship into a linear one and 
thereby overcomes the problem of non-linearity of the observed data in this case the 
dependent variable. 
The dependent variable is the proportion of the components and sub-components used 
by the firm, which are bought from external suppliers. The latter approach recognises 
the costs of transacting as a choice between alternative modes of production, that is, 
the market or the firm. The dependent variable is defined as whether the firm will 
1 It is worth noting that 0 to 100% is a probability, similar to a binary coding of 0 and 1, since both 
have an upper and lower constraint and are positive, by definition. 
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make-or-buy if the costs of each option are equal. This results in a model with a 
limited dependent variable, which in this case is a dummy variable. Both cases have a 
legitimate statistical foundation; the only empirical difference in this study is that 
there are 68 observations for the model with a continuous dependent variable that 
increases to 82 with a limited dependent variable. The relatively lower response rate 
is due the fact that the percentage bought-out question is more difficult question to 
answer than the make-or-buy. Nevertheless, this means the organisational form of the 
firm will be derived from perceived differences between the make-or-buy or contract 
differences, which will be discussed in Chapter Nine. Transaction cost economics 
also predicts that if the cost of make equals the cost of buy then the firm will buy, as 
shown in Table 8.1 with the main predictions for the independent variables. The sign 
for the variables are correct for the organisation form where make is the dependent 
variable. However, where buy (or bought-out) is the dependent variable then the 
signs are reversed, because the more a firm buys from the market then the less 
transaction costs there are in the exchange. 
Table 8.1: The nredietion% of tran. vactinn cost economics 
Variable Make Buy Sign 
Asset Specificity High Low Positive 
Uncertainty / Complexity High Low Positive 
Frequency High Low Positive 
Small Numbers Low High Negative 
Make= Buy No Yes N/A 
In turn, Table 8.1 is linked to Table 4.3, which shows the significance of asset 
specificity in the analysis relative to frequency. Within the organisation structure of 
the firm, asset specificity plays a central role in the make-or-buy decision because a 
firm should make when asset specificity is high even if frequency is occasional in 
order to avoid the hold-up problem. 
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The Model 
The generalised model for make-or-buy is given in equation 8.2 and the model to be 
tested empirically is shown in equation 8.3. Equation 8.3 links the functional form of 
the firm with a vector of explanatory variables: 
Ii Eq. 8.3 T, =flxi +'"i 
Where: 
; ri = the perceived differences between make and buy for firm i. 
j6 =a vector of co-efficients 
Xi =a vector of exogenous independent variables, which represent asset 
specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency. 
Pi = an error term 
The ultimate algebraic form of the equations to be tested is covered in the next section 
on the central hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is clear from the previous commentary that 
there are a number of possible nested models that can be analysed. The first model is 
where the explanatory variables are the three basic transaction cost dimensions of 
asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency, as in equation 8.1, whether 
using a continuous variable or a dichotomous variable as the dependent variable. The 
second model is where the small numbers exchange variable is included as in equation 
8.2, again whether using a continuous or binary variable. The third model also has 
dummy variables included to take account of specific features of the UK aerospace 
industry such as civil-military mix and the extent of the aerospace supply chain. 
Although these are not explicitly shown in equation 8.3 they appear in equation 8.4 in 
the next section below. The various models have been formally stated in order to 
show the development of the model from its theoretical form to operation structure, 
which takes into account the UK aerospace industry. 
In addition, it is worth noting that given the prescriptive nature of the transaction cost 
paradigm, there should not be any need to question the causality of the model, as long 
as the dependent and explanatory variables are correctly specified. Statistically 
however, there is a possibility of some feedback between the continuous dependent 
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variable and explanatory variables. This is because the data are cross-sectional in 
nature rather than time series and as a result there is also little probability of 
identifying instrumental variables. The next section will focus on the central 
hypotheses of the thesis. 
Central Hypotheses 
The central hypotheses of the thesis focus on vertical integration in the UK aerospace 
industry and in particular the make-or-buy decision (and contract design in Chapter 
Nine). This approach will test the organisation form, where there are transaction costs 
in the null hypothesis (110) and where there are no transaction costs in the alternative 
hypothesis (HA). The first hypothesis is presented in H I: 
HI: UK aerospace firms are likely to make due to higher levels of asset specificity, 
uncertainty and complexity, frequency and small numbers. 
The central hypothesis tests whether or not these TCE characteristics are dominant in 
the UK aerospace industry. A priori the evidence that this is a worthwhile approach 
to take is contained in the stylised facts in Chapter Two. There is massive investment 
in R&D, long life-cycles and a highly specialist products in the UKAI that are 
indicative of transaction costs. 
Subsequent hypotheses can be generated to compare different groups in the database 
given the nature of the descriptive statistics in previous Chapters. For example, the 
possible transaction cost differences between military and civilian aerospace firms in 
the database in H2 may be accounted for by asset specificity (see H2 below). In the 
dataset a military firm is coded as I and a civilian firm is coded as 0, where a military 
firm has 50% or more of the company activity in defence-related activity. The 50% 
figure is rather arbitrary and simply reflects the weight of balance for the activity that 
is 51% is greater than 49%. VvUlst it is possible to test what happens if the cut-off 
point is increased to say 75%, nevertheless the major issue remains that a division 
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exists at all rather than the point of the separation. The second hypothesis is presented 
in H2: 
H2: UK military aerospace firms are more likely to make than counterpart civilian 
aerospace firms due to higher levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, 
frequency and small numbers. 
Alternatively, the potential vertical integration difference between aerospace firms 
and general engineering firms that could be explained by transaction cost is contained 
in H3. An aerospace firm is coded as I and a civilian firm is coded as 0, where a firm 
has 50% or more of the company activity in direct aerospace related activity. Again a 
figure of 50% could be considered too low and but the effect of a 75% cut-off point is 
likely to be negligible. The significant issue is the weight of balance where more than 
50% is located in one category or another. The third hypothesis is presented in H3: 
H3: UK aerospace-specific firms are more likely to make than general engineering 
firms in the aerospace supply chain due to higher levels of asset specificity, 
uncertainty, complexity, frequency and small numbers. 
Moreover, the database is sufficiently specified to differentiate between firms by size 
in this case the number of employees. The actual employment figures can be used or 
alternatively a large firm is coded I and a small firm is coded 0, where a large firm 
has 250 employees or more in the company. It is worth noting that size is not 
measured by turnover, as this was considered too sensitive to the business cycles and 
exchange rate variations. The fourth hypothesis four is presented in H4: 
H4: Large UK firms are likely to make due to higher levels of asset specificity, 
uncertainty, complexity, frequency and small numbers. 
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The main limitation of the hypotheses is that the results are not comparable over time 
or with other industries in the UK or elsewhere given the limited survey data 
available. Also, there may be measurement problems, because there are no 
standardised ways to measure the key explanatory and dependent variables. 
Nevertheless, the previous discussion suggests that the most general form of the 
model (equation 8.2) could include all the available independent variables. This will 
take the structure shown in equation 8.4 and incorporates the dummy variables from 
the aerospace industry, where all signs are expected to be positive. Equation 8.4 is the 
preferred equation in terms of operational aspects of the model, because it takes into 
account the many empirical issues of the aerospace industry: 
Form = f(AS, U, F, SN, MC, AO, SZ) Eq. 8.4 
Where: 
MC = Military or civil finn. 
AO = Aerospace or general engineering firm. 
SZ = Size of firm above or below 250 employees. 
In sum, the reported results will use the three main categories of explanatory 
variables. Namely, model I is the basic transaction cost dimensions only (equation 
8.1), model 2 is the transaction cost dimension, plus small numbers (equation 8.2) and 
model 3 is all the explanatory variables, plus the dummy variables for military- 
civilian differences, aerospace specific distinction and company size (equation 8.4). 
The predicted sign of the dummy variables is positive. 
Table 8.2 shows there are actually two dependent variables, which can be used from 
this study, namely one for the year 1992 and another for 1997. The questionnaire as a 
whole is an attempt to draw attention to the changes in the UK aerospace industry 
over this period. From the 82 completed returns, 61 firms detailed the bought-out 
figure for 1992, which increased to 68 for 1997 and both periods will be assessed. 
Table 8.2 also shows that the mean percentage of bought-out has increased by nearly 
190 
four percentage points over the five-year period 1992-97. This suggests that there has 
been a rise in outsourcing in the UK aerospace industry in the immediate post-Cold 
War era. Whether this is due to a general increase in outsourcing since 1992, which 
has resulted in more firms buying components from the market, rather than making 
internally is a mute point. Anecdotal evidence from the pilot study shows there has 
been a greater emphasis on outsourcing in business strategy, but the survey is not 
sufficiently detailed to fully capture the issue. 
Tnhh- R-l! Ps-repntnof- nf enmnnnpnt. q hnnfiht-out in 1992 and 1997 
Variable Number (n) Range Mean Std Deviation 
Bought-out 92 61 99 50.11 29.65 
Bought-out 97 68 99 53.88 30.81 
The second measure has the dependent variable as a dummy variable with a binary 
response, linked directly to the concept of makc-or-buy. This is generated by the 
survey question for 1997, if the cost of making a component equals the cost of buying 
from a supplier, then do you make or do you buy? Table 8.3 shows that just less than 
two thirds of the sample replied make and over one third replied buy. These 
responses are then interpreted as classifying the firm as either a make firm or a buy 
firm, which in turn can test the prediction of the transaction costs model. The model 
itself would predict buy if make equals buy on the assumption it is always more 
advantageous to buy than make. The results included in Table 8.3 are therefore 
interesting as it suggests the UK aerospace may have other reasons to make rather 
than buy. For example, sunk costs may be high and prevent supplier-switching. The 
issue of labour- hoarding may also prevent a perfect switch from in-house to the 
outsourcing of work by an aerospace firm. 
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Table 8.3: Make-or-buv nrofile of the firm in 1997 
Response Make (n) Make (%) Buy (n) Buy (%) 
Buy = 0.00 31.0 37.8% 51.0 62.2% 
Make = 1.00 51.0 62.2% 31.0 37.8% 
Total 82.0 100% 82.0 100% 
The explanatory variables are an attempt to explain variations in the dependent 
variable in equation 8.3. The nature of all these variables is shown in detail in Table 
8.4, including the dummy variables from equation 8.4, as well as the various types of 
dependent variables and the range of explanatory variables. 
Table 8.4: Dependent and explanatory variable listing 
Variable Name: Variable Definition: 
Dependent Description 
(1) MAKE The make-or-buy decision at the firm level, that is, the 
(Make-or-buy) decision when make equals buys. 
(2) BO The percentage of components bought-out from 
(Bought-out) external suppliers. 
(3) CONTRACT The decision to have a formal written contract with 
(Formal contract) 
suppliers and customers. 
Explanatory Description 
EMPAS: The extent to which skills, knowledge or experience of 
(Employment specificity) employees are specific to a firm. 
FACAS: The extent to which facilities and equipment used in 
(Facility specificity) production is specific to a firm. 
DEDAS: The extent to which facilities and equipment used in 
(Dedicated assets) production is specific to a customer. 
LOCATION: The distance of the main factory site located from the 
(Location specificity) most important customer 
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SUPDEL: The likelihood of unexpected changes in supply for 
(Uncertainty in supply) firms components. 
DEMDEL: The likelihood of unexpected changes in demand for 
(Uncertainty in demand) firms products. 
ONEOFF: The extent to which the main company business is one- 
(Frequency) off or repeat business. 
CUSNUM The number of UK customers in the main markets. 
(Customer small numbers) 
SUPNUM The number of UK suppliers in the main markets. 
(Supplier small number) 
Dummy Description 
MC Dummy variable for the type of company market, 
(Military-civil dummy) where I= military and 0= civilian. 
AO Dummy variable for the type of company output, where 
(Aerospace dummy) I= aerospace and 0= non-aerospace. 
Sz Dummy variable for the size of company, where 1 
(Size dummy) large firm and 0= SME. 
The predictions of the main variables are contained in Table 8.1. These predictions 
show that if asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency arc high then the model will 
predict a make strategy and a buy strategy if these variables are low. The dummy 
variables in Table 8.4 are an aid to understanding the characteristics of the aerospace 
industry given the nature of H2, H3 and H4. The predicted signs of the dummy 
variables will be positive if military firms, aerospace suppliers or large firms have 
greater transaction costs than civilian firms, non-aerospace suppliers or small and 
medium-sized suppliers, respectively. 
Although this is mainly a cross sectional database, it does contain some changes over 
time as in Table 8.5 below. Table 8.5 tabulates the response to the question on 
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whether the transaction cost dimension, such as asset specificity has increased, 
decreased or stayed the same over the previous five years. The column headed Likcrt 
scale is the mean score from the survey and shows that EMPAS and ONEOFF have 
the highest transaction cost factors. Also, DEDAS has increased by 44%, which 
indicates that firms have become increasingly more concerned with specific assets. 
SUPNUM has the lowest Likert scale and the lowest percentage increase of the 
explanatory variables, which suggests that the number of suppliers is relatively 
constant although this is not a main transaction cost issue in any case. 
Table 8.5: Descrintivextatiptieq of the evnianatorv variables 
Variable Likert scale Increased (%) Decreased Constant 
EMPAS 7.41 28 11 61 
FACAS 6.51 28 4 68 
DEDAS 6.20 44 1 55 
DEMDEL 6.21 35 4 61 
SUPDEL 4.89 30 6 64 
ONEOFF 7.00 29 6 65 
CUSNUM 5.09 26 22 52 
JSUPNUM 
4.91 16 36 48 
In general, the responses in Table 8.5 imply approximately a third of firms in the 
survey consider the ranking of the transaction dimension to have increased over a 
five-year period. Approximately two thirds consider the ranking to be constant, with 
only a few percentage points showing a decrease in the ranking. For the majority of 
firms the dimensions to the transaction have remained relatively static. However, for 
a Significant minority the ranking has increased pointing to greater potential for the 
incidence of transaction costs in the industry. An implication of this result is that the 
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parameters of transaction cost economics are possibly becoming more relevant to 
finns in the UKAI. 
Dependent variables 
There are two dependent variables used in the analysis, namely make-or-buy and 
formal contracts (the latter is discussed in Chapter Nine). At this stage, it is worth 
noting that the matrix of the various models to be tested is shown in Table 8.6 below: 
Table 8.6: Matriy nf Rpori-prinn nnd T, nfyit mndp. l. q 
Explanatory variables and Dependent variable: Dependent variable: 
model specification bought-out Make-or-buy 
Explanatory variables: model I AS, U, F AS, U, F 
Model dimension only 
Explanatory variables: model 2 AS, U, F, SN AS, U, F, SN 
Model dimension + SN 
Explanatory variables: model 3 AS, U, F, SN, MILCIV, AS, U, F, SN, MILCIV, 
Model dimension + SN + dummy AERO, SIZE AERO, SIZE 
The sequential ordering of the models with or without variables is a useful approach 
to show the progress of the model-building and the success or otherwise of the model 
fitting empirical data (Field, 2000: 165). The next section assesses the dependent 
variable bought-out in more detail. 
Dependent variable: bought-out (13097) 
The classic regression method transforms the basic relationship in equation 8.1 and 
8.2 then creates the linear correlation in equation 8.3. For the purposes of this work, 
the dependent variable used is the latest available, since this is the same time period 
for the limited dependent variable make-or-buy. This allows a better comparison to 
be drawn between the two models, since both models are cross-sectional by 
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definitioný. Assessment of the data for 1992 is deemed not possible for this series of 
models since there are no data for dependent variables for 1992. The number of 
observation in this model is 68, which are approximately 35% of the SBAC 
population of aerospace firms. The next section presents the results of the original 
dataset generated from the survey. The results are divided into two main sections, one 
where the results are ftom the classical regression with bought-out as the dependent 
variable and the other where the results are from a logit regression with make-or-buy 
as the dependent variable. 
(i) Regression Model 1 results 
The dependent variable in this model is the percentage of components bought-out in 
1997 (B097), since the date of the study is 1997-98, with the explanatory variables 
asset specificity (AS), uncertainty (U) and frequency (F). This model contains only 
the transaction cost dimensions as explanatory variables. The regression results are 
detailed in Table 8.7. 
Table 8.7: Mndpl I Cneffiripnt. r. fnr dp. npndent variable B097 
_Explanatory variable 
Beta T statistic 
_ 
Significance 
Constant N/A 4.328 0.000 
EMPAS (-)0.115 (-)0.884 0.380 
FACAS -0.341 (-)2.527 0.014 
DEDAS 0.036 0.270 0.788 
LOCATION 0.049 0.392 0.696 
DEMDEL (-)0.199 (-)1.473 0.146 
SUPDEL 0.268 1.894 0.063 
ONEOFF 0.0261 0.2101 0.835 1 
N/A = not available; where the R2=0.183. 
2A possible improvement to the model would be to use a pooled cross-sectional data set, which is only 
possible in this study with bought-out (B092 and B097) as the dependent variable. However, the 
survey does not have the values for the explanatory variables in 1992. 
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The main result is the R', which is 0.183 and indicates that 18.3% of the variance in 
the dependent variable is due to the explanatory variables. This result is relatively 
low in comparison with previous transaction cost studies in the literature and therefore 
there is no significant support for the transaction cost approach. Other variables could 
be included to augment the quality of the results and this approach is attempted in 
both models 2 and 3, which expands the list of explanatory variables and add dummy 
variables, respectively. Also, the EMPAS, FACAS and DEMDEL variables all have 
negative signs. Whilst this is expected for a bought-out, the variables are not relevant 
when a co-efficient is not significant. Therefore, only FACAS is a significant variable 
with the correct sign. The only other significant variable with the correct sign is 
SUPDEL, which is part of the uncertainty dimension. In fact, SUPDEL is close to 
being significant with a t-statistic equal to 1.89, but is insignificant with a 6.3% 
probability of a Type I error. There is no need to conduct a one tail test on the 
significant variables because these have an incorrect sign, but if a co-efficient is 
significant then the sign has to be assessed. 
The analysis of variance in Table 8.8 confirms the R2 result from regression. Using 
the F-distribution for 95% confidence intervals with 7 degrees of freedom for the 
numerator and 60 degrees of freedom for the denominator the critical value is 2.09. 
Therefore, with the F-test result of 1.95 the model is found to be not significant at 
95%. The significance level of 0.083 means there is an 8.3% chance of a Type I error 
occurring, which means the regression result would be accepted at only a 90% level. 
In general, the results are unsatisfactory, which provides insufficient support for 
transaction costs in the UK aerospace industry. Further investigations are required in 
to the null hypothesis, as these results are from only a limited model. 
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Table 8.8: Analvsis of variance (ANOVA) for model I 
Model 1 Degrees of freedom F Significance 
Regression 7 1.95 0.083 
Residual 60 
Total 67 
Model 1 suggests there is insufficient evidence in favour of the transaction cost 
approach. The R' is relatively low at 0.183, which is significant at between 5% and 
10%, that is, the confidence level lies between 90% and 95% and could indicate that a 
transaction cost explanation is at best not proven and at worst it is not relevant. There 
is concem about the size and overall worth of some of the asset specificity variables 
and the sign of EMPAS and FACAS, but there is evidence that uncertainty is 
important, especially uncertainty with suppliers (SUPDEL). Finally, the frequency 
variable ONEOFF is highly insignificant. Clearly there is a need for further work on 
the modelling, which will be attempted next in model 2. In particular, more 
explanatory variables should be added to see if the explanatory power of the model 
can be improved. 
(ii) Regression Model 2 results 
The main result in model 2 is the R', which has slightly improved from model 1 to 
0.203 and indicates that 20.3% of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted 
by the explanatory variables. 3 This result remains rather low with 80% unexplained 
and therefore other variables should be included to augment the results. This is 
attempted using the dummy variables in model 3, which are specific to the UK 
aerospace industry. 
The supplier small number shows the predicted negative sign and the customer small 
number is positive, which is expected, but in this regression is not significant and 
3 This will happen defacto as variables are added; therefore there is a need to look at the adjusted R2 
which is shown in Table 8.13. 
198 
hence the sign is unimportant. In other words, the transaction cost approach predicts a 
firm will make with supplier small numbers, which is explained by the hold-up 
problem and monopsony. However, this may not be the case where a firm has a small 
number of customers, since the hold-up and the monopsony can be exploited by the 
firm itself. 
Table R-9- Mndt-I 7. (nt-ffieipntc fnr dt-m-ndp. nt variable B097 
Explanatory variable Beta T statistic Significance 
Constant N/A 3.429 0.001 
EMPAS (-)0.118 (-)0.898 0.373 
FACAS (-)0.330 (-)2.430 
_0.018 
DEDAS 0.053 0.3827 0.700 
LOCATION 0.092 0.708 0.482 
DEMDEL (-)0.161 (-)1.145 0.257 
SUPDEL 0.263 1.852 0.069 
ONEOFF (-)0.005 0.041 0.968 
SUPNUM (-)0.005 (-)0.040 0.968 
CUSNUM 0.155 1.216 0.229 
Where the R2=0.203. 
The problem of hostage taking is a problem in factor markets for firms, but in goods 
markets it can be turned into monopoly power. These results in model 2 are an 
improvement from the previous model 1, but there is concern as almost all variables 
are not significant and offer very little support for the transaction cost model. 
Therefore, more proof is needed on the relevance of the transaction cost model when 
applied to the LJK aerospace industry. The analysis of variance in Table 8.10 
confirms the relatively weak result from regression R 2. Using the F-distribution for 
95% confidence intervals with 9 degrees of freedom for the numerator and 58 degrees 
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of frccdom for the dcnominator the critical valuc is 2.02. Thcrdorc, with the F-test 
result of 1.65 model 2 is also not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the 
significance level of 0.124 means there is a 12.4% chance of a Type I error occurring, 
which means the regression result would be not be accepted even at a 90% level, 
which prompts the decision to seek ways to further improve the model. 
Table 8.10: Analvsis of variance (ANOVA) for model 2 
Model 2 Degrees of freedom F Significance 
Regression 9 1.65 0.124 
Residual 58 
Total 67 
Model 2 shows there remains only relatively weak evidence for the transaction cost 
approach. The R2 remains relatively low at 0.203, which is not even significant at 
the 90% level. The concern about the significance and sign of the asset specificity 
variables remain and the small numbers variables introduced in this model are not 
significant either. The relatively low R' could point towards the transaction cost 
approach being considered insignificant to the UK aerospace industry or at best not 
proven as significant. If the transaction cost approach were ultimately insignificant 
then this would lead to concluding the possibility of other approaches as more 
appropriate. Hence, the next stage is to conduct even more work on the modelling, 
which is attempted in model 3. Overall, the lack of significant coefficients at this 
stage is in itself an interesting result as it points to little or no support for the 
transaction cost hypotheses as specified in Hl. 
(iii) Regression Model 3 results 
Model 3 introduces the dummy variables of MILCIV, AERO and SIZE. In this 
model, the main R' result has significantly improved once again from model 2 to 
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0.320, showing that 32.0% of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted by 
the explanatory variables. This still remains low, but it does show the dummy 
variables in general have augmented the quality of the results, in this case especially 
the explanatory variable AO. 
Table 8.11: Mnde. ] I rneffirienk. far denendent variable B097 
Explanatoryvariable Beta T statistic Significance 
Constant N/A 2.989 0.004 
EMPAS (-)0.124 (-)0.977 0.333 
FACAS (-)0.308 (-)2.3230 0.024 
DEDAS (-)0.008 (-)0.057 0.955 
LOCATION 0.095 0.751 0.456 
DEMDEL (-)0.228 (-)1.678 0.099 
SUPDEL 0.239 1.754 0.085 
ONEOFF (-)0.068 (-)0.508 0.613 
SUPNUM (-)0.043 (-)0.370 0.713 
CUSNUM 0.201 1.570 0.122 
mc 0.34 0.252 0.802 
AO 0.370 2.974 0.004 
sz (-)0.0101 (-)0.079 
Where the R2=0.320. 
In particular, there is only the dummy variable for the aerospace specific firms that is 
both the predicted positive sign and significant. This is clear evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis in H3; that is, aerospace firms are more likely to make than 
general engineering firms in the aerospace supply chain. However, there is support 
for the null hypothesis in H2 and H4 for the military-civil split and company size, 
respectively. These areas operate similar to perfect competition, with little or no 
effect of transaction costs. Overall, there is a need to consider the possibility of 
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further empirical testing of the model, which can take a number of forms. Firstly, use 
another dependent variable, such as contract type, considered in Chapter Nine. 
Secondly, check the measurement of the variables or finally even reject the model and 
seek an alternative approach. This will be considered in Chapter Ten. Also, as a 
check for multi-collinearity model 3 is compared without the dummy variables (such 
as AO) with model 2 and there is little difference in the significance or the sign of the 
explanatory variables. 
The analysis of variance in Table 8.12 confirms the improved R2 result for model 3. 
Using the F-distribution for 95% confidence intervals with 12 degrees of freedom for 
the numerator and 55 degrees of freedom for the denominator the critical value is 
1.95. Therefore, with the F-test result of 2.15 the model is significant at the 95% level. 
In addition, the significance level of 0.028 means there is only a 2.8% chance of a 
Type I error occurring, which means the regression result would be accepted at a 95% 
lcvcl, but not at a 99% confidcncc lcvel. 
Table 9.12! Annlv,. gi-. of varinnep (ANOVA) for model 3 
Model 3 Degrees of freedom F Significance 
Regression 12 2.15 0.028 
Residual 55 
Total 67 
Model 3 shows there is comparatively limited evidence for the transaction cost 
approach. The R2 result has considerably improved to 0.320, which is significant at 
between 95% and 99% level. However, this result is not a resounding confinnation of 
the null hypothesis, but nevertheless it provides some evidence in support of the 
transaction cost approach in the UK aerospace industry. The concern about the 
significance of the asset specificity variables remain, with only the FACAS and 
SUPDEL variables in model 3, which is close to significant and the predicted sign. 
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In summary, the results in the three models show a considerable improvement as the 
other variables are added from model I to model 3. The results for the three models 
are summarised in Table 8.13. To reiterate, the model in regression 3 is specified the 
best with a significant R' result of 0.320 and an F-test which accepts the null 
hypothesis at between a 95% and a 99% level. The R, R' and significance have all 
been reported and the adjusted R square takes into account the issue of increasing 
predicted power that can occur simply by adding variables. The results for the 
adjusted R2 are slightly lower than the result for the R2. 
Table 8-1-3! Rummnrv nf the represqion model results 
Model R R square Significance Adjusted R 
sq are 
Regression 1 0.427 0.183 >90% <95% 0.178 
Regression 2 0.451 0.203 <90% 0.197 
Regression 3 0.565 0.320 >95% <99% 0.310 
Overall, using the classic regression methodology, there is very limited evidence in 
support of the transaction costs approach and there are doubts about whether the 
dependent variable is suitable for OLS. Notwithstanding, there is support for model 
2, as specified in HI, with the R' result at 0.203, albeit at a significance level below 
90%. There is only very little evidence in support of H2 that there is a difference 
between civil and military firms in the aerospace supply chain. Indeed, the dummy 
variable MC is insignificant with an 80.2% probability of a Type I error. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis is rejected that there is indeed no transaction cost difference 
between military and civilian firms in the UK aerospace supply chain. There is also 
no evidence in support of H4 that there is a difference between large and small firms 
in the aerospace supply chain. Indeed, the dummy variable SIZE is highly 
insignificant with a 93.7% probability of a Type I error and it is the wrong predicted 
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sign. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis 
that there is no transaction cost difference between large and small firms in the UK 
aerospace supply chain. However, there is evidence in support of H3 that there is a 
difference between aerospace and general engineering firms in the aerospace supply 
chain. Indeed, the dummy variable AERO is certainly significant with only a 4% 
probability of a Type I error. Therefore, there is little evidence that the null 
hypothesis is acceptable and that there is a transaction cost difference between 
aerospace and general engineering firms in the UK aerospace supply chain. Hence, it 
is not possible to state that aerospace firms in the supply chain are more likely to be 
vertically integrated than other general engineering firms in the sample and this result 
is only partially explained by transaction costs at best. 
Overall, the results show little support for the transaction cost model outlined in this 
thesis. The aerospace supplier is significant but the military-civilian split and size arc 
not significant. The next section presents the MAKE variable as the dependent and 
uses a logit regression methodology. 
Dependent variable: Make 
The logit modelling method transforms the basic relationship in equation 8.1 and 
presents the linear correlation in equation 8.5. The dependent variable is known as 
the log odds ratio and a maximum likelihood estimation is used as the method of 
analysis (Green 2000: 860). 
In prob(make) =a+ fl, X. + P, Xý... X, +, u Eq. 8.5 
[I 
- prob(make)] 
The dependent variable is specified as natural logs and transformed into a log ratio for 
the make outcome. In this case the dependent variable is NLA. KE. The mirror image 
of this variable is BUY. The logistic specification was selected, because the 
dependent variable is binomial, which makes the classical regression model 
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inappropriate (Greene, 2000: 216). This is because the dependent variable is 
effectively a dummy variable, where the estimated probabilities are neither negative 
nor greater than one, which is generally required in classical regression analysis 
(Gujarati, 1992: 144). In the presence of a limited or restricted dependent variable, 
then a logit or probit model is appropriate to account for the dichotomous nature of 
the dependent variable. In sum, this type of model allows for the probability to 
decline as it approaches the limits of either 0 or 1. There are no guidelines or 
evidence to suggest whether the logit or probit approach is the most effective and in 
this study the logit approach will be employed, because it usually accepted as 
relatively more straightforward than probit (Pampel, 2000: 5). Although the probit 
regression has not been used in the research, it is acceptable in the literature to use 
only one method and in the transaction cost literature this tends to be logit (Gujarati, 
1992: 423). 
(i) Logit Model 1 results 
The logit model, given in equation 8.5, has been estimated with the log odds ratio of 
MAKE as the dependent variable. This is an appropriate method where the dependent 
variable is non-linear, because the logit regression coverts the truncated or 'ceiling 
and floor' distribution of the variable into a linear distribution sigmoid shape by 
transforming the probabilities into logits (Pampel, 2000: 8). Hence, a logistic 
regression will in effect linearise the non-linear distribution of the dichotomous or 
limited dependent variable. The explanatory variables of asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency are split into the relevant component parts, as before with OLS. The 
results from the logit regression for model I are given in Table 8.14, which reports 
beta, standard error (SE), Wald and significance results. 
The beta value gives the size of the estimates in the logit equation. In these results, 
the constant, FACAS and SUPDEL show the largest predicted values. Indeed, both 
the constant and SUPDEL have a negative sign. This is contrary to the transaction 
cost prediction for uncertainty in Table 8.1, although it is far less important for the 
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constant. All other variables have a sign as expected a priori, but none are 
significant, which makes it impossible to comment further. The standard error of the 
regression is defined in terms of the standard error of the deviation of the estimated 
regression line. It is a summary measure of the goodness of fit (Greene, 2000: 101). 
The Wald statistic is equivalent to the t statistic within maximum likelihood 
estimation. In these results, only FACAS and SUPDEL are greater than 2 and can 
therefore be considered as important. This is a pattern that is repeated elsewhere in 
the results. 
Table 8.14: Logit results for the eyninnatorv variables for model 1 
Variable Beta SE Wald Significance 
Constant (-)1.62 1.38 1.38 0.24 
EMPAS 0.07 0.16 0.21 0.65 
FACAS 0.17 0.10 2.65 0.10 
DEDAS 0.09 0.10 0.78 0.37 
DEMDEL 0.09 0.12 0.53 0.47 
SUPDEL (-)0.32 0.14 5.22 0.022 
ONEOFF 0.10 0.11 0.84 0.36 
All values are at I% significance. 
The significance data for the logit regression shows the probability of making a Type 
I error, defined as the error of rejecting a correct hypothesis (Gujarati, 1992: 92). The 
variables FACAS and SUPDEL produce the most important results, because there is 
only a 10% and 2.2% probability of a Type I error, respectively. All the other 
variables have a high or very high probability of rejecting a correct hypothesis and arc 
also not significant. 
The Cox and Snell h2 is relatively low at 0.137 as is the Nagelkerke h2 at 0.187, 
where these type of regression results can be seen as proxy for the R'result. This 
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leads to the conclusion that the representation of the transaction cost model given here 
is not a satisfactory explanation of vertical integration in the UK aerospace industry. 
On this basis, there is a need to revisit the model and highlight any shortcomings, 
which may account for the weaknesses in the estimation. 
Another method to decide if the model is a good estimation or not is to assess the 
overall percentage of cases which are predicted as correct. The logit regression 
results in this case show the BUY variable in the model correctly predicted 38.7% of 
cases and for MAKE it predicted 86.3% of cases. The overall percentage correct was 
68.3%. In order to gain a benchmark for this figure, it is possible to compare against 
the simple arithmetic mean of make, which is 62.2%. Thus, without the model we 
would have predicted 62.2% simply by predicting all cases to be the make option. 
Hence, with the model there is a slight overall improvement to 68.3% as stated above, 
which is better than no increase at all. This implies whilst there is room to improve 
the specification of the model, nevertheless there is some predictive power in the 
model, since it improves overall by 6.1 percentage points, but that this is a small 
amount. Even so, there is evidence to suggest that FACAS and SUPDEL are 
important variables in determining make-or-buy and significant at the 90% level. 
This gives possible weight to the value of asset specificity in particular and 
transaction costs in general. The additional detail in the model specification will be 
attempted in model 2 where this model has another explanatory variable. However, at 
this stage transaction cost analysis in model I has failed to explain as predicted by the 
theory. 
(H) Logit Model 2 results 
The explanatory variables of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency are used in 
model two as well as the small numbers variable as a fourth explanatory variable. 
The dependent variable remains MAKE as with model 1. The results from the logit 
regression in model 2 are given in Table 8.15 and discussion of the results follows. 
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Table 8.15: Lotit results for the exDlanatorv variables for model 2 
Variable B SE Wald Significance 
Constant (-)1.62 1.38 1.38 0.24 
EMPAS 0.07 0.16 0.21 0.65 
FACAS 0.17 0.10 2.65 0.10 
DEDAS 0.09 0.10 0.78 0.37 
DEMDEL 0.09 0.12 0.53 0.47 
SUPDEL (-)0.32 0.14 5.22 0.022 
ONEOFF 0.10 0.11 0.84 0.36 
SUPNUM 0.05 0.09 0.23 0.63 
CUSNUM 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.88 
Values are at 1% significance. 
The beta value in the results indicates that the constant, FACAS and SUPDEL have 
the largest predicted values. Indeed, both the constant and SUPDEL have a negative 
sign, as previously in model 1. To confirm, this is contrary to the TCE prediction for 
uncertainty in Table 8.1, albeit not significant and less important for the constant in 
any case. All the other variables have a sign as expected a priori, except the variable 
SUPDEL again. 
Only FACAS and SUPDEL are greater than 2 and can therefore be considered as 
significant. This is a pattern, which was initially identified in model 1. The 
significance data for the logit regression shows the probability of making a Type I 
error, defined as the error of rejecting a correct hypothesis (Gujarati, 1992: 92). Once 
again, the variables FACAS and SUPDEL produce the most significant results, 
because there is only a 10% and 2.2 % probability of a Type I error, respectively. The 
variables included for small numbers have a high or very high probability of rejecting 
a correct hypothesis and are therefore considered significant. 
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h2^2 The Cox and Snell remains low at 0.140 as is the Nagelkerke R at 0.191, where 
as in model I these type of regression results can be seen as proxy for the R2 result. 
This would reinforce the conclusion that the representation of the transaction cost 
model given provides only a limited explanation of vertical integration in the UK 
aerospace industry. There is a need to revisit the model and highlight any 
shortcomings, which may account for the weaknesses in the estimation. 
The overall percentage of cases it has predicted as correct has not improved much 
from model 1. The overall percentage correct is at 70.7% against the benchmark 
figure; it is possible to compare against the simple arithmetic mean of make, which is 
62.2%. Thus, without the model it is possible to have predicted 62.2% simply by 
predicting all cases to be make. With the model there is a slight overall improvement 
to 70.7% as stated above. This implies whilst there is room to improve the 
specification of the model, nevertheless there is potential in the model, since it 
improves prediction by 8.5 percentage points. Therefore, model 2 is an improvement 
on model I and the explanatory power of the small number variable is significant. 
The next model will introduce the dummy variables into the logit analysis. 
(iii) Logit Model 3 results 
The results from the logit regression for model 3 are given in Table 8.16, where the 
four transactions cost variables are included, plus the three dummy variables. The 
significant data for the logit regression shows the probability of making a Type I 
error, defined as the error of rejecting a correct hypothesis (Gujarati, 1992: 92). 
Once again, the variable SUPDEL produced the most important results, because there 
is now only a 2.0% probability of a Type I error, but FACAS now has a 23.3% 
probability of a Type I error. From the remaining variables, only MILCIV is 
significant at 4.9% and has a negative sign, which is a reversal of the transaction cost 
prediction. The result could imply that the variable or the relationship is incorrectly 
specified in the model. . 
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^2h2 is The Cox and Snell R has improved to 0.203 as is the Nagelkerke 0.277, where 
these types of regression results can be seen as proxy for the R' result. Once again, 
this leads to the conclusion that the representation of the transaction cost model is at 
best only a partial explanation of vertical integration in the UK aerospace industry. 
Table 8.16: Loeit results for the explanatory variables in model 3 
Variable B SE Wald Signiflcance 
Constant (-)0.79 1.61 0.25 0.62 
EMPAS 0.13 0.16 0.67 0.41 
FACAS 0.12 0.10 1.42 0.23 
DEDAS 0.06 0.11 0.28 0.59 
DEMDEL 0.12 0.12 0.91 0.33 
SUPDEL (-)0.35 0.14 5.40 0.020 
ONEOFF 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.67 
SUPNUM 0.06 0.10 0.29 0.59 
CUSNUM (-)0.01 0.10 0.00 0.96 
MILCIV (-)1.32 0.67 3.8 0.05 
AERONON (-)0.57 0.76 0.55 0.46 
SIZE 0.72 0.60 1.43 0.23 
Values are at 1% significance. 
The overall percentage of correctly predicted results has improved to 72.0%. This is 
set against the benchmark for this figure of 62.2%. This implies whilst there is still 
room for improvement in the specification of the model, nevertheless there is potential 
in the model, since it improves prediction about 10 percentage points. 
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Summary of the Logit regressions 
A summary of the logistic regressions for the three models is show in Table 8.17. 
This Table shows the full extent of the results from the logit modelling process and 
helps to compare the various models in terms of significance the 'k 
2 and the predictive 
power of the results. 
Table 8.17. - Summarv of the lopistic repression model results 
Model Nagelkerke 
R square 
Percentage 
predicted 
Significance Chi - square 
Logit 1 0.177 68.29 >90% <95% 12.1 
Logit 2 0.183 70.73 <90% 12.4 
Lo it 3 0.277 71.95 >90% <95% 18.6 
The results of the models have improved to the point where in logistic regression 3 
there is a more acceptable Nagelkerke 1? 2 of 0.277, or 27.7% of the variance in the 
dependent variable accounted by the explanatory variables, even though over 70% is 
unexplained. This result is also significant at a level between 90% and 95%. 
Importantly the predicted power of the model is 10 percentage points higher than the 
benchmark, which makes this a potentially worthwhile exercise. The result creates 
other problems for the research. Whilst the results do not fully support the transaction 
cost approach it is not possible to reject it either. In any situation of risk such as an 
investment or even gambling to increase the odds of being successful by 10 
percentage points would be seen as an achievement. For example, using a Mote Carlo 
method of betting odds a method that improves the odds by ten percentage points 
would be seen as very successful indeed (Vaughan-Williams, 2003: 10). However, in 
this context it is not sufficient to conclusively prove the transaction cost analysis is 
correct, not least as the transaction cost approach is time-intensive. The outcome is 
that transaction cost explanation is not proven by the results. 
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Conclusions 
This Chapter has used a transaction cost approach to assess the organisational. form of 
firms in the UK aerospace industry. Both OLS regressions and Logit regressions 
were used to test four main hypotheses generated from the transaction cost literature. 
This approach is necessary because there are two dependent variables with Bought- 
Out as the dependent (continuous) variable for OLS regressions and MAKE as the 
dependent (dichotomous) variable for Logit regressions. However, all the four 
hypotheses presented in this Chapter are rejected, because in every case there is 
insufficient evidence in the results to accept the null hypothesis. 
For the OLS regressions, Model 3 provided the best results with the R' result of 
0.320, with significance between the 95% and 99% levels. Whilst the R' result is 
comparatively low it does present partial evidence for the transaction cost approach, 
albeit far from overwhelming. However, this result also begins to cast doubt over the 
relevance of the transaction cost approach and is compounded by the results using 
Logit. For the Logit regressions, Model 3 again provides the best results with a 
Nagelkerke h2 of 0.277 with significance between the 90% and 95% levels. Whilst 
the predicted feature of the regression is improved by almost ten percentage points, 
the Nagelkerke h2 is once more rather low. This may be due to incorrect 
measurement of the transaction cost variables, in spite of the pilot testing. 
The main issue from this Chapter is that a transaction cost approach has realised 
insignificant results from the data. At best, the results are inconclusive although the 
models do have some predictive power, especially with the dichotomous make-or-buy 
dependent variable. The results show there is only partial evidence of transaction cost 
in the industry and that there is a possible need to find other ways to measure the 
variables; or even consider an alternative methodological view of the data such as 
monopoly power. 
In summary, the results may lead to rejecting the transaction cost approach as an 
explanation of the UK aerospace industry. However, there needs to be caution as the 
results in this thesis may be due to incorrect measurement of the data used in the 
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model or other factors, unknown to the research. In other words, given the evidence 
of some albeit limited explanatory power in the model, it would be advisable to state 
that the transaction cost approach is not proven as an explanation of the results. The 
ten percentage point improvement in the Logit 3 model is significant and would be 
seen as welcome in the economics of gambling. A cost-benefit analysis of the time to 
collect and analyse the transaction costs of the UK aerospace industry could also 
prove that obtaining a ten percentage point improvement in the predictions is 
worthwhile. However, given the lack of decisive results in this Chapter, the main 
conclusion is that the transaction cost approach has failed to explain the make-or-buy 
decision as applied in this thesis. The next Chapter will use similar analysis with the 
contract type as dependent variable to assess contract design. 
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Chapter Nine: 
Econometric analysis of UK aerospace 11: contracts 
Introduction 
This Chapter presents an econometric analysis of contract design in the UK aerospace 
industry. The explanatory variables and dummy variables used in Chapter Eight are 
utilised, but with contract type as the dependent variable. Whilst the previous Chapter 
used the survey to analyse the make-or-buy decision, this Chapter uses the survey to 
assess contracts. The aim is to understand the impact of contracts using the hostage 
model (Williamson, 1983: 522). There are no data available for the dependent 
variable as a continuous variable and as a result contract type is used as a limited 
dependent variable. This Chapter addresses the following research question. What 
potential hold-up problem exists between aerospace firms in the supply chain from the 
perspective of contract design? The plan of the Chapter is to assess contract design 
using the hostage model approach. This includes an econometric analysis of contracts 
using a logit regression. There is analysis of the results and a comparison between the 
results and those from the previous Chapter. The next section presents the hostage 
model. 
The Hostage Model 
The hostage model was first developed by Williamson (1983: 522-523) as an attempt 
to specify different types of commitments and threats between economic agents in any 
situation of contractual exchange. In many respects it is simply an extension of the 
transaction cost model and certainly is not a radical departure from the existing 
aspects of markets and hierarchies in vertical integration (Williamson, 1975: 8). The 
work on hostage-taking gives greater emphasis to opportunism and the need to protect 
against opportunistic behaviour in the design and implementation of contracts. The 
possibility for opportunism arises from asset specificity. That is, the hostage model 
closely links commitments and threats to the hold-up problem. According to 
Williamson (1983: 519): 
"Credible commitments and credible threats share the following attribute: both 
appear mainly in conjunction with irreversibleý specialised investments! 
Williamson (1983: 519). 
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Commitments are defined as "reciprocal acts designed to safeguard a relationship" 
often through contracts; whereas threats are defines as "unilateral efforts to pre-empt 
an advantage7 known as opportunism (Williamson, 1983: 519). The hostage model is 
seen as a way to combine the economic analysis of the transaction such as asset 
specificity and the legal aspect of the contract. A contract is defined as a legal 
agreement, written or otherwise, that can be enforced and recognised in law (Lyons, 
1996: 27). Lyons (1996: 27) asserts that: 
"Economists have adopted a broader definition [of contract] to include 
agreements enforced by non-legal means ... [w]henever anyone buys or sells 
something, there is a contractual relation established. This may range from a 
lengthy negotiated document to an implicit agreement... " 
Lyons(1996: 27). 
Credible threats are when a firm, which fears the possibility of opportunism resulting 
from asset specificity is exposed to economic risks inherent in market transactions. 
Any firm which is buying from the market will attempt to enter a formal written 
contract with its suppliers as a safeguard against the threat of opportunism. Credible 
commitments are when a firm, which welcomes the legal safeguard against 
opportunism is covered against the economic risk inherent in the market transactions 
by entering a contract with its customers. Any firm which is selling to the market will 
attempt to enter a formal written contract with its customers as a way to develop 
relationships where there are gains from long term agreements that may involve asset 
specificity. This has been promoted in UKAT through the Supply Chain Relationships 
in Aerospace (SCRIA which was introduced in Chapter Five). There is supporting 
evidence in Chapter Seven that over 50% of aerospace firms in the survey write 
formal contracts with suppliers (see Table 7.11) and 70% of aerospace write formal 
contracts with customers (see Table 7.13). 
Williamson refers to credible threats as supplier opportunism and credible 
commitments as protective governance structures (Williamson, 1983: 526-527). The 
hostage model is identified as follows: 
"The simple hostage model serves to illuminate both unilateral and bilateral 
exchange, permits the concept of specific capital .... and clarifies how costs should be described in assessing exchange. " 
Williamson (1983: 522). 
In other words, contract schemes can replicate "the efficient investment and supply 
conditions of vertical integratioe (Williamson, 1983: 525). Vertical integration has 
been considered in this thesis within the comparative economic analysis of the make- 
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or-buy issue, but it can also be viewed as legal principles of contract design. 
Williamson also states: 
"the study of contract is appropriately extended from legal rules to include an 
assessment of alternative governance structures... " 
Williamson (1983: 537). 
and furthermore the hostage model: 
"... re-affirms the basic proposition that governance structures need to be 
matched to the underlying attributes of transactions in a discriminating 
way if the efficiency purposes of economic organisations are to be realised. " 
Williamson (1983: 537). 
The aim of this Chapter is to re-produce the original Williamson model, whilst 
including the improvements from the existing body of empirical work. Also, there are 
further improvements made to the model, which incorporate the features of the 
aerospace industry, for example, the split between civil and military production. 
Applying the hostage model 
This section applies the data from the UK aerospace survey to the hostage model. 
The hostage model has a log odds ratio where contract is the dependent variable 
(Williamson, 1983: 524). The measure for the dependent variable is similar to 
dichotomous make-or-buy variable and would generate an outcome of either I or 0 for 
any individual firm, where I= contract and 0= no contract (Lyons, 1996: 30). A 
figure of between I and 0 would be generated by the mean value. In other words, by 
using a dummy variable as the dependent variable the aim is to capture the contract 
design and related decisions of the firm. The dependent variable is the log odds ratio 
of whether or not the firm has a formal contract with either the supplier or the 
customer. The full form of the equation is shown in equation 9.1 below: 
prob(contract) In[, 
- proh(contraci)_ 
= a+, gX, +j6, X2 ... . ... j6. X. +p 
Eq. 9.1 
The logit regression for contracts will transform the basic relationship in equation 9.1 
and present the linear correlation. The approach in equation 9.1 is slightly altered in 
order to take account of the revised dependent variable. This is because the analysis 
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AM 
is focusing on contract type rather than the make-or-buy decision. Hence this will be 
a test of equation 9.2: 
17i, =pxi+pi 
Eq. 9.2 
Where: 
iri = the differences between contractual arrangement for firm i. 
j6 =a vector of co-efficients 
Xi =a vector of exogenous independent variables, which represent asset specificity, 
uncertainty/complexity and frequency, derived from survey data 
Pi = an error term 
In equation 9.2, the explanatory variables will be the same as the logit model for 
make, as shown in Equation 8.3, which means comparisons between the two models 
are relatively straightforward. These comparisons are presented later in the Chapter, 
which summaries the results. The dependent variable is the differences between the 
contractual arrangements for any given firm. That is, whether or not the firm has a 
formal written contract with suppliers or with customers. When there is a 
dichotomous dependent variable not all the assumptions of linear regression are valid 
such as linearity, unconstrained and continuous variables. Equation 9.2 transformed 
the data using logs so that the "form of the relationship is linear whilst leaving the 
relationship itself as non-linear" (Field, 2000: 165). 
Central Hypotheses 
There are two main hypotheses relating to the hostage model. The first cluster of 
hypotheses is based on UK aerospace firms that are purchasing from the market will 
want to enter into a formal written contract with suppliers in order to reduce or avoid 
ex post opportunism given that there is asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency and 
small numbers exchange. That is, the customer will offer written agreements to the 
supplier (or market firm) in return for lessening the effects of ex post opportunism as 
shown in the contracts section of Chapter Seven. 
HI(i) (contract with supplier): UK aerospace firms are likely to enter formal written 
contracts with suppliers due to higher levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, 
complexity, ftequency and small numbers. 
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The second cluster of hypotheses is based on the view UK aerospace firms who are 
suppliers will want to enter into a formal written contract with customers in order to 
gain long term relational agreements. That is, the supplier will trade the potential 
advantage of the threat of expost opportunism for long term agreements by entering a 
formal written contract with the customer. 
HI(H) (contract wit customer): UK aerospace firms are likely to enterformal written 
contracts with customers due to higher levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, 
complexity. ftequency and small numbers. 
In both cases the supplier has gained by securing a relationship agreement with the 
customer, and the customer has gained by reducing the threat of expost opportunism 
by the supplier. It is assumed that the requirement for relational contracts is only 
apparent in the presence of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity frequency and 
small numbers exchange. This assumption is possible because in the absence of such 
dimension in the transaction then all firms (that is, supplying firms and buying firms) 
would use spot markets for all transactions. That is: 
"Not every transaction poses defection hazards, and it may not be possible to 
safeguard all that do. " 
Williamson (1983: 537). 
In the cases where contracts do not work then courts and other forms of arbitration are 
required, but nevertheless, "contracting institutions arguably start at the beginning" 
according to Williamson (1983: 537). The hostage model can be specified using the 
following variables from the survey, including keeping the same dummy variables 
developed in Chapter Eight. 
The evidence from the aerospace survey and reported in Chapter Seven shows there is 
also economic incentives in the written contracts. Table 7.14 highlights the cost 
discounts offered by suppliers as an inducement for buyers. Also, Tables 7.17 and 
7.18 shows there are number of different types of contracts in the UKAI including 
firm price and fixed price. The next section assesses, contract as the dependent 
variable in the transaction cost model. 
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Dependent Variable: Contract 
Table 9.1 contains a classification of the various contractual relationships between 
suppliers and customers taken from the survey. The response coded 0 means there is 
no formal written contract with the customer or supplier; whereas a response coded I 
means there is a formal written contract. In the case of no formal written contract 
then the economic relationship is similar to a spot market or at least it can be assumed 
that supply is readily available. In the case of a formal written contract, the market 
relationship is different from a spot market or at least it can be assumed that supply is 
more uncertain. This is because economic agents seek to protect a position with a 
formal written contract with either a supplier or customer. A formal written contract 
with a supplier would imply that buyer is relatively unsure about the vendor or at least 
there is no spot market, where there is an exchange of standard contracts. A formal 
written contract with a customer may imply that demand is relatively uncertain and/or 
that a vendor has invested specific or dedicated assets in the transaction. 
Table 9.1: Formal contract by aerospace firms 
Response Contract with 
customer (n) 
Contract with 
customer (%) 
Contract with 
supplier (n) 
Contract with 
supplier (%) 
0.00 25.0 30.5% 38.0 46.3% 
1.00 57.0 69.5% 44.0 53.7% 
Total 82.0 100% 82.0 100% 
Where contract =I and no contract =0 
Theoretically, the dependent variable for contract type is not as close a proxy for 
organisation form as make-or-buy, but is useful as a comparison. It also has the 
potential to generate some novel results in terms of linking organisation to law (as 
opposed to linking governance structure of organisations to make-or-buy). 
Williamson (1975,1985) has always claimed that transaction costs is concerned with 
the combined areas of law, economics and organisation, but there are very few studies 
that have attempted to systematically test the three aspects. 
Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables are taken directly from the transaction costs approach, 
namely asset specificity, frequency, complexity, uncertainty and small numbers. 
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Moreover, in the literature there has been a tendency to add a measure relating to 
economies of scale, as well as a measure of contract type (Lyons, 1994: 264). The 
latter two variables have been included here in order to test the original model of 
Williamson (1983) plus recent contributions ftom Lyons (1994: 260), which directly 
tests for economies of scale. These are added to this model in order to gain more 
explanatory power (see Appendix V). 
The operational aspects of the Williamson model were considerable as shown in 
Chapter Four. In sum, the variable listing for the model is detailed below in Table 
9.2, including whether the category of variable is dependent or explanatory. 
Table 9.2: Variable listing: new variables 
Variable name Category of variable Measurement of variable 
Vertical integration Dependent Contract type for both supplier 
and customer 
Small numbers Explanatory Number of suppliers and 
number of customers 
Economies of scale Explanatory Concentration of suppliers and 
concentration of customers 
Contract type Explanatory and Type and length of contract with 
Dependent suppliers and customers 
The predictions for the variables detailed in Table 9.2 are the same as the models used 
in Table 8.1. The definitions of the variables are the same as the previous Chapter 
and are in Table 8.4 and the measure 
I 
ment of the variables are in Table 6.1 along with 
the descriptive statistics. 
Dummy variables 
As with Chapter Eight, there are a number of dummy variables, which are used to 
establish the defining characteristics of a firm. These dummy variables are defence or 
civilian work and whether the firm is primarily involved with aerospace or other 
engineering work, as specified in Table 9.3. This classification system is important, 
because it allows the firms in the sample to be compared with one another. The key 
features of Table 9.3 are that the majority of firms are civilian aerospace and over one 
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in four firms are not specifically aerospace firms, suggesting that the aerospace firms 
have to search outside the industry for specialist or low-cost suppliers, which is 
evidence of the make-or-buy decision. 
Table 9.3: Dichotomy of the 82 aerospace respondents 
Aerospace 
(code = 1) 
Other 
(code = 0) 
Total 
Military (code 1) 17(20.8%) 4(4.9%) 21(25.6%) 
Civilian (code 0) 43 (52.4%) 18 (22.0%) 61(74.4%) 
Total 60 (73.21/o) 22(26.8%) 82(100.0%) 
Summary of results 
Using the same logit methodology developed in the previous Chapter, this section 
presents the results for the percentage predicted correct by the models and the 
Nagelkerke f? 2, respectively. The dependent variables are contract with supplier and 
contract with customer. The Logit I model has asset specificity, frequency and 
uncertainty only as the dependent variables, Logit 2 has the explanatory variable small 
numbers added and the Logit 3 has the dummy variables added for both the contract 
dependent variables. 
Table 9.4 shows the summary results for the percentage predicted correct for the two 
models, plus the results for Make as the dependent variable from the previous Chapter 
as a comparison. 
Table 9.4: Summary of the percentage correctly predicted by the models 
Model Make Contract: supplier Contract: customer 
Benchmark 62.20 53.70 69.50 
Logit 1 68.29 57.32 71.95 
Logit 2 70.73 63.41 67.07 
Logit 3 71.95 62.20 80.49 
Change 9.75 8.50 11.00 
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The variables contract supplier and contract customer have a benchmark figure of 
53.70% and 69.50% (see Table 9.1), respectively, which is simply the change in the 
percentage of the sample in the survey that has a formal written contract with the 
supplier or customer'. The research would have yielded these percentages simply by 
stating that there is a formal written contract. Hence, with the dependent variable as 
contract supplier the predictive power has increased by 8.50% and with contract 
customer the predictive power has increased by almost 11%. Therefore, all the 
various models have improved on the benchmark, in terms of the predictive power, 
but a formal contract with customer has improved by the largest percentage. 
However, as with the results in the previous Chapter for Make the improvement in the 
predictive power represented by the results are modest. There is surprisingly little 
improvement and whilst this result is better than no improvement at all it casts further 
doubts over the transaction cost model. 
In terins of the proxy R2 or the Nagelkerke h2 the result for contract type are shown 
in Table 9.5 as well as for Make for comparative purposes. 
Table 9.5: Summary of Nagelkerke h2 
Model Make Contract: supplier Contract: customer 
Logit 1 0.177 0.103 0.201 
Logit 2 0.183 0.120 0.223 
Logit 3 0.277 0.146 0.447 
The Nagelkerke j? 2 for contract with supplier does not significantly improve over the 
three logit models and remains low. A proxy R2 of only 0.146 or 14.6% at best is too 
low and the model is rejected. However, the proxy R2 of 0.447 or 44.7% for contract 
with customer is modest but acceptable. The result tends to indicate (rather than 
confirm) that suppliers would prefer to trade the threat of opportunism for the security 
of a relational contract with their customers. There is some evidence for contracts 
with customers being explained by the hold-up model, but there is no evidence for 
1 Sindbrly, the bcnchmark figurc for the MAKE dcpcndcnt varablc is 62.20 */o, wWch mcans logit 3 
has i1nProved the prcdiction power by 9.751%, 
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contracts with suppliers, which is further evidence of a lack of support for the 
transaction cost model as applied in this thesis. 
The summary results in Table 9.4 and Table 9.5 are clear that the most effective 
logistic model is logit 3, which has all the transaction cost explanatory variables, plus 
all the dummy variables. The most effective model is where customer contract acts as 
the dependent variable. However, these results do not constitute overwhelming 
support for the transaction cost model. The proxy R2 such as Nagelkerke 'k 
2, which 
has 44.7% of the variation accounted for by the dependent variables is a good result, 
but there remains 55.3% unexplained. When taken into account with the 11% 
increase in the predictive power of this model and with an 8.86% probability of a 
Type I error occurring, then the model is relatively well specified, but is far from 
being fully robust. Cumulatively, these results indicate a disappointing lack of 
convincing support for the transaction cost model as applied in this thesis. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the model can be still further improved by having 
customer contract as the dependent variable, with supplier contract added to the 
explanatory variable list of logit 3. This result has a Nagelkerke h2 of 0.459 and the 
percentage of correctly predicted results of 82.93, which is an improvement of 13.5 
percentage points from the benchmark model for contracts. However, this experiment 
with the data is not part of the transaction costs approach and is more than likely a 
result of autocorrelation in any case. In other words, the model can be improved 
without recourse to the transaction cost theory, which is further evidence of a lack of 
support in this thesis. 
Overall, using a logistic regression methodology, there is insufficient evidence in 
support of HI (i) (contracts with suppliers) with the proxy R2 result at 0.146, at a 
significance level above 90% and below 95%. Therefore, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. There is partial evidence in support of HI (ii) (contracts with customers) 
with a proxy R' result at 0.447 at a significance of between 90% and 95%. The null 
hypothesis is accepted in this case. The implication for this thesis is that the 
transaction cost approach can not be fully supported and alternative approaches are 
needed to explain the data in the survey. 
The data can also be used to test hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 developed in the previous 
Chapter. There is more positive evidence in support of H2 for customer contracts but 
not supplier contracts. That is, there is a difference between civil and military firms in 
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the aerospace supply chain for customer contracts. Indeed, the dummy variable 
MILCIV is significant at only a 5% probability of a Type I error with MAKE as the 
dependent variable. However, the sign is negative, which may require further analysis 
such as standardised variables to make the result more robust. Nevertheless, the null 
hypothesis can be accepted (and the alternative rejected) that there is transaction cost 
difference between military and civilian firms in the UK aerospace supply chain. 
There is very little evidence in support of H3 (customer contracts or supplier 
contracts) that there is a difference between aerospace and general engineering firms 
in the aerospace supply chain. Indeed, the dummy variable AERO is insignificant 
with a 45.5% probability of a Type I error. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected 
because there is no transaction cost explanation of the difference between aerospace 
and general engineering firms in the UK aerospace supply chain. 
There is also little evidence in support of H4 (customer contracts and supplier 
contracts) that there is a difference between large and small firms in the aerospace 
supply chain. Indeed, the dummy variable SIZE is insignificant with a 23.1% 
probability of a Type I error, although it is the correct predicted sign. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis is rejected, because there is no transaction cost explanation of the 
difference between large and small firms in the UK aerospace supply chain. 
Overall, the outcome is that the four transaction cost hypotheses are not proven by the 
results and at best there is only limited support. The next section compares all the 
results from Chapters Eight and Nine. 
Comparison of results from Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine 
The full breakdown of the various models from both Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine, 
in respect to the four central hypotheses is given in Table 9.6 below. It is evident that 
model 3 is important to the quality of the results and also that there is a certain amount 
of evidence in favour of HI. The other hypotheses are less clear cut with only mixed 
evidence in support, although 1-13 does have a degree of evidence in its favour. In 
addition it is also clear that CUSTCON is as important a dependent variable as 
MAKE. However, SUPCON is considerably less important with little or no evidence 
in support of the transaction cost approach. 
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Table 9.6: Matrix of evidence for transaction costs: model 3 by hypothesis 
Model 3: Ill: H2: H3: H4: 
The type of Transaction Military & Aerospace & The size of 
Specification Costs Civilian split Other split The Firm 
Regression: BO Partial TC No TC Yes TC No TC 
Model 3 
Logit: Make Partial TC Yes TC No TC No TC 
Model 3 
Logit: Customer Yes TC Partial TC No TC Yes TC 
Model 3 
Logit: Supplier No TC No TC No TC No TC 
Model 3 
Where: TC = transaction costs 
Table 9.6 shows there is mixture of evidence for the transaction cost approach. In 
particular, there is considerable evidence for HI with partial and confirmed evidence 
of transaction costs from across the models and dependent variables. There is less 
evidence for H2 of the military-civil split is significant. There is significantly less 
evidence for IB aerospace-non-aerospace split and H4 the size of the firm, where 
evidence of the model significance is confined to only one of the four models. 
There are certain patterns in the results that can be identified from Table 9.6. Firstly, 
reading vertically across models by hypothesis, it is possible to discover that there is 
some support for HI, but little, if any, significant support for H2, H3 and H4. In other 
words, there is limited support for the general presence of transaction costs. 
Secondly, reading horizontally, across hypotheses by model its possible to discover 
that the logit model 3 using customer contract as the dependent variable is overall the 
model that best fits the data. 
In sum, there is limited evidence of transaction costs and nine of the sixteen models in 
Table 9.6 show no support for the transaction costs approach at all. The remaining 
seven models show only mixed support for the transaction cost approach. Therefore, 
the decision is to reject the transaction cost approach as not proven in this thesis. The 
next section is a critique of the transaction cost formulae and an analysis of how to 
improve the results from a theoretical or model-building perspective. 
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Critique of results 
The main findings are a partial support for asset specificity, especially facilities asset 
specificity. in general, this is in line with the transaction costs predictions and other 
studies, which support the importance of asset specificity. The results show that it is 
the facilities and equipment of aerospace production that are the most important in 
explaining the make-or-buy decision in vertical integration. As can be expected, this 
is because of the huge capital investment required in both facilities and equipment for 
aerospace production. However, it is unexpected to find employment asset specificity 
and dedicated assets not to be important, which casts more doubts about the 
transaction costs approach. Not unexpectedly for the LTK aerospace industry, location 
asset specificity is considered relatively unimportant for this industry, since it 
operated in national and international markets. The result has interesting implications 
for industrial location in the UK as it suggests that location is not important in the UK 
aerospace industry. This result may reflect the national and international supply 
chain and special suppliers in the aerospace industry. 
There is a possible need to revisit some of the measurement of the variables. Asset 
specificity is the most straightforward of the explanatory variables to measure in the 
format of the questionnaire. Uncertainty and complexity are much more difficult to 
capture and measure even on a likert scale. Similarly, frequency may not be specified 
correctly and this accounts for the limited success of this explanatory variable in the 
overall results. This proposal is explored as a suggestion for further research in the 
next Chapter. 
Finally, there is also an issue of sample size, where 82 cases may be considered 
relatively low, but this is in line with Lyons (1994: 274) who also used a postal 
questionnaire in the UK and received 91 returns. There are no specific rules on this 
issue; however, Finch (1994: 268) claims that the number of cases should ideally be at 
least 100, if not greater than 100, so that there is no small number bias. In the logit 
study by Finch (1994: 271) on UK aerospace the number of cases was 96 and was 
considered acceptable. Whilst this survey has a number of cases less than 100, it is 
worth bearing in mind that a number equal to 82 in this industry does account for 
nearly 45% of the actual population, which is considerably significant number in 
itself In other words, the size of the sample in this thesis is not a major problem in 
the research. 
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Conclusions 
Chapter Mine has attempted to use the transaction cost framework and use the type of 
contract as the dependent variable using Logit regressions, since OLS was not 
possible with this dataset. This approach is using the hostage model as the basis of 
the Chapter and using commitments rather than make-or-buy to determine relations in 
the aerospace industry supply chain. Commitments in this context are measured by 
contract with two types of contracts used, namely contracts with customers and 
suppliers. The results show that the model has only limited predictive and 
explanatory power. The Nagelkerke JPresults remain low at 0.146 for contract with 
suppliers, but are improved with contract with customer to 0.447. This shows some 
support for the hostage model and a possible source of further research in the area. In 
particular, the use of credible threats and credible commitments between transacting 
firms may prove fi-uitful in terms of economic incentives and legal safeguards. Also, 
the work by Lyons (1994,1996) has signalled a move away from an exclusive 
analysis of make-or-buy to research that explicitly takes account of contract design. 
Finally, the matrix in Table 9.6 highlights some mixed results. There is some 
evidence for HI on transaction costs with less support for the other hypotheses H2, 
H3 and H4. Also, model 3 using customer contract as the dependent variable is 
overall the model that best fits the data. Overall, there is general rejection of the null 
hypotheses as applied in this thesis. 
The main conclusions to be drawn from Chapter Nine are that transaction costs with 
contract design as the dependent variable are not proven. Overall, the outcomes from 
the results in this Chapter are not as expected in advance and disappointing from a 
transaction cost economics perspective. There are potentially some fruitfiil areas of 
analysis for transaction cost using contract as the dependent type in terms of 
incentives in contract design. Significantly, this Chapter fails to prove that the 
transaction cost approach is totally useftil within the context of the UK aerospace 
industry and with the level of data generated in the survey. Finally, the lack of 
support for transaction costs as applied in this thesis can be viewed as an original 
contribution to economics, because it casts serious doubts about empirically testing 
the theory using this approach. In the final part of this thesis, there is an assessment 
of the implications of the survey results and conclusions, as well as the proposals for 
further research. 
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Part M 
Conclusions 
Chapter Ten: 
Conclusions and Further Research 
"The characteristics of the future aerospace firm might include ... new forms of industrial organisation, reflecting efforts to economise on transaction costs (e. g. 
buying rather than making [and] international supplier networks ... Y, Hartley and Braddon (2002: 17). 
Introduction 
The original contribution of this thesis is to examine the make-or-buy decision and 
choice of contract type in the UK aerospace industry within a transaction costs 
framework for the first time. However, at best the results show insufficient evidence 
in support of a transaction costs approach to vertical integration as applied in this 
thesis. There is a body of opinion in economics that the transaction costs approach is 
suited to explain the industrial organisation of aerospace firms (Hartley and Braddon, 
2002: 17). This thesis has shown there is insufficient evidence in the UKAI to 
support this belief. 
If the transaction costs approach offers little or no explanation then alternative 
hypotheses must be explored. Whilst the transaction cost approach certainly can be 
viewed as complementary to other approaches such as monopoly power arguments 
and game theory, nevertheless further research must establish which approach is the 
most appropriate, given that the research questions are unsatisfactorily explained by 
transaction costs in this thesis. The aim of this Chapter is twofold. Firstly, it presents 
the conclusions to the research questions and secondly it proposes some areas of 
further research. The next section presents the answers to the research questions. 
Thesis conclusions 
There are two specific research questions considered by this thesis within the context 
of vertical integration. Firstly, what determines the make-or-buy decision within the 
aerospace firm? Secondly, what is the potential hold-up problem between aerospace 
firms from a contractual perspective? 
In answer to the first research question there is little evidence to support the make-or- 
buy decision in the UK aerospace industry using the transaction cost approach. The 
questionnaire survey delivered no conclusive proof in favour of the central 
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hypothesis. There is some, but limited, support for HI (aerospace suppliers make) 
using both OLS and logit regressions. There is no apparent support for H2 (military 
aerospace firms make) and H3 (aerospace-specific firms make), with some support for 
H4 (large firms make) as highlighted in Chapter Eight. In particular, the facilities and 
equipment asset specificity are important in partially explaining the make-or-buy 
decision in UK aerospace and overall this justifies the micro-analytical approach. 
However, a great deal of research effort was required for relatively little explanatory 
value, not least because transaction cost data are rarely published, if at all, and have to 
be collected on a case by case basis. 
In answer to second research question there is only marginally more support for 
contract design within the hold-up problem. The results gave qualified support for the 
central hypothesis, but not sufficient to prove the case for a transaction cost 
explanation as shown in Chapter Nine. In particular, using logistic regression, there is 
insufficient evidence in support of HI (i) (contracts with suppliers) with the proxy R' 
result of 0.15 meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected. There is partial evidence in 
support of HI (ii) (contracts with customers) with a proxy R2 result of 0.45 meaning 
the null hypothesis is accepted in this case. There is more positive evidence in 
support of H2 for customer contracts, but not supplier contracts and no significant 
support for H3 and H4. 
Overall, the theoretical discussions in Part One concluded that the transaction costs 
approach could be applied to the UK aerospace industry. The problems of 
contracting and make-or-buy in terms of transaction cost economising were 
highlighted and a case presented for making the theory operational. However, the 
empirical results from Part Two conclude there is little, if any, support for the four 
main hypotheses in this study. This result was not expected. A discussion of these 
findings and related implications follow in the next section. 
Interpreting the conclusions 
There are a number of potential reasons why the thesis has generated a negative 
conclusion. Firstly, there are a variety of measurement problems, including the need 
for better specification of the questions in the questionnaire survey. In particular, 
there is a need to revisit some of the techniques used to measure the variables. Asset 
specificity seems to be the most straightforward of the explanatory variables to 
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measure in the format of the questionnaire. Uncertainty and complexity are much 
more difficult to measure even on a Likert scale. Similarly, frequency may not be 
specified correctly between different firms and this may account for the limited 
success of this explanatory variable in the final results. In other words, the 
measurement of the variables may be causing the weak results rather than the 
transaction cost model per se. 
Secondly, the number of returned questionnaires is 82 and this figure may be 
relatively low. However, given that the percentage of the population that returned a 
completed questionnaire is 44% and the fact these cases cover a wide array of firms in 
the UK aerospace industry then this remains an acceptable number. 
Finally, there is no consistent or widespread collection of transaction cost data by an 
ýuthoritative source. This is because the transaction cost data are bespoke and costly 
to acquire and in any case they may not have any wider commercial value to firms. A 
possible alternative methodological view would use existing company accounts, 
which provide data on value added within firms. Company accounts may help to 
provide an insight into the broader make-or-buy decision through a matriculation of 
value added. In other words, equate buy with the cost of sales and make with value 
added (or turnover minus cost of sales). However, this approach was not followed in 
this thesis, because accounting data are expost by definition and a study of transaction 
costs requires ex ante data, which identifies the thinking behind entrepreneurial 
choices (see Appendix VI). 
In summary, the results from this thesis lead to rejecting the transaction cost approach 
as an explanation of vertical integration in UK aerospace. However, this outcome 
may be due to incorrect specification of the data in the model and the need for in- 
depth interviews with decision-makers. Notwithstanding, the conclusions do indicate 
that transaction cost economics is limited as a worthwhile theoretical and empirical 
approach to the study of the UK aerospace industry. The next section considers 
proposals for further research which arises from these conclusions. 
Proposals for further research 
Further research arising from this thesis cover two main aspects, namely future 
directions for transaction cost theory and implications for the UK aerospace industry. 
The future directions for transaction cost theory centre on other applications of the 
approach. In particular, decision-makers either create output through the firm 
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(vertical integration) or engage the market (long term contracts). Asset specificity in 
the context of aerospace as well as defence creates many problems that relate to 
incomplete contracts, ink costs of contract renewal and even property rights. All of 
these fall under the scope of transaction cost economics and in fact it is useful that 
asset specificity can be assessed in such a way. In addition, the single most obvious 
manifestation of this is the make-or-buy plan, which is actually promoted by the MoD 
in the area of UK defence aerospace. This is a logical position to hold, because the 
defence contract in aerospace appears to contain sizeable transaction cost problems. 
Namely, significant asset specificity exposure, bounded rationality and scope for 
opportunism, tends to characterise defence aerospace. The transaction cost model 
does need improving to fully capture transaction costs empirically given the evidence 
from this thesis. For example, in-depth interviews with key decision-makers who 
make the relevant choices in firms would augment the quality of the data. Also, the 
results of this thesis point to the measurement issues that are inherent in the 
transaction cost approach, which is a factor in the lack of conclusive evidence and 
suggests that the transaction cost model can not be tested. However, this thesis alone 
cannot determine whether the transaction cost approach per se is incorrect and should 
be replaced in favour of another approach. 
Next are the implications drawn from the conclusions for the UK aerospace industry. 
There are two major areas where further work on the UK aerospace industry needs to 
concentrate in spite of rejecting the transaction cost approach of this thesis. First, is 
the role of procurement contracts in the supply chain, which could be assessed and 
measured against the make-or-buy decision. Second, is a comparison between 
aerospace and other industries, for example the motor car industry or shipbuilding 
would be appropriate, as would comparison between UK aerospace with the 
aerospace industries of the US and EU (Jackson, 2003: 87-89). 
This list is not designed as exhaustive, but it is indicative of the possible areas of 
further research that might be generated from a transaction cost analysis of the UK 
aerospace industry. However, before any future research can be undertaken the 
problems of measurement need to be fully addressed, because the issue of quantifying 
transaction cost remains the major obstacle to further developments in the area. 
Whilst this has been an empirical thesis, future developments in the transaction cost 
approach must address first the theoretical concerns of applied research, namely, the 
need for improved definitions of the key variables. Attempts to calibrate the 
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transaction cost model and make the approach operational have not worked in this 
thesis and as such the theoretical foundations of the approach need to be addressed. 
From an empirical perspective the experience of this work has shown that if the 
measurement problems can be resolved then the issue of tautology is refuted. 
The measurement of transaction costs could be improved by a greater exploration of 
the data from in-depth interviews as opposed to postal questionnaires. A system of 
structured personal, in-depth interviews with key decision-makers in an industry may 
yield more appropriate results compared with an anonymous questionnaire. Also, 
additional theoretical work on standardising transaction cost variables is required 
before further empirical testing. In fact, if a yardstick set of transaction cost 
definitions are established then this could result in the routine collection of the data 
within firms. In turn, this outcome would overcome many of the barriers to 
researching in the area and allow a more comprehensive approach to empirical 
transaction costs research. Eventually, this may facilitate a set of standardised data 
that could be applied across industries, between countries and over a longer time 
period than five years. 
Overall, there are two related findings from thesis. Firstly, from an empirical 
perspective, whilst there is a case to suggest that the UK aerospace industry can be 
assessed through transaction costs, nevertheless the empirical results from this thesis 
reject the approach. The lack of any conclusive support for transaction costs in this 
thesis may not necessarily be due to the approach per se, but due to incorrect 
measurement of key variables. In other words, it is not clear if the whole transaction 
cost approach is at fault (and hence it needs to be replaced with an alternative 
approach); or the cause of the problem is poor definitions that lead to inconsistent 
measurement of the variables. Either way, the experience of this thesis is that the 
transaction cost approach is difficult to make operational and thereby there are no 
valid results. 
Secondly, fi7om a theoretical perspective, if the measurement problems can be fully 
resolved then this is likely to help overcome the other major criticism of tautology 
that is often levelled at the transaction cost approach (Dietrich, 1994: 25). Hence, if 
the variables can be accurately measured by a benchmark method then the criticism of 
transaction cost as circular in nature may be shown to be false. That is, theoretically it 
needs to be formally demonstrated that transaction costs are not tautological and can 
be proven categorically and directly observable. However, this view returns the thesis 
233 
to the counter-argument that all costs are subjective and the more suitable method of 
primary research is in-depth interviews focussing on choices. Therefore, transaction 
costs are a special case within a wider economic literature. Indeed, the research 
findings in this thesis suggest that transactions costs remain theoretical in nature until 
fully proven otherwise as far as the UK aerospace industry is concerned. 
A priori, the transaction cost approach was predicted to be relevant to aerospace due 
to asset specificity, make-or-buy, level of outsourcing and the role of contracts. 
Whilst it is fully accepted that transaction costs are potentially relevant to all 
industries, the approach seemed particularly appropriate to aerospace because the firm 
and the market are relatively close substitutes for many of the sub-assemblies and 
components. However, even though this thesis has highlighted the theoretical 
importance of the make-or-buy decision in the UK aerospace industry, it has failed to 
prove this finding empirically within the current tranwction cost economics 
framework. 
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Appendix I 
The Range of Empirical Studies in 
Transaction Cost Economics 
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Appendix 1: The range of empirical studies in transaction costs economics 
Author Date Country Industry Classification' 
Goldberg 1976 USA Various Case Study 
Teece 1976 USA Petroleum Industry 
Refining Study 
Williamson 1976 USA CATV Case Study 
Chandler 1977 USA Various Business 
History 
Klein el al. 1978 USA Automobile Case Study 
Suppliers 
Steer& Cable 1978 UK Large Firms Statistical 
Analysis 
Lilien 1979 USA industrial Case Study 
Products 
Williamson 1979 USA Various Case Study 
Armour & 1980 USA Petroleum Statistical 
Teece Analysis 
Klein & 1981 USA Various Statistical 
Leffler Analysis 
Teece 1981 USA Large Firms Statistical 
Analysis 
Monteverde & 1982 (a, b) USA Automobiles Statistical 
Teece Analysis 
Butler & 1983 UK Chemical Case Study 
Carney Firms 
Masten & 1983 USA Various Case Study 
Snyder 
1 Classification dcvised by Williamson (1989: 173). 
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Stuckey 1983 USA Aluminium Vertical 
Integration 
Alston, Datta 1984 USA Share-cropping Contractual 
& Nugent Vignette 
Anderson & 1984 USA Sales Force Statistical 
Schmittlein Analysis 
Davidson & 1984 USA Large Firms Statistical 
McFetridge Analysis 
John 1984 USA Marketing Statistical 
Channel Analysis 
Gallick 1984 USA Tuna Vertical 
Integration 
Masten 1984 USA Aerospace Statistical 
Analysis 
Palay 1984 USA Rail Freight Contractual 
Vignette 
Walker & 1984 USA Automobiles Statistical 
Weber Analysis 
Anderson 1985 USA Electronics Statistical 
Analysis 
Joskow 1985 USA Coal Statistical 
Analysis 
Levy 1985 USA Manufacturing Statistical 
Firms Analysis 
MacDonald 1985 USA Manufacture Statistical 
Firm Analysis 
Masten & 1985 USA Natural Gas Contractual 
Crocker Vignette 
Globerman & 1986 Canada Forest Vertical 
Schwindt Products Integration 
Harrigan 1986 USA Manufacture Vertical 
Firms Integration 
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Hubbard & 1986 USA Natural Gas Contractual 
Weiner Vignette 
MacMillan 1986 USA Purchasing Vertical 
et aL Department Integration 
Mulherin 1986 USA Natural Gas Contractual 
Vignette 
Helfat & Teece 1987 USA CAPM Vertical 
Integration 
Goldberg & 1987 USA Petroleum Case 
Erickson Coke Study 
Joskow 1987 USA Coal Statistical 
Analysis 
Walker & 1987 USA Purchasing Statistical 
Weber- Analysis 
Anderson 1988 USA Sales Force Contractual 
Vignette 
Caves & 1988 USA Intermediate Vertical 
Bradburd Goods Integration 
Croker & 1988 USA Natural Gas Statistical 
Masten Analysis 
Dwyer & Oh 1988 USA Computer Statistical 
Retailing Analysis 
Gatignon & 1988 USA MNC Statistical 
Anderson Analysis 
Heide & John 1988 USA Marketing Statistical 
Analysis 
Hennart 1988 Global Aluminiurn & Industry 
Tin Study 
John & Weitz 1988 USA Distribution Bi-variate 
Analysis 
Klein 1988 USA Automobiles Case 
Study 
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Ellickson 1989 Global Whaling Business 
History 
Mitchell 1989 USA Technology Statistical 
Sun-field Analysis 
Rogerson 1989 USA Defence Statistical 
Analysis 
Tapon 1989 USA Pharmaccutics Industry 
R&D Study 
Noordewier, 1990 USA Purchasing Bi-variate 
John & Nevin Analysis 
Pisano, 1990 USA Bio- Statistical 
Technology Analysis 
Crocker & 1991 USA Various Case 
Masten Study 
Hallwood 1991 UK Offshore Oil Industry 
Study 
Leffler & 1991 USA Timber Statistical 
Rucker Harvesting Analysis 
Lieberman 1991 USA Chemical Bi-variate 
Products Analysis 
Masten et aL 1991 USA Naval Bivariate 
Shipbuilding Test 
Mosakowski 1991 USA Computer Statistical 
Hardware Analysis 
Pittman 1991 USA Railroad Side- Business 
track History 
Walker & 1991 USA Single-source Statistical 
Poppo Suppliers Analysis 
Mahoney 1992 USA Various Literature 
Survey 
Muris et al. 1992 USA Soft Drinks Statistical 
Analysis 
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Weiss 1992 USA Mergers Statistical 
Analysis 
Balakrishnan 1993 USA Manufacture Statistical 
& Fox Firms Analysis 
Crocker & 1993 USA Air Force Statistical 
Reynolds Engines Analysis 
Lyons & 1993 UK Engineering Statistical 
Bailey Analysis 
Pirrong 1993 USA Bulk Shipping Business 
History 
Williamson 1993 USA Various Case 
Study 
Kaufmann & 1994 USA Fast Food Case 
Lafontaine Study 
Levy & Spiller 1994 USA Telecomm Statistical 
Analysis 
Lyons 1994 UK Engineering Statistical 
Analysis 
Argyres 1995 USA IBM & GM Case 
Study 
Krickx 1995 USA Computer Industry 
Mainframe Study 
Lyons 1995 UK Various Statistical 
Analysis 
Nichols 1995 UK Leisure Case 
Services Study 
Argyres 1996 (a, b) USA R&D Statistical 
Analysis 
Abraham & 1996 USA Contracting Statistical 
Taylor Analysis 
Foss 1996 Denmark Fruit and Industry 
Vegetables Study 
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Prencipe 1996 UK Aero-engines Vertical 
Integration 
Cameron and 1997 UK Music Industry Case 
Collins Study 
Maher 1997 UK Various Case 
Study 
Finch 1998 UK Aerospace Industry 
Study 
Stephen & 2000 UK Naval Statistical 
Love shipbuilding Analysis 
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UK Aerospace Supply Chain Questionnaire 
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Staffordshire University Business School 
UK AEROSPACE SUPPLY CHAIN STUDY: 
Competition - Contracts - Co-operation 
Section A: Companv Profile: 
Ql What is the name of your company or group of companies? 
Q2 a. What are your three principal areas of business by type of product? 
I 
2 
3 
b. What is the unit price of the most important product by value of sales listed 
above? (Please, / below). 
LI to 1999 E3 
11,000 to 199,999 E3 
1100,000 to L999,999 U 
11 million+ El 
Q3 a. What is the current value of your company turnover? 
Tumover: 1 (1997) 
b. What was the 1992 total of your company turnover? 
Tumover: 1 (1992) 
Q4 a. What is the current number of employees at your company? 
Employees 
_ 
(1997) 
b. What was the number of employees at your company in 1992? 
Employees 
_ 
(1992) 
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Q5 a. What percentage of your current annual turnover is aerospace business? 
Aerospace: % (1997) 
b. What percentage of your annual turnover was aerospace business in 1992? 
Aerospace: % (1992) 
Q6 a. What percentage of your current annual turnover is military business? 
Military: % (1997) 
b. What percentage of your annual turnover was military business in 1992? 
Military: % (1992) 
Q7 What is the name of your most important customer by value of sales? 
(Including MoD) 
Q8 What is the name of your most important supplier by value of purchases? 
Q9 What percentage of the components and sub-components that you use in 
manufacturing is bought-out from external suppliers? 
1997 
bought-out 
1992 
bought-out 
1. Total Business 
2. Civilian Aerospace 
3. Military Aerospace 
Section B: Companv Supply Chain: 
Answerpart a of thefollowing questions by using a scale of I to 10. Part b requires 
you to think about whether there have been any changes in the previousfive years. 
Other pans ask supplementary questions. Yhe questions areframedm terms ofyour 
company in general. 
Q10a. To what extent are the skills, knowledge or experience of your employees 
specific to your company? (Please V one). 
General 12 13 14 15 16-17 89 10 Specific 
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b. In the previous five years has this ranking increased, decreased or stayed the 
same? 
c. Give examples of three occupational groups who have highly specific skills, 
knowledge or experience at your company, (if any). 
I. 
2. 
3. 
QlIa. To what extent are the facilities and equipment used in your production 
process specific to your company? (Please V one). 
General 1 12 13 14 56789 10 Specific 
b. In the previous five years has this ranking increased, decreased or stayed the 
same? 
C. Give examples of three areas of core activity at your company, (if any). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
d. Do you sub-contract core activity during periods of high demand? (Please 
below). 
yes 1: 1 no El 
e. Do you sub-contract core activity during periods of low demand? (Please 
below). 
yes 13 no E3 
Q12a. To what extent does your company invest in facilities and equipment that are 
specific to your most important customer listed in Q. 7? (Please / one). 
General 1 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 1 10 1 Spedfic IIIIIIIIII1 
-1 
b. In the previous five years has this ranking increased, decreased or stayed the 
same? 
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c. How far from your most important customer is your main factory site located? 
miles 
d. Would you benefit fi7om being located any closer to your most important 
customer? 
yes 0 no El 
Q13a. What is the likelihood of unexpected changes in demand for your products? 
(Please v*' one). 
lAttle 1 12 13-1 4151 6- 171819- -1 10-1 Rýh--ly---] 
likelihood rikely 
b. In the previous five years has this likelihood increased decreased or stayed the 
same? 
c. What is the typical length of time between a customer placing an order and 
delivery for your most important product listed in Q. 2 b? 
days / months / years 
Q14a. What is the likelihood of unexpected changes in supply for your components? 
(Please / one). 
Uttle 124569 ighly 
likelihood likely 
I 
b. In the previous five years has this likelihood increased decreased or stayed the 
same? 
c. Do you consider your suppliers to be generally reliable? (Please, / below). 
yes 13 no U 
Q15a. Is your main business one-off in nature or frequent repeat business? 
(Please -, / one). 
On&-off 12345689 10 Frequent 
repeats 
b. In the previous five years has this frequency increased decreased or stayed the 
same? 
c. Does your most important customer listed in Q. 7 regularly change the 
magnitude of an order at short notice? (Please v" below). 
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yes Q no 
0 
Q16a. How would you describe the number of UK suppliers in your main supply 
markets? (Please -/ one). 
Low 12 13 14 15 16 19 10 fl 
IIII -T-f I -r -- 
b. In the previous five years has this number increased, decreased or stayed the 
same? 
c. How many suppliers account for 75% of purchases? number. 
d. What percentage of purchases is bought from your most important supplier 
listed in Q. 8? % 
Ql7a. How would you describe the number of UK customers in your main product 
markets? (Please v"' one). 
IAW 12 13 14 15 16 17 
-18 
91 10 1 High IIIIIIIIIII 
b. In the previous five years has this number increased, decreased or stayed the 
same? 
c. How many customers account for 75% of sales? number 
d. What percentage of your annual turnover is sold to your most important 
customer listed in Q. 7? % 
Q18a. Do you make or buy, if the cost of making a component in-house equals the 
cost of buying from a supplier? (Please v" below). 
make 13 buy 13 
b. If you do switch suppliers for any given component, rank the following 
reasons why in terms of importance; where I= most important and 5= least 
important. 
low price Q 
quality of item El 
delivery date LI 
supplier reliability L3 
other (specify) 
Section C: Company Transactions: 
Part a of thefollowing questions are answered by statingyes, no or sometimes. Part 
b requires you to choose between various alternative Me questions are typically 
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ftamed in terms ofyour company in general, 
Q19a. Do you usually have a formal written contract with your supplier? (Please V" 
below). 
yes El no L3 sometimes E3 
b. If you do usually have a formal written contract with suppliers: 
L how many companies compete for the contract? number of companies: 
ii how long is the contract? number of daystmonths/years: 
what type of contract? fixed price (with price escalation), firm price (no 
price 
escalation), cost plus or other please specify: 
iv. Do you impose penalty clauses on suppliers for late delivery or poor 
quality? 
(Please / below). 
yes 1: 1 no sometimes EI 
Q20a. Do you usually have a formal written contract with your customers? (Please 
below). 
yes 13 no 13 sometimes 13 
b. If you do usually have a formal written contract with customers: 
i. how many other companies compete for the contract? 
number of companies: 
ii. how long is the contract? number of days/months/years: 
iii. what type of contract? fixed price (with price escalation), firm price (no 
price escalation), cost plus or other please specify: 
iv. Do your customers impose penalty clauses for late delivery or poor 
quality? (Please V below). 
yes Q no sometimes EI 
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Q21a. Do your suppliers have a cost advantage over your company for any given 
component, which was previously made in-house? (Please v"' below). 
yes no El sometimes El 
b. If yes, how significant is the cost advantage of your suppliers? 
under 5% EI 
5 to 10% 
II to 20% U 
over 20% 13 
Q22a. To what extent do your suppliers give cost discounts for bulk-buying? (Please 
,/ below). 
yes 13 no 13 sometimes LI 
b. If yes, how significant is the cost discount given by your suppliers? 
under 5% 13 
5 to 10% Q 
II to 20% El 
over 20% U 
c. Do you make or buy if the cost of making a component equals the cost of 
buying? (Please v*' below). 
make 0 buy El 
Thank you for your assistance. 
A full copy of the results will be sent to you in first quarter of 1999. 
Please return all completed questionnaires to the following address: 
Ian Jackson, Economics Division, Staffordshire University Business School, 
Leek Road, Stoke--on-Trent, Staffordshire, ST4 2DF 
If you have any questions please contact the following numbers: 
Telephone: - (0 1782) 294211 Fax: - (0 1782) 747006 E-mai I i. jackson@staffs. ac. uk 
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Appendix III: 
Pilot study 
Introduction 
The central feature of this research is the combination of published data, interviews 
and self-reported information in order to conduct the analysis. The published data is 
derived from company reports and accounts as well as listings in specialist business 
sources. The self-reported information is gathered primarily by a postal questionnaire 
and also by interviews with key respondents in selected companies. The companies 
range fi7om large multi-site, multi-nation aerospace companies, which occupy the 
position of prime contractor in the supply chain, to small and medium-sized suppliers. 
In order to establish a workable form of the questionnaire, a pilot version was tested 
on four firms in the North West region of England, which is an important area for 
aerospace in the UY, The aim of Appendix III is to report the detailed outcome of the 
pilot and to show the work in progress prior to the issue of the questionnaire. The 
Appendix reviews the nature of the population for the pilot and then assesses how the 
pilot study was developed. It will then report the findings of the work with the four 
firms in the pilot in greater detail than is possible in the main body of the thesis. 
Finally, there is a discussion on how the pilot improved and informed the final version 
of the questionnaire in each of the three sections. The next section discusses the 
development of the pilot questionnaire. 
The pilot questionnaire 
The pilot study began in June 1998 when fourteen aerospace companies were 
contacted by letter requesting their participation in the study. The sample was chosen 
by geographic location, since all the companies, which were contacted, have 
registered addresses in the North West region of England based on the SBAC 
membership list of May 1998, which accessed from the SBAC homepage. The North 
West is a highly strategic region for LJK aerospace. British Aerospace defence has 
sites at Samlesbury and Warton (and until 1993 at Preston), British Aerospace Airbus 
has sites at Broughton and Chadderton, British Aerospace Regional Aircraft has a site 
at Woodford, British Aerospace Dynamics has sites at Chorley and Lostock, plus 
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GEC-Ferranti is based in Oldham. Although British Aerospace has its registered 
headquarters in Farnborough, it is clear that the North West region is a very important 
area for the aerospace industry as a whole. In the defence sector alone, Warton is the 
final assembly point for the Hawk, Tornado and Eurofighter 2000, where defence 
accounts for 74.6% of the 1997 corporate turnover of British Aerospace, which is the 
LJK's biggest single aerospace company. It is for these compelling reasons that the 
North West region was chosen for the pilot study. From the fourteen companies that 
were contacted, four agreed to participate and the remaining seven did not respond to 
the letter. The latter companies were contacted by telephone, where two more 
companies agreed to participate, but in the final version of the questionnaire survey 
only. The response rate was 28.6% and overall the reaction from firms was variable. 
However, where companies did agree to participate, then the co-operation was 
excellent and the answers given were meaningful. 
The problem of whom to send the pilot questionnaire was overcome by telephoning 
the companies prior to sending the letter and asking the company receptionist. Whilst 
the replies given were well meaning, the request to participate in the pilot study may 
not have been received by the appropriate employee. The issue of finding the 
appropriate personnel to complete questionnaire surveys is highly significant and in 
part will determine the final response rate. The person with the appropriate 
knowledge and expertise needed to complete a questionnaire varies between 
companies. This was overcome in the final version of questionnaire through 
obtaining a complete list of companies and direct contact names supplied b SBAC. 
The list of contact names contained those specific personnel who have responsibility 
to complete or co-ordinate the company reply to the quarterly SBAC questionnaire. 
As a result the final questionnaire is accurately targeted against an up-to-date mailing 
list, which should improve the likelihood of increasing the response rate. 
The pilot questionnaire has two primary functions, namely to determine if companies 
have collected the data required and to establish if companies are willing to disclose 
the information. The aerospace industry remains a highly competitive environment 
where UK companies compete in many exacting global markets especially in North 
America. Therefore, commercial sensitivity is a vitally important consideration for 
civil markets, in addition to the military secrecy in defence markets. As a result, a 
meeting was requested with companies to discuss the views to make the questions as 
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meaningful as possible and acceptable for companies to answer in the wider 
population. The details of the four interviews are given below. 
Company One: Aero & Industrial Technology Limited 
NAME: Aero & Industrial Technology Limited 
BUSMESS: Combustion equipment manufacturers for 
aero and industrial gas turbines. 
TURNOVER: 
EMPLOYEES: 
AEROSPACE BUSINESS: 
M[ILITARY BUSINESS: 
NUMBER OF YEARS TRADING: 
MAKE: 
BUY: 
126 million 
500 
95% 
50% 
55 years 
67% 
33% 
MARGINAL MAKE OR BUY: Make 
ASSET SPECIFICITY: Very high 
UNCERTAINTY: Moderate 
FREQUENCY: Very high 
SMAI. LNUMBERS: Yes 
CONVETITION BETWEEN 
SUPPLIERS 
COMPETITIONFOR 
BUSINESS: 
UNIT PRICE OF 
TYPICAL PRODUCT: 
Medium 
Medium to high 
>1 100 - <1 100,000 
Aero & Industrial Technology Limited (AM is a medium-sized company, based in 
Burnley, Lancashire. It designs, develops, tests and manufactures combustion 
equipment for use in mainly aero and industrial gas turbines. Turnover is in excess of 
125 million with approximately 500 employees. The typical unit price of its products 
is between 1100 and 1100,000. It is primarily an aerospace company, with markets in 
Europe, North America and Australia. Business is divided 50-50 between civilian and 
military work. AIT is a fully owned subsidiary of Bimeo Industries. 
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Currently 33% of components are bought-out; five years ago this was 45%. This 
indicates that AIT is increasingly making a greater proportion of its products. Indeed, 
the marginal make or buy decision is make. This is supported by very high asset 
specificity for employees, dedicated assets, facilities and equipment. Location is also 
important to this company. 
Overall, AIT is a highly specialised aerospace component manufacturer, with 
significant vertical integration. It also forms part of a large number of aerospace 
suppliers in East Lancashire that is, Blackburn, Burnley, Nelson and Coln. This 
specific cluster of aerospace firms can be viewed as an industrial district, which 
benefits from economies of agglomeration and serves the British Aerospace and GEC 
sites on the Flyde coastline, namely BAe Samlesbury and Warton and GEC Preston. 
AIT is also a member of the Consortium of Lancashire Aerospace (CLA), which was 
set up to represent the relatively large number of aerospace suppliers in the Lancashire 
area. There is a similar organisation in the Bristol area named the West of England 
Aerospace Forum. 
Company Two: Aerospace Metals 
NAME: 
BUSINESS: 
TURNOVER: 
EMPLOYEES: 
AEROSPACE BUSINESS: 
MILITARY BUSINESS: 
NUMBER OF YEARS 
TRADING: 
MAKE: 
BUY: 
MARGINAL MAKE OR BUY: 
ASSET SPECIFICITY: 
UNCERTAINTY: 
FREQUENCY: 
SMALLNUMBERS: 
COMPETITIONBETWEEN 
Aerospace Metals 
Distribution and stockist of metals mainly 
for aerospace 
120 million 
50 
90% 
15% 
20 years 
50% 
50% 
Buy 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Yes 
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SUPPLIERS: Very low 
COMPETITIONFOR 
BUSINESS: Medium 
UNIT PRICE OF 
TYPICAL PRODUCT: >1100, <1100,000 
Aerospace Metals is a small to medium-sized company based in Bury, Lancashire. It 
is a stockist and distributor of primarily aircraft metals that range from raw material to 
partially machined metal parts. Approximately 11.5 million worth of stock is held at 
any given time, subject to world metal availability and prices. Just-in-Time and Total 
Quality Management policies of many aerospace manufactures, that results in these 
companies holding little stock, has had a profound effect on Aerospace Metals. It 
now has to hold more stock and deliver in shorter time periods. There is typically a 
lead-time of six to twelve months from the mills, but customers can request delivery 
in a matter of days. Indeed, whilst copper alloy, stainless steel and aluminium require 
six months, titanium can take up to twelve months to be delivered from the mills. In 
addition, smart and man-made materials, for example, carbon fibre composites are 
having an effect on the supply side of this market. As a result Aerospace Metals has 
been seeking new markets in medical equipment, marine and offshore construction. 
Another development is for customers to request certain orders to be part or fully 
machined. An order can often arrive with a bespoke specification for machining 
attached. As a result the company has invested in additional cutting equipment 
including laser, water jet and CNC. The overwhelming majority of this turning and 
machining is performed in-house. This is because of the large value added involved 
and the fact that the company is keen to develop a metal service centre. It is clear that 
for many machine tasks performed on the raw metal, then it is more cost-efficient for 
Aerospace Metals to undertake this activity, as a metal stockist, than for the aerospace 
manufacturers themselves. 
Another recent development in May 1998 was the acquisition by Aerospace Metals by 
AM Castle (USA) one of the top three metal distributors in the world. AM Castle has 
an annual turnover of $750 million and hold $200 million of stock at any given time. 
The UK operation will be relocated to Blackburn, Lancashire and as a result of this 
horizontal merger there will be more new business and a further development the 
value-added areas of work in the metal service centre. 
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Company Three: Bellhouse Hartwell & Company Limited 
NAME: Bellhouse Hartwell & Co. Ltd. 
BUSINESS: Aircraft equipment manufacturers 
TURNOVER: 115 million 
EMPLOYEES: 325 
AEROSPACE BUSINESS: 98% 
MILITARY BUSINESS: 60% 
NUMBER OF YEARS TRADING: 50 years 
MAKE: 8(YYo 
BUY: 201% 
MARGINAL MAKE OR BUY: Make 
ASSET 
SPECIFICITY: Low 
UNCERTAINTY: Moderate 
FREQUENCY: High 
SMALLNUMBERS: No 
COMPETITION BETWEEN 
SUPPLIERS: Medium 
COMPETITIONFOR. 
BUSINESS: Medium 
UNIT PRICE FOR TYPICAL 
PRODUCT: >. voo, <1100,000 
Bellhouse Hartwell and Company Limited (BHW) is a medium-sized company based 
in Westhoughton, Lancashire. it is principally an airframe component manufacturer. 
Turnover is approximately L15 million with 325 employees. The company has a 
considerable produce range and will bid for a wide variety of work connected with 
aircraft parts that is, manufacture, overhaul and servicing. As such, it is primarily an 
aerospace company, which undertakes both military and civilian work. It is currently 
making 10% profit on turnover, but its export markets are less than 0.5% of turnover. 
The main customer is British Aerospace: civilian airbus work from Chadderton and 
various military work from Samlesbury and Warton. Location is very important to 
BHW, since four British Aerospace sites are within a 20-mile radius, from its factory, 
which generates a location advantage when bidding for work from BAE-Systems. 
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BHW endeavours to maintain as much work as possible in-house in order to keep the 
factory at near full capacity, although the asset specificity is low (other than location). 
In total, whilst BHW specialise in aerospace, it is essentially a general engineering 
company. However, it has won some important contracts in recent months from 
British Aerospace (Airbus and Defence), that has previously been performed by 
British Aerospace in-house. Therefore, a combination of aircraft expertise and 
relatively low overheads has given BHW a competitive edge over not only other 
competitors, but also internal divisions within British Aerospace. Since British 
Aerospace are finding the global aerospace markets to be even more competitive, they 
are looking to sub-contract even greater amounts of work to companies fiirther down 
the supply chain, including some work which has previously been performed in- 
house. Indeed, British Aerospace are viewing other divisions and sites as simply 
another source of supply which has to compete for work as indeed they were prior to 
nationalisation and merger. The beneficiaries of this policy are companies like BHW, 
who often can produce work using fewer man-hours and at a lower labour rate. 
Company Four. - Didsbury Engineering Limited 
NAME: Didsbury Engineering 
BUSINESS: Manufacturer of boists, wincbes and 
related equipment for lifling and lowering 
personnel and equipment 
TURNOVER: f3 million 
EMPLOYEES: 36 
AEROSPACE BUSINESS: 22% 
MILITARY BUSINESS: 57% 
NUMBER OF YEARS TRADING: 58 years 
MAKE: 20% 
BUY: 80% 
MARGINAL MAKE OR BUY: Buy 
ASSET SPECIFICITY: Very low 
UNCERTAINTY: Low 
FREQUENCY: Low to moderate 
SMALLNUMBERS: Yes 
COMPETITION BETWEEN 
257 
SUPPLIERS: Medium 
COMPETITION FOR BUSINESS: Medium 
UNIT PRICE OF TYPICAL 
PRODUCT: >1100, <100,000 
Didsbury Engineering is a small sized company based in Levershulme, Manchester. 
It is a manufacturer of specialist lifting equipment including hoists, winches and 
safety rope. It serves aviation and public utilities markets as well as the defence 
industry and defence ministries. The products allow precision handling of materials 
(including munitions) and personnel from ships, aircraft and armoured vehicles. A 
quarter of its business is aerospace, but over half its turnover is generated from 
military markets. 
Asset specificity is very low. Most employees have a general engineering background 
and the factory itself used to produce chocolate before 1940. In general, the 
frequency is low, and business is conducted through trade fairs and repeat business, 
but up over many years, plus a good reputation for quality and reliability. 
The two main aspects of production are castings and fabrication. Only a small 
proportion of the fabrication of materials is undertaken in-house and there is a strong 
network of suppliers. Castings and machining is increasingly being sub-contracted. 
Approximately 15 to 20 years ago a larger part of the casting and machining was 
engineered in-house. Since this period less and less is sourced in -house, because it is 
more economic to procure from more specialist engineering companies. Suprisingly a 
great deal of the casting and machining could still be achieved in-house, as the 
facilities still remain. However, this is only used in periods of excess demand and the 
company has continued with its policy to outsource wherever possible, and whenever 
it is the lowest cost option. 
Overall, the company trades very heavily on goodwill and a strong reputation for 
branded products such as Minilift, E2i-lift and talking rope. As a result they have 
only a small sales team. Instead, there is a strong customer support unit, which co- 
operates very closely with the requirements of the client, who range from haulage 
companies to the Ministry of Defence. 
Finally, to supplement the pilot study contact has been made with personnel at several 
British Aerospace and Rolls Royce sites throughout the UK. Visits have been made 
to British Aerospace at Samlesbury, Stevenage and Warton, as well as visits to Rolls 
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Royce at Derby, Filton and Hillingdon. These visits have served two important 
functions. Firstly, an overall appreciation of the aerospace industry has been gained. 
British Aerospace is one of Europe's biggest aerospace and defence companies and 
remains the largest single UK manufacturer of fixed-wing aircraft. Rolls Royce is one 
of the world's biggest engine manufacturers with a strong presence in both civil and 
military aeroengine markets in Europe and North America. It remains the only 
aeroengine manufacturer in the UK. Secondly, several personnel at both companies 
have made detailed comments on the questionnaire and provided general advice on 
the workings of the aerospace sector. In sum, the guidance that has been given 
without prejudice has enabled a detailed picture of the aerospace industry to be gained 
on both production and procurement (make or buy) issues. 
Conclusions 
The pilot has confirmed that UK aerospace firms do tend to hold the relevant 
information to conduct a transaction cost questionnaire. The statement of purpose for 
the questionnaire is focused on the make-or-buy decisions of UK aerospace 
companies. The aim is to establish the reasoning behind production and procurement 
decisions and to identify the supply chain matrix in the aerospace industry, in addition 
to those industries, which supply from other sectors. Sub-groups within the 
population have been specified as military and civil companies, aerospace and non- 
aerospace companies, plus high technology and heavy-industry groupings. The 
population is also assessed in terms of company size, company location and number 
of years the company has been trading. 
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Aimendix IV: Descrintive statistics of the kev nuestionnaire variahles 
Variable 
Name 
Number 
(N) 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Pi 82 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.11 
P2 82 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.47 
P3 82 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49 
P4 82 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 
P5 82 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 
T97 80 1.10 8546 234.76 1074.97 
T92 71 0.75 11508 270.99 1426.36 
E97 82 14.00 43400 1818.53 6866.89 
E92 82 5.00 87400 2544.28 11401.53 
A97 82 2.00 100 71.52 29.27 
A92 82 0.00 100.00 67.03 30.47 
M97 82 0.00 100.00 27.51 29.89 
M92 82 0.00 100.00 29.81 30.70 
B097 68 1.00 100.00 53.88 30.81 
B092 61 1.00 100.00 50.11 29.65 
CA97 58 1.00 100.00 54.23 31.72 
CA92 54 1.00 100.00 50.64 31.88 
MA97 55 1.00 100.00 47.95 33.12 
MA92 51 1.00 100.00 47.15 30.83 
EUIPAS 82 1.00 10.00 7.41 1.80 
FACAS 82 1.00 10.00 6.51 2.83 
SUBIHGH 82 0.00 1.00 0.4024 0.49 
SUBLOW 82 0.00 1.00 0.1585 0.37 
DEDAS 82 1.00 10.00 6.19 2.86 
LOCATION 82 0.00 7000.00 661.91 1478.89 
CLOSELOC 82 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 
DEMDEL 82 1.00 10.00 6.21 2.37 
TIME 82 1.00 1000.00 201.34 220.30 
ISUPDEL 821 1.001 10-O! j 4.89 
261 
SUPRELI 82 0.00 1.00 0.84 0.36 
ONEOFF 82 1.00 10.00 7.00 2.49 
ORDER 82 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 
SUPNUM 82 1.00 10.00 4.91 2.68 
SUP75 82 1.00 200.00 18.01 27.62 
SUPIMP 82 1.00 98 29.66 22.76 
CUSNUM 82 1.00 10.00 5.08 2.77 
CUS75 82 1.00 300.00 20.67 37.27 
cusump 82 4.00 100.00 27.98 21.53 
MAKE 82 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.49 
BUY 82 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49 
LOW 82 1.00 4.00 2.62 1.21 
IUGHQ 82 1.00 4.00 1.96 0.91 
DELDATE 82 1.00 4.00 2.80 0.95 
SUPREL 82 1.00 4.00 2.61 1.20 
SUPCONYES 82 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.50 
SUPCONP 82 0.00 2.00 0.69 0.75 
CUSCONY 82 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.46 
CUSCONO 82 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.19 
CUSCONP 82 0.00 2.00 1.07 0.71 
SUPCAYES 82 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41 
SUPCANO 82 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 
CUSCAYES 82 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.47 
CUSCANO 82 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47 
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Appendix V: Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Definition 
ABI Annual Business Inquiry 
AECMA European Association of Aerospace Industries 
AES Annual Employment Survey 
AIA Aerospace Industries of America 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
AWM Advantage West Midlands 
BAE British Aerospace p1c. 
CAD Computer Aided Design 
CAM Computer Aided Manufacture 
CARAD Civil Aircraft Research and Technology Demonstration 
CNC Computer Numerically Controlled 
DERA Defence Evaluation and Research Agency 
DIB Defence Industrial Base 
DMA Defence Manufactures Association 
DoD Department of Defense 
DPA Defence Procurement Agency 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
EU European Union 
EADS European Aeronautical Defence Space 
F Frequency 
FAME Financial Access Made Easy 
FUMA Future Unmanned Aircraft 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GEC General Electric Company 
GKN Guest, Keen, Nettlefolds 
GM General Motors 
HO Null Hypothesis 
HA Alternative Hypothesis 
IDDS International Defence Disarmament Studies 
JSF Joint Strike Fighter 
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MBDA Matra, BAE, Dynamics, Aerospatiale 
ME Military Expenditure 
MIC Military Industrial Complex 
MLU Mid Life Update 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NCE Neo Classical Economics 
NS National Statistics 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PE Procurement Executive 
PSBR Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
QSE Qualified Scientists and Engineers 
RLFC Rugby League Football Club 
ROF Royal Ordnance Factory 
RR Rolls Royce plc 
SBAC Society of British Aerospace Companies 
SCP Structure, Conduct, Performance 
SE Standard Error 
sic Standard Industrial Classification 
SMMT Society of Motor Manufactures and Traders 
TSR-2 Tactical, Strike, Reconnaissance 
TC Transaction Costs 
TCE Transaction Cost Economics 
TD Technical Drawing 
R&D Research and Development 
RAF Royal Air Force 
SCRIA Supply Chain Relationships in Aerospace 
UKAI United Kingdom Aerospace Industry 
USA United States of America 
USSR Union Soviet Socialist Republics 
VSEL Vickers Shipbuilding Engineering Limited 
VSTOL Vertical, Short Take-off and Landing 
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Appendix V: Variable Listing 
Variable Name Variable Derinition 
A92 Aerospace in 1992 
A97 Aerospace in 1997 
AERO Aerospace-Non-Aerospace Split 
AS Asset Specificity 
B092 Bought-out in 1992 
B097 Bought-out in 1997 
BUY Buy Proportion 
CA92 Civil Aerospace Proportion in 1992 
CA97 Civil Aerospace Proportion in 1997 
CLOSELOC Close Location 
CUS75 Top 75% of Customers 
CUSCANO No Customer Cost Advantage 
CUSCAYES Customer Cost Advantage 
CUSCONY Contract with Customer 
CUSCONO No Contract with Customer 
CUSCONP Customer Contract Price 
CUSIMP Customer Importance 
CUSNUM Number of Customers 
DEDAS Dedicated Assets 
DELDATE Delivery Date Criteria 
DEMDEL Change in Demand 
E92 Employment in 1992 
E97 Employment in 1997 
EMPAS Employment Asset Specificity 
F Frequency 
FACAS Facilities Asset Specificity 
HIGHP High Price Criteria 
LOCATION Location Asset Specificity 
LOW Low Price Criteria 
M92 Military Proportion in 1992 
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M97 Military Proportion in 1997 
MA92 Military Aerospace Proportion in 1992 
MA97 Military Aerospace Proportion in 1997 
MAKE Make Proportion 
MIILCIV Military-Civil Split 
ONEOFF Frequency of Transaction 
ORDER Order Size of Transaction 
Pi Price Category I 
P2 Price Category 2 
P3 Price Category 3 
P4 Price Category 4 
P5 Price Category 5 
SIZE Size of Firm 
SLJBIIIGH Sub-Contract in High Demand 
SUBLOW Sub-Contract in Low Demand 
SUP75 Top 75% of Suppliers 
SUPCANO No Supplier Cost Advantage 
SUPCAYES Supplier Cost Advantage 
SUPCONYES Supplier Contract 
SUPCONP Supplier Contract Price 
SUPDEL Change in Supply 
SUPRVIP Supplier Importance 
SUPNUM Number of Suppliers 
SUPREL Reliability of Supply Criteria 
SUPRELI Supplier Reliability 
T92 Turnover in 1992 
T97 Turnover in 1997 
TC Transaction Costs 
TIME Time in Contracts 
U Uncertainty 
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Adverse selection: the self-selection of high risk economic agents in a population, 
which was originally observed in insurance markets. 
Aerospace: economic activity where firms are involved in the design, development, 
production, repair and support services of aircraft and helicopters for military and 
civil markets, together with missiles and space systems and related equipment, parts 
and components. 
Asset specificity: the degree to which an asset is explicit or definite to any given 
transaction with little or no alternative use. 
Asymmetric information: the situation where economic agents have unequal access 
to information in an agreement, contract or transaction. 
Bi-lateral monopoly: a monopolist and monopsonist co-existing in the same market. 
Bought-out: the percentage of components, parts and/or services purchased from the 
market rather than made in-house. 
Bounded rationality: the limit to an individuals ability to gather and process 
information in a given transaction. 
Complexity: the degree to which a transaction is complicated or difficult. 
Components: parts or sub-assemblies used in manufacturing. 
Contract design: the creation of legal agreements. 
Frequency: the extent to which a transaction is repeat or one-off. 
Governance structures: the way in which firms are interrially organised. 
Hold-up problem: where one firm can hold another hostage in the supply chain due 
to asset specificity. 
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Idiosyncratic investment: alterriative phrase for asset specificity. 
Ink costs: the costs incurred from changes in a written contract or agreement. 
Make-or-buy: the choice between producing in-house and buying from the market. 
Moral hazard: the tendency for economic agents to be less careful when insured. 
Outsourcing: another phrase for purchasing from the market. 
Opportunism: the chance to take advantage in a transaction, especially where there is 
asset specificity. 
Quasi-rent: the cost of the next best alternative for an asset. 
Small numbers exchange: the number of suppliers in any given transaction. 
Structure-Conduct-Performance: the paradigm for assessing market concentration, 
behaviour and operation. 
Sub-contractors: firms employed by other firms to perform a task. 
Supplier-switching: the extent to which a buyer can swap between suppliers. 
Supply chain: a metaphor for business-to-business relationships. 
Transaction costs: the costs of using the market, where there are ex anle costs 
(bargaining and search) and expost costs (monitoring and enforcement). 
Uncertainty: a situation where there is non-measurable risk. 
Vertical integration: the extent to which firms incorporate the production process 
upstream with distribution and downstream with parts and components. 
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